Wooten v. Csx Rr.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2005 CA 4.,2005 CA 4.
• Citation: 2005 Ohio 6252,842 N.E.2d 603,164 Ohio App.3d 428
• Parties: WOOTEN et al., Appellants, v. CSX RAILROAD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

842 N.E.2d 603

164 Ohio App.3d 428

2005-Ohio-6252

WOOTEN et al., Appellants, v. CSX RAILROAD et al., Appellees.

No. 2005 CA 4.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Miami County.

Decided November 23, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gary J. Leppla, Dayton, for appellants.

James L. O'Connell and James F. Brockman, Cincinnati, for appellee CSX Transportation, Inc.

Steven G. Laforge and Jeffery J. Sniderman, Columbus, for appellees Miami County Board of Commissioners and Douglas Christian.

Jeffery C. Turner and Boyd W. Gentry, Dayton, for appellee Board of Trustees of Staunton Township.

WOLFF, Judge.

{¶ 1} Amber Wooten appeals from a judgment of the Miami County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"); the Board of Trustees of Staunton Township ("Staunton Township"); the Miami County Board of Commissioners and Miami County Engineer Douglas Christian (collectively, "Miami County").

{¶ 2} The following facts are undisputed.

{¶ 3} At approximately 9:30 a.m. on July 25, 2001, Amber Wooten was driving her infant daughter, Ashley, to visit the child's father. Ashley was riding in the back of Wooten's vehicle, a 2001 Chevy Cavalier. As part of her route, Wooten traveled east on Peterson Road in Staunton Township, Miami County, Ohio. Peterson Road runs east and west and is intersected by a railroad that runs north and south. The crossing was indicated by a railroad "crossbuck" sign, and a white stop bar was painted on the road beside the sign. The crossing was not equipped with active warning devices, such as flashing lights or a gate. On July 25, 2001, a field of mature corn occupied the land on the southwest quadrant of the Peterson Road intersection. The corn was approximately seven feet high.

{¶ 4} As Wooten approached the crossing from the west, a northbound train operated by CSX also approached the crossing. The train was controlled by Larry Terrell, the engineer, and Randolph Napier, the conductor, both long-time CSX employees. Terrell began blowing the train's whistle as he passed the whistle signal. When the train was approximately 100 feet south of the crossing, Terrell observed Wooten's car "come out from behind the corn field" about 25 feet west of the tracks. Wooten testified in her deposition that she had a habit of approaching train tracks at a speed of approximately 15 miles per hour and of stopping before the tracks (at approximately the stop bar) to look and listen for a train. In contrast, Terrell testified in his deposition that Wooten approached the crossing very slowly and stopped on the tracks, with a part of her car about four feet east of the western-most rail; Wooten then looked down the line at the train. Terrell "put the train in emergency" and made an exclamation of alarm. Napier looked up and saw Wooten — her car stopped on the track — looking at the train. Terrell placed an emergency call to the CSX dispatcher.

{¶ 5} The CSX train hit the front right passenger side of Wooten's vehicle and pushed it approximately 25 feet along the track. The train traveled approximately 1,800 feet past the crossing before coming to a halt. Wooten suffered serious injuries, including severe injuries to her head and face. Ashley suffered only minor injuries.

{¶ 6} On July 17, 2003, Wooten, Ashley, and Wooten's mother, Diane Litton, brought suit against CSX, Miami County, and Staunton Township in the Miami County Court of Common Pleas, alleging several common-law negligence claims. With regard to CSX, the plaintiffs claimed that the railroad had negligently failed to (1) exercise proper caution when approaching the crossing, (2) remove obstructive vegetation, (3) install lights and gates at the crossing, and (4) reduce the train's speed due to the visually obstructive vegetation at the crossing. They further claimed that Miami County and Staunton Township breached their duty to maintain Peterson Road and keep it clear of nuisance, i.e., the obstructive vegetation.

{¶ 7} The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on February 2, 2005. The court held that Staunton Township had no duty to maintain Peterson Road, a county highway, and that Miami County's maintenance of Peterson Road did not proximately cause Wooten's injuries. The court emphasized that the corn was grown entirely on private property and did not extend into the county's right-of-way. As for CSX, the court noted that the train had been operated within its authorized speed, and it "[found] no factual support for [Wooten's] argument that even if speed has been preempted by federal statutes, a local safety hazard theory creates a genuine issue of fact." The court further stated: "Photographs in this case establish the corn did not severely obstruct the motorist's view of the tracks or trains on the track. The photographs establish that a vehicle could stop within the fifteen feet from the nearest rail as mandated by R.C. 4511.62 and look down the tracks to see an approaching train." The court noted that the evidence "conclusively established" that the train had sounded its whistle, and the corn was not growing on the railroad's property or right-of-way. Accordingly, the court found that CSX was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claims against it.

{¶ 8} Our review of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is de novo. See Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 703 N.E.2d 841. Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment may be granted when the moving party demonstrates that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. See State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66, 8 O.O.3d 73, 375 N.E.2d 46.

{¶ 9} Wooten raises two assignments of error on appeal.

{¶ 10} I. "The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CSX Transportation, Inc., after failing to consider all evidence, after improperly weighing the evidence and after otherwise resolving a factual issue in favor of CSX upon which reasonable minds could differ."

{¶ 11} In her first assignment of error, Wooten claims that the trial court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the corn constituted an obstructive condition. She asserts that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence and failed to consider the affidavit of her expert, Dr. William Berg. She further argues that CSX had a duty to take steps to ensure the safety of the crossing, such as "the removal of obstructions, speed of operation, enhanced measures to warn motorists, and operational modifications, where there is a specific awareness * * * that vegetation impaired a clear and open view at the subject crossing." Wooten concludes: "The summary dismissal of claims upon this basis, upon factual conclusions reached through the court's personal inspection of photographs, is completely contrary to the purpose and policy of Civil Rule 56."

{¶ 12} A. Federal Preemption under the Federal Railroad Safety Act

{¶ 13} As an initial matter, we note that CSX has argued that Wooten's claims regarding the lack of adequate warning devices and the train's speed are preempted by federal law.

{¶ 14} The Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA") was enacted, in part, to "maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem." Section 20134(a), Title 49, U.S.Code; see Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. (C.A.6, 2004), 369 F.3d 978 ("Shanklin II"). The FRSA gives the United States Secretary of Transportation powers to "prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety," Section 20103, Title 49, U.S.Code, and provides that all "[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railway safety * * * shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable," Section 20106, Title 49, U.S.Code. See, also, Shanklin II, 369 F.3d at 985; In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 257, 626 N.E.2d 85. The statute includes a saving clause that reads: "A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation * * * prescribes a regulation or issues an order * * * covering the subject matter of the State requirement." Section 20106. A state may also "adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order (1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard; (2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and (3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce." Id.

{¶ 15} Thus, under the statutory scheme, state-law negligence claims are preempted by the FRSA if they attempt to impose a regulation in an area that is already occupied by the statute. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood (1993), 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387; Freeman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 611, 635 N.E.2d 310. However, where a local safety hazard exists, an otherwise preempted common-law negligence claim may remain viable due to the FRSA's saving clause. Id.

{¶ 16} Wooten claims that CSX should have installed additional active warning devices to warn motorists of an oncoming train at the Peterson Road crossing. In Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin (2000), 529 U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 ("Shanklin"), the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that where federal funds participate in...