Cary v. State
Decision Date | 14 December 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. PD–0445–15,PD–0445–15 |
Parties | David Frederick Cary, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
John Michael Helms Jr., for David Cary.
Lisa McMinn, Joseph Peter Corcoran, Jessica Manojlovich, for State of Texas.
Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keller, P.J., Johnson, Keasler, Alcala, Richardson, Yeary, and Newell, JJ ., joined.
David Cary was convicted by a jury of six counts of bribery, one count of money laundering, and one count of engaging in organized criminal activity. His punishment was assessed at fourteen years' confinement on each count to run concurrently with one day credit. He appealed the judgments of conviction, and a unanimous panel of the court of appeals found that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, entering an acquittal on each count. David Cary v. State , 460 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2015). The issue in this case is whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard for legal sufficiency.2 We conclude that it did not, and we will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
David's wife, Stacy Cary, was also convicted in a companion case on six counts of bribery, one count of money laundering, and one count of engaging in organized criminal activity. Stacy Cary v. State , No. 05–12–01421–CR, 2014 WL 4261233 (Tex. App.–Dallas Aug. 28, 2014) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication). The panel that decided her case affirmed her convictions. Id. Today, we reversed the judgment of that panel and rendered acquittals on each count because the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. Stacy Cary v. State , No. PD–1341–14, 507 S.W.3d 750, 759–60, 2016 WL 7856534 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2016). For the same reasons that we discussed in that opinion, we affirm the judgment of the court in this case rendering an acquittal on each count.3
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 251.001(2) –(7).
The court of appeals held that the evidence is insufficient to support David's bribery convictions because the State failed to prove that the benefits offered to Wooten were something other than political contributions. David Cary , 460 S.W.3d at 738 ; see TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(b) ( ), 36.02(a)(1)–(2), (d) (bribery and political-contribution exception). In doing so, the court rejected the State's argument that a jury could have inferred that the contributions were not political ones because David intended to "bribe" Wooten and "engaged in several deceptive practices to prevent the funds from being traced to him." David Cary , 460 S.W.3d at 737. It explained that a "political contribution" is a contribution given with the intent that it be used in a campaign for elected office and that, in this case, the evidence showed just that—David offered Wooten benefits through Spencer to fund Wooten's campaign to unseat Sandoval. Id. ; see TEX. ELEC. CODE § 251.001(5). It also pointed out that, if the State fails to negate the political-contribution exception, David's intent to "bribe" and his deceptive acts to hide the source of the money are irrelevant. David Cary , 460 S.W.3d at 737.
The State first argues that the court of appeals erred in its legal-sufficiency analysis. It also contends that the lower court mistakenly focused on the ultimate use of Stacy's money in Wooten's campaign instead of looking to the subjective intent at the time the contribution was made, as required by the Election Code. According to the State, this latter analytical error was the "fundamental misconception upon which the lower court foundered." State's Brief on the Merits at 26. Finally, the State asserts that the court of appeals failed to properly apply the standard for legal sufficiency because it did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to David's convictions. Instead, the State contends that the court's analysis was more akin to a factual-sufficiency review and that it harkened back to our discarded pre-Geesa standard, requiring the State to negate every reasonable hypothesis other than that establishing the guilt of the accused. Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Geesa v. State , 820 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ( ).
When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction, the only standard an appellate court should apply is the Jackson v. Virginia test for legal sufficiency. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 895 (plurality op.). Under that standard, the State must prove each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(22) ( ). This requirement, however, does not obligate the State to disprove every innocent explanation of the evidence before a jury can find a defendant guilty. See Tate v. State , 500 S.W.3d 410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App.2016). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In this analysis, the arguments of the parties are of no consequence because arguments are not evidence. Hutch v. State , 922 S.W.2d 166, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (plurality op.) (). To the extent that a reviewing court relies on such in a legal-sufficiency analysis, it does so in error.
The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict because it is "the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. This standard "impinges upon 'jury' discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law," and it prevents the reviewing c...
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...argument). Jury argument, however, is not evidence; therefore, it cannot be the foundation of a false testimony claim. See Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting that, in sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis, "the arguments of the parties are of no consequence bec......
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Wooten v. Roach, Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-380
...the Carys were not actually a crime pursuant to the relevant statutes. Stacy Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 750 (2016) ; David Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 761 (2016). Based on these holdings, on May 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Application for 11.072 Writ of Habeas Corpus Declarin......
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...... the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas,. in Cause Number 13-16388; The State of Texas vs. Bartholomew Granger. Ex parte Granger, No. WR-83,135-01,. 2017 WL 3379285, at *l-2 (Tex. Crim. App. May 17, 2017). ... argument). Jury argument, however, is not evidence;. therefore, it cannot be the foundation of a false testimony. claim. See Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting that, in sufficiency-of-the-evidence. analysis, "the arguments of the ......
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...the Carys were not actually a crime pursuant to the relevant statutes. Stacy Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 750 (2016) ; David Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 761 (2016).Based on these holdings, on May 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Application for 11.072 Writ of Habeas Corpus Declaring......