Wooton & Wooton v. Hinkle

• Decision Date: 31 January 1855
• Parties: WOOTON & WOOTON, Respondents, v. HINKLE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

20 Mo. 290

WOOTON & WOOTON, Respondents,

v.HINKLE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1855.

1. Partition sale set aside, where it appeared that the bidders, for the purpose of obtaining the property at a sacrifice, agreed that one should become the purchaser, and the others refrain from bidding, in consideration of sharing the benefits of the purchase.

Appeal from Lafayette Circuit Court.

This was a proceeding to set aside a partition sale of certain real estate, of which Hinkle became the purchaser. The cause was submitted to the court without a jury, and the following facts were found;

Before the sale, Samuel B. Shannon, John S. Shannon and Captain Trigg agreed among themselves to purchase the land at the sale, provided it did not sell for more than twelve dollars per acre, and authorized S. B. Shannon to attend the sale, and bid that price for the land. In pursuance of this agreement, S. B. Shannon attended the sale, and when the land was put up by the sheriff, bid the first time three dollars per acre. There were between thirty and fifty persons present at the sale. Hinkle was not present at first, but afterwards came up, and after making some inquiries, commenced bidding for the land. Several bids were made by Hinkle and S. B. Shannon respectively. Shannon having made the last bid. Hinkle took him aside, and it was then agreed between them that Hinkle should bid off the land, and the same should be equally divided between them. They then returned to the place of sale; Hinkle made a bid over Shannon's last bid, and Shannon, in pursuance of the agreement, refrained from bidding any more. The land was knocked off to Hinkle at six dollars and fifty cents an acre, or about one half its value. There were no other bidders present at the sale. The court further found that the agreement between Hinkle and Shannon was made for the purpose of preventing competition between them. Upon these facts the court declared the law to be that the agreement between Hinkle and Shannon was a fraud upon the owners, and accordingly set aside the sale.

Hinkle, the purchaser, filed a motion for a review of the facts and law, which was overruled, and he appealed to this court.

Hayden, Napton, and Morrow, for appellant, cited Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Metcalf, 384; Small v. Jones, 1 Watts & Serg. 136; 2 Const. (S. C.) 821; 3 Gilmer, 529; 11 Paige, 431; 2 Kent's Comm. (7th ed.) 700.

J. R. Troxwell, for respondents, cited 1 Story's Eq. Juris, p. 310, § 293 and authorities there cited. (Blight's Heirs v. Tobin, 7 Monroe, 612; Mills v. Rogers, 2 Littell's [Ky.] 217.)

SCOTT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

There was a motion made for a review of the facts found, but as, in our opinion, the evidence warranted the finding of the court, we shall proceed to examine the questions of law arising upon the record as presented.

At one time, the law in England seemed to be settled that the employment of puffers at auctions was illegal. (Bexwell v. Christie, Cowp. 395.) Afterwards, acts of parliament imposing a duty on sales of estates at auction, created a different opinion, and seem to have sanctioned the practice. (Sug. on Vend. 24; 1 Fonb. 178.)

In America, where the subject has not been controlled by legislation, the opinion is generally entertained that it is against sound policy and fair dealing to employ a person to bid secretly for the owner against a bona fide bidder at a public auction. (2 Kent, 539.)

According to Cicero, a vendor ought not to appoint a puffer to raise the price, nor ought a purchaser to appoint a person to depreciate the value, of an estate intended to be sold. And Huber lays it down that if a vendor employs a puffer, he shall be compelled to sell the estate to the highest bona fide bidder, because it is against the faith of the agreement, by which it is stipulated that the highest bidder shall be the buyer. (Sug. 23.)

Our laws would be justly chargeable with the censure of neglecting the interests of the vendors, if, while they prohibited them from employing puffers at auctions of their estates, they suffered purchasers, by unjust combinations among themselves, to obtain their property at a sacrifice. But our law is not obnoxious to this censure. While, on the one hand, it protects purchasers from the influence of fictitious biddings and false appearances produced by the conduct of puffers; on the other, it equally protects the rights of the...