Worcester Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellis
| Decision Date | 13 September 1935 |
| Parties | WORCESTER BANK & TRUST CO. v. ELLIS et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Proceedings between Worcester Bank & Trust Company, executor and Mary G. Ellis and others. From a decree denying a petition for proof of an alleged will of Theodore T. Ellis the petitioner and the Memorial Hospital of Worcester appeal.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Probate Court, Worcester County; F. H. chamberlain, judge.
R. G. Dodge and H. S. Davis, both of Boston, and M. S. June, of Worcester, for petitioner.
G. H. Mirick, D. Whitcomb, and P. R. O'Connell, all of Worcester, submitted a brief for Mary G. Ellis.
T. H. Gage and W. E. Sibley, both of Worcester, submitted a brief for Memorial Hospital.
C. B. Rugg and W. F. Farr, both of Boston, for Charles H. Ellis and another.
On March 24, 1927, Theodore T. Ellis executed a typewritten will, which had been drawn for him by competent counsel. Ellis was a highly successful business man, positive, impulsive and headstrong, who had accumulated an estate of more than $2,000,000. He had a wife, Mary Gertrude Ellis, but no children. Clause 1 of the will gave his wife his household effects. Clauses 2 to 6 inclusive gave comparatively small pecuniary legacies to his ‘ brothers' except Charles, and to various friends. Clause 7 gave to each employee of the New England Fibre Blanket Company, which Ellis controlled, $250 for each full year in its employ. Clause 8 gave $25,000 to a trustee, for his brother Charles for life with remainder to the Trustees of the Memorial Hospital in Worcester. Clause 9 gave $25,000 to a trustee for his sister Blanche E. Leonard for life, with a similar remainder. Clause 10 gave $10,000 to a trustee, for his cousin Alfred J. Singleton for life, with remainder to Singleton's wife and children. Clause 11 gave $10,000 to a trustee, for an aunt Sarah A. Bentley of Southport, England, for life, with remainder to the Trustees of the Memorial Hospital in Worcester. Clause 12 gave his stock in the New England Fibre Blanket Company to a trustee to sell, and pay over the proceeds to the Trustees of the Memorial Hospital in Worcester. Clause 13 gave $500,000 to a trustee, for his wife Mary Gertrude Ellis for life, with a right to use principal for her support, and with remainder to the Trustees of the Memorial Hospital in Worcester. Clause 14 gave $100,000 to a trustee, to be used for scholarships in higher schools of learning. Clause 15 gave all the residue to the Trustees of the Memorial Hospital in Worcester. By clause 16 the Worcester Bank & Trust Company was appointed executor.
On October 2, 1933, Ellis consulted the same counsel for the purpose of having a new will drawn. He said that he did not wish the Worcester Bank & Trust Company to be executor or trustee, that several legatees in the will had died, and that he wished to limit the legacies given to employees of the New England Fibre Blanket Company. He said that he wished to give his associates in that company an option to buy his stock. He said further that the liberal provision in his will for the Memorial Hospital in Worcester had been made out of respect for a physician with whom he had since had unsatisfactory relations in a commercial venture, and that he did not intend to make any such gift to the hospital in his proposed will.
At another interview on October 17, 1933, Ellis told counsel that he had not made up his mind what to do. On October 22, 1933, Ellis brought the will of March 24, 1927, to counsel. With a lead pencil, marks had been drawn in the form of the letter X through the whole or the essential provisions of clauses 1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 14 and 15, and parts of clauses 7 and 13, and single lines had been drawn through clauses 4 and 5 and the essential provisions of clauses 13 and 16. In clauses 6 and 8 a change in the amount of the legacy had been made by pencil. Neither the attestation clause, which followed closely upon clause 16, nor the signature, had been disturbed. Ellis told counsel of several changes, not theretofore mentioned, which were to be included in the proposed will.
Notwithstanding the advice of counsel at several interviews, not to leave the situation as it was ‘ because it was leaving matters up in the air,’ Ellis did nothing definite about settling or executing a new will before leaving for England late in November, 1933. He died in London on January 6, 1934.
Upon a petition for the proof of the will of March 24, 1927, the Probate Court decided that it had been revoked, and disallowed it. The executor named in the will, and the Memorial Hospital of Worcester (admittedly the residuary legatee under the will), appealed.
Under our statute (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 191, § 8), a will once properly executed can be revoked only by a new document executed as required for a will (Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164, 102 N.E. 487, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 906), by change of circumstances giving rise to a revocation implied by law (Swan v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 45, 52 Am.Rep. 255; Meyerovitz v. Jacobovitz, 263 Mass. 47, 50, 160 N.E. 331), or ‘ by burning, tearing, cancelling or obliterating it with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself or by a person in his presence and by his direction.’ The quoted words are our only concern in this case. In fact, the case narrows down to the word ‘ cancelling.’ Substantially the same language can be traced back in our statutes to Rev. St. 1836, c. 62, § 9, St. 1783, c. 24, § 2, and St. 1692-93, c. 15, § 4. The last cited section formed part of the Statute of Frauds, and was copied from the English Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, s. 6. By the Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. IV & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 20, cancellation ceased to be a legal mode of revocation in England, although a will might still be revoked by ‘ burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the Testator, or by some Person in his Presence and by his Direction, with the Intention of revoking the same.’ Stephens v. Taprell, 2 Curt. 458.
The material principles of law are settled.‘ Revocation is an act of the mind, which must be demonstrated by some outward and visible sign or symbol of revocation. The statute has specified four of these; and if these or any of them are performed in the slightest manner, this, joined with the declared intent, will be a good revocation.’ Bibb v. Thomas, 2 Wm. Blackstone, 1043, 1044. But the intent need not be declared. That it exists is enough. The intent to revoke, and the doing of one of the acts required by the statute, must both exist at the same moment. Cheese v. Lovejoy, L. R. 2 P. D. 251; Elms v. Elms, 1 Sw. & Tr. 155; Brunt v. Brunt, L. R. 3 P. & D. 37; Gill v. Gill [1909] Prob. 157; In re Frothingham's Will, 76 N.J.Eq. 331, 74 A. 471; Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. 25; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Thom, 117 Md. 154, 164, 165, 83 A. 45; Sellards v. Kirby, 82 Kan. 291, 108 P. 73,28 L.R.A. (N. S.) 270, 136 Am.St.Rep. 110,20 Ann.Cas. 214; 62 A.L.R. 1367, Note. See, also, Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 123, 72 N.E. 499,105 Am.St.Rep. 386. Cancellation is not restricted to its etymological meaning of covering with marks in the form of lattice work or crosses. Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102, 106,25 Am.Rep. 32; Estate of Olmstead, 122 Cal. 224, 230, 54 P. 745. Some decisions have extended it to any words or marks upon the will that indicate an intent to revoke, although such words or marks do not touch the original words of the will. Warner v. Warner's Estate, 37 Vt. 356; Evans' Appeal, 58 Pa. 238. But the prevailing rule requires some defacement or mutilation of the words of the will. Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 45, 136 N.E. 170; Thompson v. Royall (Va. 1934) 175 S.E. 748. There is no legal distinction between cancellation by ink and cancellation by lead pencil, although the use of the latter may be considered for what it is worth upon the question of fact whether revocation was intended. Meredith v. Merdith (Del. Super. 1931) 157 A. 202, and cases cited. A part of a will may be cancelled, leaving the rest in full force. Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102, 25 Am.Rep. 32. The burden of proof is on the party contending that a will has been revoked. Giles v. Giles, 204 Mass. 383, 385, 90 N.E. 595; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164, 171, 102 N.E. 487, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 906.
No question arises here as to the sufficiency of the marks of cancellation. They were plainly sufficient. The handing of the will, so marked, by Ellis to counsel to say nothing of his statement to counsel (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 233, § 65) warrants the conclusion that Ellis made the marks, fully as much as would the fining of the will so marked among his effects at his death. Note 62 A.L.R. 1372. No question is raised as to the admissibility of declarations of Ellis to show his intention in making those marks. Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, 257, 258,45 Am.Rep. 322; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164, 170, 102 N.E. 487, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 906; Mahan v. Perkins, 274 Mass. 176, 179, 174 N.E. 275; Crosby v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 461, 464, 109 N.E. 365; Wigmore, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 1737. Neither has it been argued that, if there was a revocation, it was limited to part of the will. The clauses marked out comprise the main provisions of the will, including the residuary clause. It is inconceivable that Ellis intended to preserve the minor clauses not actually crossed out, and to have them stand as his whole will. Leonard v. Leonard [1902] Prob. 243; Henry v. Fraser, 58 App. D. C. 260, 29 F.(2d) 633, 62 A.L.R. 1364; Dammann v. Dammann (Md. 1894) 28 A. 408. We have no occasion to consider the doctrine of conditional revocation or dependent relative revocation ...
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