Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell
| Decision Date | 13 August 1986 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | WORCESTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Richard J. MARNELL et al. 1 |
John D. Boyle, Boston, for plaintiff.
Michael E. Mone (Patricia L. Kelly, Boston, and James J. O'Malley, III, Salem, with him), for William J. Alioto.
William G. Burke, Braintree, for Richard J. Marnell and another.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
Worcester Mutual Insurance Company (Worcester Mutual) appeals from a judgment in the Superior Court declaring that it has a duty to defend and indemnify Richard and Ellen Marnell, named insureds in a homeowners' insurance policy issued by the company, in a pending wrongful death action. 2 We granted the application of the defendant William J. Alioto, administrator of the estate of Robert J. Alioto, for direct appellate review. We affirm that portion of the judgment declaring that Worcester Mutual has a duty to defend the Marnells in the underlying action.
The defendant Alioto is the plaintiff in the underlying tort action. In that action, he alleges that the Marnells' negligent supervision of a party held in their home was the proximate cause of an automobile accident that killed the plaintiff's intestate. Alioto alleges that on the night of the fatal accident, the Marnells permitted their son Michael to have a party at their residence while they were there, and that the Marnells knew or should have known that Michael, who was under the age then required by statute for legal consumption of alcoholic beverages, and his guests intended to consume and did consume alcoholic beverages at the party. The complaint further alleges that the Marnells knew or should have known that during the course of the evening their son would leave the party in his automobile to return guests to their homes. The complaint alleges that Michael became intoxicated at the party, that he left the party in an intoxicated condition, and that, while operating his motor vehicle in a negligent manner, he struck and killed the intestate. According to the complaint, the Marnells' negligent failure to provide proper supervision of the party and their negligent failure to prevent their son from consuming alcoholic beverages during the party were a proximate cause of the intestate's death.
After being served with the complaint and summons, Richard and Ellen Marnell forwarded those documents to Worcester Mutual. Worcester Mutual advised the Marnells that it would undertake the defense of that action, but only under a reservation of rights, because it appeared to the company that coverage was not available under the terms of the Marnells' homeowners' insurance policy. This declaratory judgment action followed.
The judge rightly concluded that Richard Marnell and Ellen Marnell are named insureds, and Michael Marnell is an unnamed insured under the policy. He found that Michael Marnell "owned" and "operated" the motor vehicle involved in the fatal accident. These matters are not disputed by the parties. Several provisions in the Marnells' policy are relevant to the present action. One such provision, entitled "Liability Coverages," states: "If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, we will: a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice...." Another provision, relied on by Worcester Mutual to deny coverage and which we refer to as the motor vehicle exclusion, provides that "[liability coverages] do not apply to bodily injury or property damage: ... e. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of: ... (2) a motor vehicle owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured...." The final provision of importance to this case is entitled "Severability of Insurance." This clause states, The resolution of this case depends on an interpretation of the motor vehicle exclusion in light of the severability of insurance clause.
Worcester Mutual argues that the existence of the severability of insurance clause does not affect the applicability of the motor vehicle exclusion. This is so, according to the company, because, by its terms, the motor vehicle exclusion becomes operative when the bodily injuries for which coverage is sought arose out of the "use ... of ... a motor vehicle owned or operated by ... any insured" (emphasis supplied). Worcester Mutual contends that, because the complaint in the underlying action alleges that Michael Marnell, an insured under the policy, owned and operated the motor vehicle that struck the intestate, the motor vehicle exclusion precludes every insured under the policy from obtaining coverage with respect to bodily injuries arising out of that accident. To hold that coverage is available to Richard and Ellen Marnell in this case, the insurer argues, would defeat the clear underwriting objective to place automobile accidents beyond the coverage afforded by a homeowners' insurance policy.
In addition, Worcester Mutual maintains that the applicability of the motor vehicle exclusion does not depend on the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff in the underlying action. The fact that Alioto bases his claim against the Marnells on a theory of negligent supervision is of no consequence, according to the company, because the motor vehicle exclusion looks only to the manner in which the injuries occurred. As a backup argument, the company says that, even if the theory of recovery advanced by Alioto is deemed to be important, the negligent supervision theory of recovery is enough like the negligent entrustment theory addressed in Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lally, 374 Mass....
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