Workman v. Sharp
| Decision Date | 13 December 1921 |
| Docket Number | 34086 |
| Citation | 185 N.W. 920,192 Iowa 864 |
| Parties | THOMAS WORKMAN, Appellee, v. LEROY SHARP, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Appanoose District Court.--D. M. ANDERSON, Judge.
ACTION for damages for alleged breach of warranty and for false representations made by defendant to plaintiff in the sale of a jack for breeding purposes. There was a general denial by defendant, and a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiff for alleged breach of warranty and for false representations made by plaintiff in the sale to the defendant of certain cows which were received by the defendant as part payment for the jack in question. The plaintiff claimed damages to the amount of $ 700, and the defendant claimed damages to the amount of $ 350. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $ 270. The defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
W. B Hays and T. G. Fee, for appellant.
H. E Valentine, for appellee.
No error is assigned by the defendant as appellant, upon the submission of his counterclaim. We shall, therefore, disregard it. Appellant assigns many errors upon the submission of plaintiff's cause of action. One assignment of error goes to the full merits of the case. The other assignments, in the main, are directed to specific errors in the instructions.
I. At the close of the evidence, there was a motion by defendant for a directed verdict dismissing plaintiff's petition, on the general ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish any cause of action. This motion was overruled After an adverse verdict, the defendant renewed his contention by motion for a new trial, which also was overruled. Error is assigned upon these rulings. A consideration thereof requires a consideration of the salient evidence in the case. The defendant was a breeder of jacks, which were sold to his trade for breeding purposes. At the time of the transaction in question, he had seven or eight for sale. The plaintiff was desirous of purchasing a jack for breeding purposes. He offered himself to defendant as a purchaser, and examined the jacks on hand. He selected the jack "Brownie," in the belief that he was the best individual presented to him. The jury could have found from the evidence that the jack was wholly worthless; that he lacked the propensities for the service of either mares or jennies; that he never produced a foal, and that only in a very few instances was he ever induced to pay any attention to a mare or jenny; that the few exceptions in this regard were accomplished by the use of "dope," under the advice of the defendant. The purchase was made in October, 1917. The first attempted use of the jack for breeding purposes was made in the following spring.
Under the evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant represented to plaintiff that the jack was two years old, coming three in the early spring; that he had already served two mares, which service had resulted in foals; that he was a "quick actor." Plaintiff alleges that both of these representations were false; that they were material; and that they operated as an inducement upon the plaintiff to make the purchase. The jack was, in fact, four years old, coming five. The evidence on both sides tends to show that the propensities of a jack for breeding purposes are not well matured before the age of three years. The materiality as to the representation of age is very apparent. The animal was an unusually fine and large specimen for a two-year-old. That was one of the reasons for his selection. Moreover, the alleged fact that he was only two years old furnished an explanation why he had not been put in the stud and had not been broken to the pit. The alleged fact that he had already, in his two-year-old form, shown a keen propensity to the serving of mares, and had produced foals therefrom, was itself an indication that his propensities as a breeder and foal-getter were equal to the normal. The defendant, as a witness, admitted making the representation that the jack was a "quick actor," and maintained the truth of such assertion. He also testified that he had expressly refused to warrant the jack as a breeder; that he had offered to warrant another jack which he offered to plaintiff; but that the plaintiff declined such offer, and insisted upon taking "Brownie."
For the purpose of this assignment, it is not necessary to determine whether the statement here referred to should be deemed a warranty, as distinguished from a false representation. It was a representation. If the defendant knew it to be false, this was sufficient as a reason for overruling a motion to direct a verdict. The defendant was himself the breeder of the jack. He necessarily knew its age. If it were found literally true that, in the preceding summer, the jack had produced two foals from mares, yet the statement thus made by defendant was false in a very important sense. That is to say, the significance of the fact that he had successfully served the mares in question was materially affected by the representation as to his age. If, at the time of the service, the jack had been, in fact, but "two years old, coming three," then such fact might reasonably have been accepted by the purchaser as satisfactory evidence of the probability of his future success as a breeder and foal-getter. Whereas, if he was, in fact, at that time "four years old, coming five," and if the two services in question represented...
To continue reading
Request your trial