Workman v. United Fixtures Co.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99-CV-194.,1:99-CV-194. |
| Citation | 116 F.Supp.2d 885 |
| Parties | Anthony WORKMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED FIXTURES COMPANY, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local # 7, and Rick Frantom, jointly and severally, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Lois Jewell, Niles, MI, for Anthony Workman, pltfs.
Daniel G. Lambrecht, Troff, Petzke & Ammeson, St. Joseph, MI, Michael L. Fayette, Pinsky, Smith, Fayette & Hulswit, Grand Rapids, MI, for United Fixtures Company, defts.
Daniel G. Lambrecht, Troff, Petzke & Ammeson, St. Joseph, MI, for Rick Frantom, Deft.
On February 23, 1999, plaintiff Anthony Workman filed this action in Michigan's Berrien County Circuit Court, naming as defendants both his former employer, United Fixtures Company ("United" or "the company") and his collective bargaining representative, Local No. 7 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Local 7" or "the union"). The case involves claims by Workman that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment with the company in violation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and that the union failed to fairly represent him in a grievance he filed against the company.
The union filed a timely Notice of Removal (in which the company has joined), contending that the action presents a federal question under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The matter is currently before the court on motions by both all parties for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the court denies plaintiff's motion, grants the defendants' motions, and dismisses this action with prejudice.
Workman is a resident of Niles, Michigan. In June, 1995, he began working for United as a stacker in the company's roll form department. Through his employment, Workman was a member of Local 7, which, at all pertinent times, had in force a collective bargaining agreement with the company. The relevant agreement, for purposes of this action, covered the period from September 18, 1997 to the present.
Article X of the collective bargaining agreement addressed the subjects of discipline and discharge. Paragraph (d) of Article X provided in pertinent part as follows:
(d) For the commission of any of the following offenses, an employee shall receive:
First offense Reprimand
Second offense Reprimand to 3 days off
Third offense Subject to Discharge
Paragraph (d) of Article X enumerates, among others, the following offenses as being subject to this provision:
Drinking or use of narcotics or other controlled substances not prescribed by a physician prior to reporting for duty where employee's condition is that it may affect the proper performance of his duties (Article X, ¶ d(2));
Abusive, threatening or coercive treatment of another employee on Company premises (Article X, ¶ d(6));
Failure to abide by starting and quitting times designated by the Company (Article X, ¶ d(19)).
On April 16, 1997, Workman was reprimanded for failure to abide by starting and quitting times designated by the company.1 The stated reason for the reprimand was that Workman left his work area and went into the company parking lot without permission. (Workman apparently contends that he took an early break in order to wipe his truck dry.) Workman did not file a grievance concerning this reprimand.
On August 7, 1997, Workman was cited for another violation, this time engaging in abusive or threatening behavior.2 As a result of this offense, Workman was suspended from his employment and instructed not to return to work until August 12, 1997. Once again, Workman did not file a grievance concerning this discipline.
On November 6, 1997, Workman was again cited, this time for reporting to work under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Article X, ¶ (d)(2) of the collective bargaining agreement. Because this was Workman's third instance of discipline within a period of approximately seven months, United terminated his employment.
This time, however, Workman filed a grievance with the union, protesting his termination. After United denied the grievance, on March 12, 1998 the union communicated its intent to pursue the grievance to arbitration. In the meantime, however, while the grievance was still being processed, Workman filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the union was not properly pursuing his grievance.
After this, further discussions between United and the union led to an agreement to settle the grievance. Specifically, on June 25, 1998 Workman attended a meeting between union and company representatives. During the course of this meeting, the union and the company agreed that Workman would be permitted to return to work, without back pay, provided he executed a "Last Chance Agreement" and agreed to attend a substance abuse program. Workman has admitted that although he was not pleased with the conditions, he was told by a union representative at that time that in view of the agreement, the union would not take his grievance to arbitration. Workman Dep. at 110-111.3
On July 7, 1998, United and the union reduced the settlement to writing. The written agreement provides as follows:
In accordance with the Step 3(d) section of the grievance procedure with both parties having met on June 25, 1998, this letter confirms the resolution of the above grievance and its withdrawal from Arbitration.
The Company will reinstate Mr. Workman, without entitlement to back pay, provided that Mr. Workman consults with and meets the requirements of a substance abuse counselor, mutually acceptable to the Company and the Union, for the purpose of determining the severity of his alcoholism as well as his behavioral problems, specifically his temperament, and provided that Mr. Workman successfully completes any counseling sessions and recommended programs for treatment, as determined in the sole discretion of the counselor. It is agreed that prior to reinstatement, both the Company and the Union, in conjunction with the counselor, shall establish specific parameters (including a last chance agreement) which Mr. Workman shall follow prior to and subsequent to reinstatement. Mr. Workman's failure to comply with same shall result in immediate termination. Appeal of such a termination shall be limited to whether Mr. Workman complied with the agreed upon parameters. Mr. Workman shall also be subject to and expected to comply with all other Company rules and regulations.
Several days after the company and the union executed the settlement agreement, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") appointed an arbitrator to handle the grievance. After the appointed arbitrator made written inquiry of the parties regarding whether they would be available to arbitrate on December 21, 1999, the union notified the FMCS in writing, on August 7, 1998, that it was withdrawing its request for arbitration because the parties had reached a settlement of the grievance.
Workman enrolled in a substance abuse program, as agreed between the company and the union. However, Workman never executed the "Last Chance Agreement"; he failed to show up for an August 12, 1998 scheduled meeting between the company and the union at which the agreement was to be presented to him.4 Workman has testified that he did not attend the meeting because he was not happy with the agreement negotiated between the company and the union for his return to work. Workman has also testified that he knew, by this point, that the union would be "out of the picture" if he did not execute the "Last Chance Agreement."
Shortly thereafter, Workman consulted with an attorney regarding his situation. On September 1, 1998, his attorney wrote to United, informing the company that her client had taken the option to consult her before signing the "Last Chance Agreement." Counsel's letter also expressed her awareness that although there had been "active consultations and negotiations on this matter over the past year, ... the arbitration on which Mr. Workman was relying was canceled by you." Finally, she expressed her desire to "clarif[y] matters" with the company, although she indicated that she was going on vacation and would not return until the third week of September, 1998.
Information in the record also indicates that on November 30, 1998, Workman's counsel wrote to the president of Local 7. In her letter, counsel indicated that she was "disappointed to have had no follow-up from [the union] in the almost two months since I have sent you copies of my correspondences with [United] on behalf of your member, Tony Workman." Counsel also stated that
Unless we hear by 10 December that a date for unbiased and binding arbitration is set for this month, as we were previously instructed. I will have no choice but to conclude that you are an adversary to Tony in this matter. In that case, we will be obliged to pursue at minimum, a suit that includes you, for failure of fair representation of your Union member.
As noted above, however, Workman did not file his complaint in state court until 85 days later, on February 23, 1999.
As initially pled in state court, Workman's action asserted claims against the company for violation of the collective bargaining agreement (Count I) and against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation (Count II).5 However, in an amended pleading filed in this court on August 6, 1999, Workman added a new defendant, Rick Frantom, who he alleges was employed as a nurse at United. The amended complaint alleges that Workman was, due to injuries he had suffered in a fall on company premises, a frequent visitor to Frantom's nursing station, and that Frantom was the architect of an allegedly false report of "abusive or threatening behavior" asserted against Workman, which had...
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