Workman v. United Methodist Committee On Relief, No. 01-7161.
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Writing for the Court | Ginsburg |
Citation | 320 F.3d 259 |
Parties | MaryAnn WORKMAN, Individually and as personal and legal representative of the Estate of Deena Marie Umbarger, deceased, Appellant, v. UNITED METHODIST COMMITTEE ON RELIEF OF THE GENERAL BOARD OF GLOBAL MINISTRIES OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Appellee. |
Docket Number | No. 01-7161. |
Decision Date | 25 February 2003 |
Page 259
v.
UNITED METHODIST COMMITTEE ON RELIEF OF THE GENERAL BOARD OF GLOBAL MINISTRIES OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 00cv00616).
Mark London argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
William H. Briggs, Jr. argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Cathlene A. Tharp.
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.
Page 260
GINSBURG, Chief Judge:
MaryAnn Workman, the mother of a woman murdered in Somalia while on a mission for the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), sued UMCOR, alleging that the defendant negligently failed to prepare her daughter for and protect her from the dangers of her assignment. We hold that the district court properly entered summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that Workman had failed to meet the "heightened foreseeability standard" applicable under the law of the District of Columbia to a case in which the harm arises from the criminal act of a third party.
Deena Marie Umbarger, a 1994 graduate of the Yale Law School, left her law practice in 1997 to become a relief worker for UMCOR. Her first international assignment was to Kenya, followed by a brief stint in the Republic of Georgia. In November 1998 she returned to Kenya to live with her fiancé. There UMCOR retained her under a series of short-term consulting agreements until her death in March 1999.
The agreements defined Umbarger's role as that of an independent contractor charged with evaluating UMCOR's past relief efforts in Kenya and Somalia and with developing a plan for the future, possibly to include the opening of an UMCOR office in Nairobi. Umbarger was UMCOR's sole representative in the region; she reported directly to Kemba Eneas, UMCOR's Program Director for Africa and the Caribbean, who was based in Virginia.
On March 20, 1999 Umbarger traveled to Somalia. An UMCOR memorandum contains the following description, based upon a report from the United States Embassy in Kenya, of the events of that day:
At approximately 3:00 p.m., Deena and Ahmed Hussein [of Somali Community Services/Nairobi] arrived at Nkokani Airport, NW of Lamu, Kenya. Eight people in a vehicle with a Somalian license tag picked her up. Deena and her counterparts registered with the local police at the border to explain their business with the community. Six of the eight persons were there on the invitation of SCS, the other two we[r]e from the Aqwin Militia who were warlords there to monitor their activities. At 5:00 p.m. they arrived at a restaurant 40 km outside of Kiangu, on the border of Kenya and Somalia (in the SW corner of Somalia) where they were to meet five town elders. At 5:30 p.m. before eating, a gunman murdered Deena in the restaurant. The elders caught the gunman; however, other members of the militia shot in the air which startled the elders and caused the gunman's release. The persons that were with Deena put her back in the vehicle and drove her to the nearest clinic or hospital in Kenya whe[r]e she was dead on arrival.
In February 2000 Workman filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia alleging that UMCOR had "failed to discharge its duty and obligation to protect [Umbarger] as she assisted UMCOR in carrying out its activities in Kenya and Somalia." Workman sought damages for Umbarger's death under the District of Columbia Wrongful Death Act, D.C.Code § 16-2701, and under the Survival Statute, D.C.Code § 12-101, which allows a legal representative to bring a claim on behalf of a person who has died. UMCOR, invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, removed the case to the district court. In a ruling not challenged here, the district court dismissed the wrongful death claim because the statute applies only to deaths occurring within the District of Columbia.
Page 261
At the close of discovery, UMCOR moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim under the Survival Statute arguing, as relevant here, that because UMCOR could not have foreseen Umbarger's murder, it had no duty to protect her from that crime. In support of its motion, UMCOR submitted declarations from Eneas and from Sam W. Dixon, the head of UMCOR's Nongovernmental Organization Unit. Dixon stated that Umbarger's duties were "to determine whether there were sources of funding for relief projects in the region and whether the region was safe and secure enough to justify a permanent UMCOR presence," and that Umbarger was "solely ... responsib[le]" for the manner in which she carried out these duties, including her decision to travel to Somalia. Dixon characterized Umbarger as UMCOR's "eyes and ears" in the region; indeed, "[t]he information that UMCOR had about potential security risks in Somalia came primarily from [her]." Dixon also stated:
I did not have, nor was I aware of anyone at UMCOR who had, any advance knowledge or warning that ... her travel to Somalia or work in Kenya would put her at some unique risk beyond the typical security risks known to anyone — including Deena — who provides relief to people living in the most dangerous areas of the world.
Eneas supported Dixon's description of the relationship between UMCOR and Umbarger. She stated that although Umbarger reported to her, Eneas did not "supervise" Umbarger and did not require Umbarger to travel to Somalia. Eneas stated that Umbarger had gone to Somalia once before, "without incident." In addition, Eneas reported that during her visit to Nairobi about a week prior to the fateful trip, "[w]e spent a large amount of time together and Deena never told me that she feared traveling to Somalia or that she was concerned that she might be harmed in any way during that trip. To the contrary, Deena was eager to travel to Somalia."
In opposition to UMCOR's motion for summary judgment, Workman submitted the declaration of Michael D. O'Neill, the Coordinator for Volunteer Safety and Overseas Security for the Peace Corps. According to O'Neill, even in cases in which decision-making is left to the aid worker, "the institution for whom she works also is expected to provide reasonable safety and security support," including "proper security assessment of the area in question, appropriate risk reduction strategies, a security management system, a program for sharing information, and training." By way of example, O'Neill noted that the Peace Corps provides 12 weeks of training to volunteers before they are posted abroad. O'Neill stated that upon his review of the evidence, he had seen nothing to indicate that Umbarger received "proper training and guidance" or that UMCOR maintained a "reasonable safety and security support system" for its overseas workers.
Workman also produced a February 1999 email from Umbarger to Eneas, in which Umbarger had noted possible irregularities in the accounting of relief funds earmarked for Somali Community Services and expressed concern that her investigation of the issue could render a planned trip to Somalia particularly dangerous. She wrote:
I need to spend a fair amount of time with Fawzi [the SCS liaison to UMCOR] getting the particulars of just what was provided to beneficiaries....
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...it were particularly foreseeable to the defendant that a third party would commit the crime. Workman v. United Methodist Comm. on Relief , 320 F.3d 259, 263 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Romero , 749 F.2d at 81 ). This heightened showing of foreseeability has been described as " ‘exacting,’ ‘dema......
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Smith v. Hope Village, Inc., Civil Action No. 05-633 (RBW).
...act of a third party." Workman v. United Methodist Comm. on Relief of the Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, 320 F.3d 259, 262 Page 186 (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Dominion Bank of Wash., 963 F.2d 1552, 1558 (D.C.Cir.1992) (stating that "[a]s a general ru......
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Miango v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Civil Action No. 15-1265 (ABJ)
...evidentiary hurdle is higher." Workman v. United Methodist Comm. on Relief of Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries of United Methodist Church , 320 F.3d 259, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 2003).District of Columbia courts have been "reluctant to see a defendant held liable for harm caused by the criminal act o......
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Hedgepeth v. Clinic, No. 07–CV–158.
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