Workman v. Workman

• Decision Date: 09 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 43434,43434
• Citation: 498 P.2d 1384
• Parties: Lorene WORKMAN, individually, et al., Appellant, v. James Washington WORKMAN, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1384

498 P.2d 1384

Lorene WORKMAN, individually, et al., Appellant, v. James Washington WORKMAN, Appellee.

No. 43434.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 9, 1972.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1972.

Loren McCurtain, McAlester, for appellant.

Leon G. Belote, McAlester, for appellee.

DAVISON, Vice Chief Justice.

This action was filed by appellant, Lorene Workman, individually, and on behalf of Lorene Workman, as mother and natural guardian of Lorie Huff, a minor child, and Lorene Workman, as surviving mother and next of kin of Leona Marie Huff, deceased minor child, and Norma Lee Huff, deceased minor child, against James Washington Workman, appellee, husband of lorene Workman, and the stepfather of Lorie Huff, a minor, and Leona Marie Huff and Norma Lee Huff, the two deceased minor children.

The action was for damages against appellee for the alleged negligent driving of his pick-up truck in which Lorene Workman and the three stepdaughters above named were passengers, chusing an accident in which Leona Marie Huff and Norma Lee Huff were killed and Lorie Huff received certain personal injuries.

The accident occurred soon after dark when appellee's pickup truck struck the side of a parked automobile which caused him to collide with an oncoming car, thus causing the injuries and deaths involved herein.

That the parties were on a pleasure trip and the evidence disclosed that appellee was driving at a slow rate of speed. He was charged with ordinary negligence.

At the conclusion of all the evidence offered by appellant in her respective capacities in support of her petition, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the evidence insofar as the three minor children were involved on the theory that appellee was standing in loco parentis to the minor children; that the unemancipated minors, under the evidence, could not maintain the action against the appellant-stepfather. This appeal results from such ruling.

The decisive question to be determined is whether the appellee was standing in loco parentis under the evidence and applicable law to be applied thereto.

In order to decide this question a summary of the evidence becomes necessary.

The evidence discloses that the mother of the three minors and appellee had been married for over two years before the accident in question occurred; that upon their marriage the unemancipated minros, with their mother, moved into the unencumbered home of the stepfather and were living with him at the time of the accident; that the children called appellee 'Dad' or 'Daddy;' that the appellee furnished the home to the mother and the children without cost to them; that appellee would obtain jobs, usually fence repairing or building, and the children and their mother worked with appellee on said jobs and they were all paid equally for their work; that both the mother and appellee would buy groceries for the entire family; that they all ate together as a family; that family bills were paid jointly out of the family moneys obtained from the family work; that they all lived under the same roof with no rent to pay; that they lived like a normal family with husband and wife both working to pay the bills.

It is true that the three minors collectively drew $170.00 per month as Social Security payments derived from the benefits of their, deceased father. This amount was insufficient to pay the full amount of their support. The Social Security checks were made payable to the mother but she had no bank account.

The term in loco parentis is described in 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 71, as follows: 'The term 'in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent, and a 'person in loco parentis' may be defined as one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption.'

In the case of Wooden v. Hale, Okl., 426 P.2d 679, we held that the unemancipated stepchild occupies the same legal status as a natural child and cannot maintain an action for ordinary negligence against a stepparent, citing and relying on Title 10 O.S.1961, § 15, which provides that if the stepfather receives them into his family and supports them it is presumed he does so as a parent.

In the present case the mother and stepfather both helped in the support of the minor children.

In Tucker v. Tucker, Okl., 395 P.2d 67, we held that a minor child may not recover damages from a parent for personal injuries suffered while unemancipated as a result of said parent's ordinary negligence in the operation of an automobile in which the child was a passenger. The testimony in ...