World Express & Connection, Inc. v. Crocus Invs., LLC
| Decision Date | 28 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 15-8126 (KM) (MAH) |
| Parties | WORLD EXPRESS & CONNECTION, INC., Plaintiff, v. CROCUS INVESTMENTS, LLC, CROCUS FZE, ALEXANDER SAFONOV, AND MIDDLE EAST ASIA ALFA FZE, Defendants. CROCUS INVESTMENTS, LLC, CROCUS FZE, ALEXANDER SAFONOV, and MIDDLEEAST ASIA ALFA FZE, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. MARINE TRANSPORT LOGISTIC INC., ROYAL FINANCE GROUP, INC., CAR EXPRESS & IMPORT INC., ALEKSANDR SOLOVYEV, VADIM ALPER a/k/a DIMITRY ALPER, ALLA SOLOVYEVA, RAYA BAKHIREV, and ROMAN CHERNIN, Third-Party Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
:
This action is the latest action brought by similar parties to recover damages in connection with the shipping, export, repair, and resale of boats and automobiles. It is an object lesson in what can happen when parties fail to define their relationship in a written contract or otherwise. Having failed to allocate the risks in advance, these parties are trying to do it in retrospect.
In essence, these parties have been litigating the failure of their business relationships in various forums, involving various parties, for over seven years. See, e.g., Mavl Capital, Inc. v. Marine Transp. Logistics, Inc., No. 13-CV-7110(PKC)(RLM) (E.D.N.Y.); Crocus Investments, LLC and Crocus FZE v. Marine Transport Logistics, Inc., Aleksandr Solovyev a/k/a Royal Finance Group Inc., (Federal Maritime Commission Dkt. No. 15-04); MAVL Capital, Inc., IAM & AL Group Inc., and Maxim Ostrovskiy v. Marine Transport Logistics, Inc. and Dimitry Alper (Federal Maritime Commission Dkt. No. 16-16).
In this action, the Plaintiff, World Express & Connection, Inc. ("World Express"), filed a Complaint seeking storage and other related charges for three boats owned by Defendants, Crocus Investments, LLC ("Crocus LLC"), Crocus FZE, Alexander Safonov, and Middle East Asia Alfa FZE ("Middle East FZE"). (DE 1)
Those four Defendants then filed a Third-Party Complaint and Counterclaim to recover damages associated with these boats and the purchase, storage, shipping, and repair of two automobiles. (DE 11, DE 16, 17) The Third-Party Complaint is asserted against Marine Transport Logistics, Inc. ("Marine Transport"), Royal Finance Group Inc. ("Royal Finance"), Aleksandr Solovyev, Car Express & Import Inc. ("Car Express"), Alla Solovyeva, Raya Bakhirev, Roman Chernin, and Vadim Alper (collectively, "Third-Party Defendants").
Now pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment and a motion for sanctions. (DE 187, DE 188, DE 189)
Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendants (with the exception of Mr. Alper) move for summary judgment requesting that all of Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed. (DE 187)
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment on the claims they assert in their Third-Party Complaint and move to dismiss both counts of the Complaint.
For the reasons explained herein, I will grant in part and deny in part the motions for summary judgment. I will deny the motion for sanctions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth. of Pa. & N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ().
Unsupported allegations, subjective beliefs, or argument alone, however, cannot forestall summary judgment. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1988) (); see also Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001) (). Thus, if the nonmoving party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . there can be 'no genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
Moreover, the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. A fact is only "material" for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
That the matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment does not affect the analysis:
This [Rule 56] standard "does not change when the issue is presented in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment." [quoting Appelmans v. City of Philadelphia, 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987)]. When both parties move for summary judgment, "[t]he court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 2016).
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) That one of the cross-motions is denied does not imply that the other must be granted. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 785, 794 (D.N.J. 2015). Rather, "[i]t is well settled that cross-motions for summary judgment do not warrant the court in granting summary judgmentunless one of the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon the facts that are not genuinely disputed." Manetas v. Int'l Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 541 F.2d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 1976).
Local Rule 56.1 states in part, "the movant shall furnish a statement which sets forth material facts as to which there does not exist a genuine issue, in separately numbered paragraphs citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in support of the motion." Moreover, "[t]he opponent of summary judgment shall furnish, with its opposition papers, a responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant's statement, indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion."
Both Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendants and Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs run afoul of these rules. Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendants' motion for summary judgment makes little effort to inform the Court of all material facts necessary for resolution of their motion. (See DE 187-1; 187-2) Their moving brief—a brief that appears to simply build on the disjointed set of facts presented in the SOF—jumps into the issues in the middle and assumes the Court has all relevant information without providing that information. Moreover, the SOF contains legal conclusions that are not statements of fact and often summarizes allegations rather than citing the underlying evidence. (PSOF ¶¶ 6, 9, 11, 12, 17, 21) Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendants' responsive statement of material facts likewise fails provide evidence in support of its denials, speculates as to facts, and resorts to legal argument. (See, e.g., PRSOF ¶¶ 12, 32, 61, 74, 76, 79, 83, 86, 113, 114, 133, 135, 138, 150, 153) Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs for their part respond to certain statements in the PSOF by proffering legal arguments or failing to cite to relevant evidence in the record. (See, e.g., DRSOF ¶¶ 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, 20) Moreover, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, in their briefing, repeatedly assert facts without citation to any evidence or their SOF. (See DE 192, passim) I havemade every effort to avoid crediting factual statements of any party where they are not properly supported. See L. Civ. R. 56.1(a).
The parties have dumped hundreds of pages of documents into the record with little effort to outline a coherent summary. Accordingly, I provide below a summary of what I believe are the facts material to resolving the cross-motions for summary...
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