World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 14 February 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 06 C 2891
• Citation: 234 F.Supp.3d 904
• Parties: WORLD OUTREACH CONFERENCE CENTER, an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, and Pamela Blossom, President of World Outreach Conference Center, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

234 F.Supp.3d 904

WORLD OUTREACH CONFERENCE CENTER, an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, and Pamela Blossom, President of World Outreach Conference Center, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.

Case No. 06 C 2891

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed February 14, 2017

Andy Robert Norman, John William Mauck, Joseph Lee McCoy, Jr., Noel W. Sterett, Richard S. Bell, Mauck & Baker, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew S. Mine, David Arthur Graver, David Alan Grossman, Mardell Nereim, Mary Eileen Cunniff Wells, Rebecca Alfert Hirsch, City of Chicago, Department of Law, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Joan H. Lefkow, U.S. District Judge

This case is before the court on the motion of World Outreach Conference Center's attorneys for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and for costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (dkt. 359). On April 1, 2013, this court granted summary judgment in favor of World Outreach and Pamela Blossom, its President,¹ in the amount of $15,000 on a portion of its claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. , and granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Chicago on all other aspects of the RLUIPA claim and all other counts of the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 247). The parties stipulated to a final judgment order in the amount of $15,000, representing damages to World Outreach on the successful claim, both parties reserving their appellate rights. (Dkt. 270.) On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of World Outreach but remanded the remainder of the case for trial. On April 4, 2016, the case came to a close when World Outreach accepted the City's Rule 68 offer of judgment for $25,001. For the reasons stated below, World Outreach is awarded $467,973.45 in attorney's fees, and the parties are directed to confer regarding costs as required under Local Rule 54.3.

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 1988 provides district courts with discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in RLUIPA actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). While a party who receives even nominal damages is a prevailing party under § 1988, "a reasonable attorney's fee for a nominal victor is usually zero." Aponte v. City of Chi. , 728 F.3d 724, 726–27 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) ). If more than nominal damages have been awarded, courts follow the alternative path set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart , which starts with determining the lodestar amount, i.e. , "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The court may then adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward depending on a variety of factors, such as the degree of success, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, and awards in similar cases. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, n.9 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) ).

ANALYSIS

The parties dispute whether a reasonable attorney's fee should be computed under Farrar or Hensley . Farrar applies if World Outreach obtained a nominal award, which is determined by whether "the plaintiff was aiming high and fell far short, in the process inflicting heavy costs on his opponent and wasting the time of the court, or whether ... the case was simply a small claim and was tried accordingly." Hyde v. Small , 123 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1997) ; see also Aponte , 728 F.3d at 728 (noting same). Although the vast majority of cases applying Farrar involve plaintiffs who were awarded $1 or $100—i.e., nominal, de minimis , or technical damages by any definition² —the Seventh Circuit has indicated that there is no precise dollar or percent of recovery threshold that triggers Farrar . Rather, a more holistic approach is used: "[I]n determining whether an award should be analyzed under Farrar , district courts should look at the entire litigation history, including the number of victorious versus unsuccessful claims, the amount of damages sought versus recovered, time expended by the parties, and judicial resources." Aponte , 728 F.3d at 728. In evaluating this case purely in light of Aponte 's language,³ this would seem to be a case in which Farrar provides the appropriate methodology. World Outreach certainly aimed high and achieved meager monetary results, although it did achieve its goal of operating a community center despite the local alderman's opposition, which can partially be attributed to the litigation's ten-year war of attrition.

But despite Aponte 's broad language, the few cases to have considered whether Farrar applied where recovery exceeded the clearly nominal threshold have concluded that Farrar did not apply.⁴ Although Aponte allows lower courts to apply Farrar in cases involving a few hundred or perhaps a thousand dollars, the Seventh Circuit continues to indicate that the lodestar is the appropriate methodology when damages are not objectively de minimis. In Montanez v. Simon , 755 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014), the court ruled that a $2,000 recovery in a "simple civil-rights claim, overlitigated by both sides," was not so nominal so as to apply Farrar . Id. at 550, 556–57 ("We don't mean to suggest that [the plaintiff's] victory was purely nominal, in which case he would not be entitled to attorney's fees at all." (citing Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 )). Rather, such limited success warranted a substantial reduction of the lodestar, and the court affirmed the district court's substantial across-the-board reduction of the modified lodestar to account for the limited success. Montanez , 755 F.3d at 557. The same approach is warranted here. As such, the court will calculate the lodestar.

I. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

World Outreach bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the requested hourly rates for its attorneys are "in line with those prevailing in the community."

Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr. , 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ). If this burden is met, the City then has the burden to "offer evidence that sets forth 'a good reason why a lower rate is essential.' " Id. (quoting People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. , 90 F.3d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1996) ). If World Outreach fails to satisfy its burden, the court may determine a reasonable rate. See Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd. , 176 F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1999).

For the most part World Outreach has met its burden of showing that its proposed rates are reasonable. The City argues that counsel seek a windfall and proposes significantly reduced rates. The court has considered the arguments raised and will address only those it considers substantial.

First, Daniel Dalton's declaration in support of World Outreach opining that certain of World Outreach's attorneys rates are reasonable have little value, "unlike affidavits describing what 'comparable attorneys charge for similar services.' " Montanez , 755 F.3d at 554 (quoting Pickett , 664 F.3d at 647 ). Similarly, Dalton's statement that a number of courts have found that $580 per hour is a reasonable fee for his services in RLUIPA litigation is not helpful since he fails to document it. That omission led the court to review the readily available RLUIPA cases in which Dalton has petitioned for fees. These cases suggest that Dalton, at least in some instances, received a much lower rate than he claims in his declaration. See Church of Our Savior v. City of Jacksonville Beach , 108 F.Supp.3d 1259, 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (finding $325 a reasonable rate for Dalton); Lighthouse Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Hattiesburg , No. 12 C 184, 2014 WL 1653108, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 23, 2014) (finding $325 a reasonable rate for Dalton); Paeth v. Worth Twp. , 08 C 13926, 2010 WL 4867406, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2010) (finding $300 a reasonable rate for Dalton).

Second, the City argues that, to the extent that World Outreach's attorneys have a practice of discounting the rates they charge to clients so as to fulfill their charitable mission, the City too should benefit from that reduced rate. However laudable that practice, the relevant inquiry is not what a particular attorney charges but what is a reasonable rate in the community. See Blum , 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (" '[R]easonable fees' under § 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel."); see also People Who Care , 90 F.3d at 1310 ("If the court is unable to determine the attorney's true billing rate, however (because he maintains a contingent fee or public interest practice, for example), then the court should look to the next best evidence—the rate charged by lawyers in the community of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." (quotation marks and citations omitted)). For this reason, the evidence of hourly fees of World Outreach's attorneys that the City has put into the record are of little value in establishing a reasonable hourly rate, as is the $125–200 per hour rate that the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) agreed to compensate World Outreach's attorneys as part of a non-recourse grant.

Third, just as the City tries to inject inapplicable hourly rates into the analysis, so does World Outreach. The fact that one of World Outreach's attorneys was able to recently obtain a $750 hourly rate is of little value given that the matter was the representation of a limited partnership in its sale of a hotel in Memphis, Tennessee. That representation is not indicative of a reasonable rate in the relevant community.

Fourth, the City cites case law that this court may veer from previous fee awards if it has justification, but the City has not provided any reason why...