Worldpeace v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline

• Decision Date: 03 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 14-03-01339-CV.,14-03-01339-CV.
• Citation: 183 S.W.3d 451
• Parties: John WORLDPEACE, Appellant, v. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 451

183 S.W.3d 451

John WORLDPEACE, Appellant, v. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee.

No. 14-03-01339-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston Fourteenth District.

November 3, 2005.

Rehearing Overruled January 12, 2006.

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John WorldPeace, Houston, pro se.

Jerald Grimes Molleston, Jr., Houston, Linda Acevedo, Austin, for appellee.

Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FOWLER and FROST.

OPINION

ADELE HEDGES, Chief Justice.

John WorldPeace appeals from the trial court's judgment disbarring him. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline filed a petition alleging professional misconduct against WorldPeace in relation to his representation of five clients: Johnell Collins, Helene Fraser-Nash, Darlene A. Williams, John Lynch, and John A. Lang. The allegations included that he neglected legal matters, failed to keep clients informed, failed to keep funds segregated, engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, failed to timely respond to complaints filed with the district grievance committee, and failed to furnish information sought by the committee. A jury found WorldPeace guilty of professional misconduct in relation to each client except Lynch. The trial judge then entered a judgment disbarring WorldPeace and enjoining him from the practice of law.

WorldPeace also filed a number of counterclaims and third-party claims. As will be discussed in detail below, the trial court considered the counterclaims separately and granted summary judgment on them favoring the Commission; the court also severed the third-party claims into an independent action with a new docket number.

On appeal, WorldPeace raises twenty-five issues, and although we will address each issue, for organizational purposes, we group our analysis into the following six general categories: (1) addition of complaints by different complainants to the disciplinary petition after it was filed with the Texas Supreme Court Clerk, (2) inclusion of injunctive language in the judgment, (3) imposition of restitution as a sanction, (4) finality of the judgment, (5) claims relating to the court's orders, and (6) alleged constitutional violations by this court. We modify the judgment of disbarment and, as modified, affirm.

I. Adding Complaints by Different Complainants

In his first four issues, WorldPeace contends that the trial court erred in permitting the Commission to add the complaints of additional complainants to the disciplinary petition instead of requiring it to file new petitions with the supreme court clerk. WorldPeace further maintains that this procedural error prevented the trial court, and thus this court, from obtaining jurisdiction over the additional complaints.

Procedurally, once the Commission has recommended disbarment after hearings, a respondent attorney may elect a trial de novo (as WorldPeace did here) under Rule 2.14 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. TEX.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.14, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (Vernon 1998).¹ Under Rule 3.01, the Commission must then file a disciplinary petition with the supreme court clerk. Id. 3.01. The petition must include a description of the conduct giving rise to the allegations. Id. 3.01D. Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk brings it to the attention of the supreme court, which must then appoint a district judge to preside over the proceedings. Id. 3.02.

Here, the original disciplinary petition filed by the Commission with the supreme court clerk included only the complaints raised by complainant Collins. After the case was assigned to a court and a district judge, the Commission filed an amended petition adding the Fraser-Nash, Williams, Lynch, and Lang complaints.² WorldPeace contends that complaints by different complainants cannot be added to a petition that has already been filed and assigned; instead, he argues, such complaints must be raised in wholly new petitions filed with the clerk. We disagree.

As stated, Rule 3.01 requires that a petition be filed with the clerk when a respondent attorney elects for trial de novo. Id. 3.01. It also provides certain requirements for disciplinary petitions. Id. 3.01D. However, it does not expressly refer to subsequent amendment of the petition or the addition of complaints by different complainants. Nor would a requirement that additional complaints be filed in new petitions serve any discernable purpose. WorldPeace does not offer any authority or cognizable policy rationale for requiring new petitions to be filed with the clerk, and we discern no such rationale.³ To the contrary, concerns of judicial economy clearly suggest that new petitions should not be required. Accordingly, we believe that the addition of complaints by different complainants after a petition has been assigned does not violate the letter or the spirit of the Rules.

Furthermore, Rule 3.08B of the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure states that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in disciplinary proceedings except as varied by the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Id. 3.08. Rule 51(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to join as many claims as it may have against the opposing party. TEX.R. CIV. P. 51(a); see also Allison v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex.1981) (holding that matters of joinder are within the trial court's discretion, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion); Varme v. Gordon, 881 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (stating that trial courts have "a great deal of discretion in matters of joinder" under Rule 51(a)). Because the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure do not clearly vary the practice of permissive joinder of claims under Rule 51(a), that rule governs the joinder of claims in disciplinary actions. Cf. Diaz v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 953 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.) (citing Rule 51(a) and rejecting the argument that the Commission could not assert additional violations not raised in original complaint).⁴ WorldPeace does not dispute that joinder was proper under Rule 51(a). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the additional complaints to be added to the existing petition. We overrule WorldPeace's first four issues.

II. Injunctive Language

In his fifth and sixth issues, WorldPeace contends that the judgment does not conform to the pleadings because it grants injunctive relief to the Commission when the Commission did not plead for such relief. In his seventh issue, WorldPeace contends that the judgment is void because it does not include specific language regarding injunctive relief from Rule 3.11. TEX.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.11. We will address the fifth and sixth issues first.

Generally, a trial court's judgment must conform to the pleadings filed in the case. TEX.R. CIV. P. 301. Specifically, a trial court cannot grant relief that is not supported by the pleadings. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.1979). The ultimate purpose of pleadings is to give the adversary parties notice of each others' claims and defenses and the relief sought. Perez v. Briercroft Serv. Corp., 809 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex.1991). Pleadings should generally be construed as favorably as possible to the pleader. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Bliss, 368 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Tex. 1963).⁵

WorldPeace is correct that the Commission did not expressly use the terms "injunction" or "injunctive relief" in its petition. It is clear, however, and WorldPeace acknowledges, that the Commission did plead for his disbarment. Under Rule 3.11 of the disciplinary rules, a sanction of disbarment requires the trial court to enjoin the responding attorney from practicing law or holding himself out as an attorney eligible to practice law. TEX.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.11. Thus, to plead for disbarment is necessarily to plead for injunctive relief because the very essence of a disbarment is that the person is barred (i.e., enjoined) from practicing law. See id. Consequently, the Commission's pleadings gave adequate notice that it was seeking injunctive relief, and the injunctive language in the judgment could not have taken WorldPeace by surprise. See Rivero v. Blue Keel Funding, L.L.C., 127 S.W.3d 421, 424-25 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) (holding that pleading supported judgment and gave fair notice of claim against party even though it did not include specific prayer for the relief granted); cf. Perez, 809 S.W.2d at 218.⁶ Because the judgment conforms to the pleadings, WorldPeace's arguments to the contrary are without merit. We overrule WorldPeace's fifth and sixth issues.

In his seventh issue, WorldPeace contends that the judgment is void because it does not include verbatim the language from Rule 3.11. The judgment states that WorldPeace is "permanently enjoined from practicing law in Texas [and] from holding himself out as an attorney." WorldPeace complains that the judgment does not quote Rule 3.11 exactly in that (1) it adds the word "permanently" at the beginning of the quoted phrase, and (2) it omits the clause "eligible to practice law during the period of disbarment" from the end of the phrase. WorldPeace postulates that by this addition and this omission, the trial court's judgment prevents him from ever seeking reinstatement. See generally TEX.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 11.01-11.08 (governing reinstatement after disbarment or resignation). While we do not necessarily agree that the trial court erred in its choice of language in the judgment, in the interest of clarity, we sustain issue seven in part and modify the judgment. The judgment is modified by deleting the word "permanently" from the passage excerpted above and inserting the phrase "eligible to practice law during the period of disbarment" at the end of the passage.

III. Restitution

In his eighth through eleventh issues and...