Worrall v. H.S. Chase & Co.

Decision Date23 November 1909
Citation123 N.W. 338,144 Iowa 665
PartiesMRS. E. E. WORRALL, Appellee, v. H. S. CHASE & CO. and others, Appellants
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. W. H. MCHENRY, Judge.

ACTION in equity to restrain the enforcement of an alleged judgment rendered by a justice of the peace against the plaintiff in favor of H. S. Chase & Co. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Schenck & Berryhill and F. A. Cope, for appellants.

J. L Witmer, for appellee.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

The parties stipulate for the submission of the case upon the following facts:

(1) That H. S. Chase & Co. is a corporation.

(2) That Fred A. Cope is a justice of the peace in Des Moines Polk County, Iowa.

(3) That the defendant, J. L. Porter, is a duly acting constable.

(4) That on or about September 8, 1908, the said H. S. Chase & Co. filed in the office of Fred A. Cope a petition upon an open account for groceries, praying for judgment against this plaintiff, Mrs. E. E. (Loretta) Worrall, and asking that a writ of attachment issue thereon, upon the third, fourth, fifth, and eighth grounds for attachment under section 3878 of the Code of Iowa.

(5) That a writ of attachment issued.

(6) That the said J. L. Porter levied upon certain described personal property owned by plaintiff, Mrs. E. E. (Loretta) Worrall.

(7) That this plaintiff, the said Mrs. E. E. Worrall, filed a verified answer to said petition, claiming the exemption of said property, and said cause was tried to the court, commencing at ten o'clock a. m., on September 18, 1908; that the evidence was all introduced and the argument of counsel completed at four-thirty p. m. of said September 18, 1908.

(8) That thereupon the said defendant, Fred A. Cope, justice of the peace, asked that he might have three days' time to look into the authorities, for the purpose of determining said issues. That said request was acquiesced in by the attorneys for both parties, whereupon the said justice continued the said trial for three days, to wit, to September 21, 1908.

(9) It is stipulated and agreed that at the time of said trial, and of said continuance, said Fred A. Cope was the only acting justice of the peace in Des Moines township, Polk County, Iowa, in consequence of which all of the business ordinarily transacted by the two justice courts in said township fell upon the said Fred A. Cope. That the said justice of the peace, having been unable to attend to the matters aforesaid, on the said September 21, 1908, upon his own motion entered a purported continuance of said trial to September 24, 1908. That on September 24, 1908, the said Fred A. Cope, justice of the peace, entered judgment for the said H. S. Chase & Co. as against the said Mrs. E. E. (Loretta) Worrall in the sum of $ 67.92, on page 247 of volume 65 of his docket, as is set out in Exhibit A to plaintiff's petition.

(11) That the said plaintiff, Mrs. E. E. (Loretta) Worrall, and her said attorney, J. L. Witmer, had knowledge of the rendition of said judgment on said September 24, 1908, and at all times thereafter.

(12) And that on the 14th day of November, 1908, and within twenty days after the rendition of said judgment, said Mrs. E. E. (Loretta) Worrall commenced this action to enjoin proceedings under said judgment of the said Fred A. Cope, justice of the peace, by service of original notice and by securing a temporary injunction before Hon. Hugh Brennan, judge of the district court in and for Polk County, Iowa.

(13) It is stipulated and agreed that the facts, as above set out, constitute all the evidence necessary to the determination of the merits of said cause, and that said stipulation shall be submitted to the court, and shall have the same force and effect as if these facts had been proven by undisputed testimony of witnesses duly sworn and examined in said court.

Upon this showing it is plaintiff's contention that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction in the justice to render it. On the other hand, the defendants insist that the conceded facts show full authority and jurisdiction in said justice to enter the judgment in controversy, and that in any event equity will not interfere to set it aside. The trial court held with the plaintiff. The statute defining the civil jurisdiction of a justice of the peace provides for the commencement of actions by the service of original notice or by voluntary appearance. Code, section 4486. The time fixed in such notice may not be less than five or more than fifteen days. Code, section 4490. Upon the return day, if the justice be engaged in other official business, he may postpone proceedings until such business be finished. Code section 4495. If for any cause he is unable to attend the trial at the time fixed, he may on his own motion adjourn the case for a period not exceeding three days, but he may not make more than two such adjournments. Code, section 4496. The powers and duties of the justice with reference to the entry of judgment are stated in these words: "In cases of dismissal or judgment by confession or on the verdict of a jury the judgment shall be entered on the docket forthwith. In all other cases it shall be done within three days after the cause is submitted to the justice for final action." Code, section 4522. Such being the law applicable to the case, is the judgment in question void for want of jurisdiction in the justice? It is quite clear that this question must be answered in the affirmative. Our own precedents bearing on this class of cases are quite numerous, and are uniform in their conclusions. Where the statute requires the justice to act forthwith, a reasonable delay of a few hours has been held not to deprive him of jurisdiction (Burchett v. Casady, 18 Iowa 342; Davis v. Simma, 14 Iowa 154); but where the statute...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT