Worrall v. River Shack LLC
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:22-CV-0392-B |
| Decision Date | 15 August 2022 |
| Parties | PAUL CRAIG WORRALL, Plaintiff, v. RIVER SHACK LLC d/b/a WOODSHED SMOKEHOUSE and LOVE STYLE, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is River Shack LLC d/b/a Woodshed Smokehouse and Love Style, Inc. (collectively, River Shack)'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS River Shack's motion.
BACKGROUND[1]
This is an employment disability discrimination case. Plaintiff Craig Worrall (Worrall) worked as a Restaurant Manager for River Shack from September 9, 2020, to March 14, 2021. Doc. 1 Compl., ¶¶ 13, 39-40. On or about March 1, 2021 Worrall learned that his wife tested positive for COVID-19 (COVID). Id. ¶ 24. “Worrall's wife was very ill with COVID symptoms[,] and he had to stay home to care for her.” Id. ¶ 24. Worrall took a COVID test that same day and two days later found out that he also had COVID. Id. ¶¶ 23, 26. On March 4, a River Shack employee told Worrall that while he was not at work, the most he could be paid was “50% of 90% of [his] wage.” Id. ¶ 28.
On March 5, after Worrall inquired, River Shack Human Resources (“HR”) confirmed to Worrall that he could return to work with full pay if he produced a negative COVID test. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Worrall took a second test that same day, tested negative, and went to work from March 6, 2021, to March 10, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. On March 10, HR and the Chief Operating Officer requested that Worrall take a third test, which he did on March 11. Id. ¶¶ 32-34. On March 13, Worrall was notified that he had again tested positive for COVID. Id. ¶ 34. After his positive test “Worrall began to feel the effects of COVID-19, such as a lack of energy to perform daily tasks, and was instructed to not leave his home for fourteen . . . days.” Id. ¶ 37. On March 14, River Shack terminated Worrall for “falsification of documents.” Id. ¶¶ 39-40. Worrall asserts that he has records that all three COVID tests were “administered and signed by an attending physician or official” and claims that “falsification of documents” was a “pretext to discriminate against him on the basis of disability.” Id. ¶¶ 38, 40, 46.
Worrall filed his complaint on February 17, 2022. Doc. 1, Compl. Specifically, Worrall makes four claims: (1) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) disability discrimination under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code (TLC) or the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act (TCHRA)[2]; (3) associational discrimination under the ADA; and (4) associational discrimination under the TCHRA. River Shack filed a motion to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on May 2, 2022. Doc. 6, Mot. The motion being ripe, the Court considers it below.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). But the court will “not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted based on the alleged facts.” Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When well-pleaded facts fail to meet this standard, “the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Below, the Court addresses the threshold issues of whether Worrall has plausibly alleged facts showing that his and his wife's COVID illnesses were disabilities under the ADA, and thus the TCHRA. The Court then addresses Worrall's claims that River Shack discriminated against him for his disability under the ADA and TCHRA, and against him for his wife's disability under the ADA.[3]A. Discrimination Under the ADA and TCHRA (Worrall)
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a qualified individual based on the individual's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The term “disability” is construed broadly to ensure coverage in accordance with the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). The TCHRA definition of “disability” conforms to the ADA definition.[4] To “be substantially limited means to be unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or to be significantly restricted in the ability to perform it.” EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
To make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) [he] has a disability, or was regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.” Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d at 697). Courts apply the same framework for an ADA claim that they apply for a TCHRA claim.[5]
1. Whether Worrall Was Disabled or Regarded as Disabled
For this element of Worrall's prima facie showing of disability discrimination, the Court first analyzes Worrall's actual disability claim and then his regarded-as disability claim.
In order to adequately allege an actual disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must plead facts giving rise to an inference that his or her impairment “substantially limits one or more ‘major life activities.'” Luedecke v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2015 WL 58733, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2015); (quoting Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 500-01(5th Cir. 2011)). While the issue of what a plaintiff claiming disability based on COVID must plead to satisfy this burden is far from settled, a plaintiff must, at minimum, allege how his specific COVID symptoms impacted specific major life activities. See McCone v. Exela Techs., Inc., 2022 WL 801772, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2022) (); but cf. Brown v. Roanoke Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr., 2022 WL 532936, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 22, 2022) (). Allegations regarding a need to isolate or quarantine, without more, do not support an inference of disability. See Champion v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 538 F.Supp.3d 1344, 1349 (M.D. Ga. May 10, 2021) ().
Here, Worrall alleges that after “a positive COVID-19 test on March 11,” he “began to feel the effects of COVID-19, such as a lack of energy to perform daily tasks.” Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 37. He “was told by CVS officials that he had to quarantine for fourteen . . . days,” meaning “because he was positive with COVID-19 . . . his major life functions [were] impaired.” Id. ¶ 61.
River Shack argues that Worrall's claims should be dismissed because “his bout with COVID-19 is precisely the type of short-term COVID that the EEOC Guidance and the ADA Guidance indicate did not qualify as an actual disability at the time of his termination.” Doc. 7, Defs.' Br., 8. River Shack further argues that “regardless of whether [Worrall] was too sick to work or simply instructed to isolate, the mere fact that [he] missed two weeks of work due to his COVID-19 diagnosis does not suggest that his ability to work was substantially limited and that he is consequently considered disabled under the ADA.” Id.
EEOC guidelines, which courts may find persuasive in determining disability, say that mild symptoms of COVID that resolve within several weeks or asymptomatic cas...
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