Worth et al v City of Rogers et al

Decision Date13 April 2000
Docket Number99-89
Citation14 S.W.3d 471
PartiesClarence J. WORTH and Demaris E. Worth et al. v. CITY of ROGERS et al. 99-89 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Benton Circuit Court, Division I; Tommy J. Keith, Judge; reversed and remanded.

1. Judgment -- summary judgment -- when granted. -- Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact.

2. Judgment -- summary judgment -- standard of review. -- On appellate review, the court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion leave a material fact unanswered; the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party; appellate review is not limited to the pleadings, as the court also focuses on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties.

3. Judgment -- summary judgment -- when denied. -- After reviewing undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied if, under the evidence, reasonable men might reach different conclusions from those undisputed facts.

4. Judgment -- summary judgment -- mere suspicion will not create genuine issue of material fact. -- A mere suspicion in the mind of the party against whom summary judgment is sought will not create a genuine issue of material fact.

5. Judgment -- summary judgment -- trial court erred in granting where further development of facts was required to determine true nature of reappraisals. -- Where the pleadings, affidavits, and other materials gave rise to more than a mere suspicion that the reappraisals conducted were countywide reappraisals subject to the rollback provision of Amendment 59 to the Arkansas Constitution, and where there was conflicting evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the reappraisals, the supreme court concluded that further development of the facts was required to determine the true nature of the reappraisals; the supreme court further concluded that the trial court had incorrectly resolved any doubts or inferences regarding the nature of their appraisals against appellants instead of appellees and held that summary judgment was not warranted as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion.

6. Taxation -- reappraisal -- trial court erred in finding reappraisal was not countywide. -- Where the evidence before the trial court established the fact that the reappraisal in question was a countywide reappraisal as set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-401 (Repl. 1997); and where appellees not only failed to introduce evidence that the reappraisal was not countywide, but also conceded on the record that the reassessment begun in 1996 was subject to the provisions of Ark. Const. amend. 59, the trial court erred in finding that the reappraisal begun in 1996 was not a countywide reappraisal.

7. Statutes -- construction -- first rule. -- In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language; if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation.

8. Taxation -- reappraisal -- trial court's finding that rollback was not required was based on erroneous statutory interpretation. -- The trial court's erroneous interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-306(e) (Repl. 1997) that any taxes due and owing are not subject to a rollback essentially carved out an exception to the requirements of Ark. Const. amend. 59; just as the attempt of Act 758 of 1995 to circumvent the rollback provisions of Amendment 59 was unconstitutional, so any attempt to interpret the provisions of Act 836 in a manner inconsistent with the dictates of Amendment 59 was also invalid.

9. Appeal & error -- mootness -- requirement. -- For an issue to be moot, there must be no controversy, thus rendering any decision in the case a mere advisory opinion.

10. Taxation -- appellants submitted proof that 1996 figures were discarded --trial court erred in ruling issue concerning 1997 taxes was moot. -- Where appellees had the burden of establishing that there was no disputed fact and failed to meet their burden with any proof that the method of calculating the rollback did not violate Ark. Const. amend. 59; where, on the other hand, appellants submitted proof to establish that the 1996 figures had been discarded and that values from 1997 were the only ones considered; and where, at the summary-judgment stage, any doubts or inferences must be resolved against the moving party, the trial court did not follow the law in this regard, and, therefore, it was erroneous in its ruling that the issue concerning 1997 taxes was moot because the county had begun to complete the rollback of millage rates for the reappraisal ending in 1997.

11. Judgment -- summary judgment -- appellees failed to establish absence of genuine issues of material fact. -- Regarding summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in controversy; appellees clearly failed to meet the burden with respect to whether the 1990-95 reappraisal program was in fact a countywide reappraisal subject to the provisions of Ark. Const. amend. 59.

12. Constitutional law -- interpretation of Arkansas Constitution -- plain meaning. -- When interpreting a provision of the Arkansas Constitution, if the language of a provision is plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its obvious and common meaning, and neither rules of construction nor rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain meaning of a constitutional provision.

13. Taxation -- reappraisal -- appellees' interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-401(3) would defeat intent & purpose of Ark. Const. amend. 59. --The supreme court concluded that if Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-401(3) (Repl. 1997) was interpreted, as appellees urged, to mean that a reappraisal is never countywide unless certified, then assessors in each county would be able to avoid the rollback provision of Ark. Const. amend. 59 by never seeking certification from the Assessment Coordination Department when conducting reappraisals; such an interpretation would defeat the intent and purpose of Amendment 59.

14. Taxation -- taxes paid after filing of complaint -- not deemed voluntary. --Taxes paid voluntarily are not recoverable; however, taxes paid after the filing of a complaint are deemed to be taxes paid under protest and, thus, not voluntary.

15. Taxation -- mootness of voluntary-payment issue -- appellees' argument based on trial court's erroneous determination failed. -- Where appellees, contending that because the taxes levied for 1996 were not illegal, any issue of voluntary payment was rendered moot, based their argument on the trial court's erroneous determination that Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-306 exempted the 1996 tax payments from the rollback provision of Ark. Const. amend. 59, their argument on the point failed.

16. Taxation -- voluntarily paid taxes -- recovery prohibited by common-law rule. -- While there is no applicable statutory requirement for payment under protest, the supreme court has held that it always follows the common-law rule prohibiting the recovery of voluntarily paid taxes; the court has also held that the common-law rule applied to illegal exactions; taxes voluntarily paid prior to the time when a suit is filed are not recoverable.

17. Taxation -- voluntarily paid taxes -- rationale for common-law rule. --When taxes are paid to a government they are deposited into that government's general revenues and ordinarily are spent within that tax year; when, however, the government is put on notice that it may be required to refund those taxes, it can make the appropriate allowances for a possible refund; if refunds were allowed for taxes voluntarily paid in previous years, it would jeopardize current and future governmental operations because current and future funds might be necessary for the refund.

18. Taxation -- payment of illegal demand -- when deemed voluntary. -- Where a party pays an illegal demand, with full knowledge of all the facts that render the demand illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to release (not to avoid) his person or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of his person or property, such payment must be deemed voluntary, and cannot be recovered.

19. Taxation -- coercion rendering payment of taxes involuntary -- actual or threatened exercise of power. -- Coercion that renders a payment of taxes involuntary must consist of some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed by the party exacting or receiving payment over the person or property, from which the latter has no reasonable means of immediate relief, except by making payment.

20. Taxation -- voluntarily paid taxes -- issues required further development.-- The supreme court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding the payment of taxes resulting from the 1990-95 reappraisal, namely whether the tax payments were made as a result of coercion and whether the payments were made with full knowledge of the facts; accordingly, these issues required further development at the trial-court level to determine whether the taxes were paid voluntarily.

21. Judgment -- summary judgment -- grant reversed & matter remanded. -- Where there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding...

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