Wortham v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 04 June 1886
• Citation: 1 S.W. 109
• Parties: WORTHAM v. BOYD.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

1 S.W. 109

WORTHAM v. BOYD.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 4, 1886.

Appeal from McLennan county.

Action to procure the cancellation of a deed alleged to have been executed in fraud of the grantor's creditors.

W. M. Sleeper and Eugene Williams, for appellant. Surrat & Taylor, for appellees.

WILLIE, C. J.

The object of the suit, as it was originally brought by Mrs. Mary A. Blocker against King and Ham, was to set aside an alleged fraudulent sale of land made by Marshall to D. W. King, and to subject the land to a debt due by the former to the plaintiff in that action. D. W. King having, previously to the commencement of the suit, sold a part of the land to Ham, the latter was necessarily made a party defendant in order to divest the title acquired by him. For this purpose it was alleged that Ham bought the 100 acres conveyed him by D. W. King with knowledge that the conveyance from Marshall to D. W. King was made in fraud of the former's creditors, and prayer was made that both conveyances be canceled, and the whole land subjected to Mrs. Blocker's debt against Marshall King. The suit was in effect one to annul conveyances made in fraud of the plaintiff's rights, and to declare the land conveyed to be subject to a debt due her from the original fraudulent vendor. Upon Ham's notice of the fraud the whole case was rested, so far as he was concerned, and to this case Ham's answer was a complete defense. He denied all knowledge of the fraud, and alleged that he was an innocent purchaser, and had paid most of the purchase money before the suit was brought. If the proof sustained Ham's allegations, the plaintiff's case necessarily failed, and Ham's title to the land was valid. The plaintiff's case did fail by her own confession; for she admitted the truth of Ham's defense, and declined to attack his conveyance. She, in her pleadings, admitted facts which validated Ham's deed, set up different grounds of action as against him, and founded upon them a prayer for a different judgment. In her original petition she said: "Ham had notice of King's fraud; his deed was therefore void, gave him no title, and must be canceled." In her amended petition she said: "Ham had no notice of the fraud. His deed is valid, and his title to the land good. My original allegations were not true, and I now ask that the deed be confirmed, and that I have judgment for the unpaid purchase money due by him on the land."

It is a general principle of equity that one who purchases pending a suit in which the title to land, or a lien upon it, is involved, does so subject to the final judgment in the cause. His title must abide the result of the suit, whether he be made a party or not. It shares the fate which would have befallen the title had it remained in his vendor. But the title of the lis pendens purchaser is not affected, unless the suit is brought to a successful termination as against his vendor. 2 Pom. Eq. § 634. Should it be ended by a dismissal, or abandonment by the adverse party, the rights of the purchaser remain as if the suit had never been commenced. No subsequent suit founded upon the same cause of action, much less one which seeks a different remedy for different reasons against the same land, can interfere with his title, or bind it by the judgment rendered in the cause, unless he is made a party thereto. But the abandonment of one cause of action, and the adoption of a new one by amendment, is in effect the dismissal of the former suit, and the commencement of a new one upon a different cause of action; hence the necessity for making all persons whose interests are to be affected by a judgment upon the amended pleadings parties to the suit. If they were already parties, and had appeared and answered, and were therefore before the court, they would be bound to take notice of the amendment without any additional service upon them. If not, such service would be necessary to bind them by the newly-sought decree. In our decisions such an amendment is always treated as a new suit, and all defenses accruing down to the date of the amendment may be pleaded in bar of the action, and the costs of the old suit are charged to the plaintiff. Hence a party who buys the property in controversy during the progress of the suit under the original pleadings is a lis pendens purchaser only as to the controversy created by them. As to the new controversy between the parties, he has purchased before suit brought, and cannot be affected by any judgment rendered therein, unless made a party to the cause. It is the policy of the law to prevent alienations of property in litigation, which place it beyond the reach of the successful party, and compel him to submit to another suit for its recovery; but it is also the policy of the law that no unfounded demand shall tie up property in the hands of a party to a suit till his adversary can reach it by a claim to mature or be procured in the future, or one which he held, but would not assert, at the commencement of the suit....