Worthington v. CoLLINS'S Adm'r.
| Decision Date | 11 April 1894 |
| Parties | worthington v. CoLLINS'S Adm'r et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Where an agreement is rescinded, the general rule is, that it must be rescinded entirely, and the parties be placed as near as may be in statu quo.
Where the rescission is made on account of the vendor's default the general rule is, that the vendee is entitled to have the purchase-money paid by him with its interest returned, also to be paid for permanent improvements made in good faith; but he is to be charged with the reasonable rents and profits after deducting the amount paid for taxes, and is also to be charged for any waste by him committed.
A case in which these principles are applied. Sequel to Worthington v. Staunton, 16 W. Va. 208.
W. S. Laidley and Geo. S. Couch, for appellant cited 16 W. Va. 228; 2 Warv. Vend. & Pur. 878; 3 Leigh 113; 11 Gratt. 468; 25 Am. Dec. 155; 12 Am. Dec. 453.
Mollohan & McClintic and Geo. E. Price, for appellees. Holt, Judge:
This is the sequal of the case of Worthington v. Staunton, 16 W. Ya. 208, decided in 1880, by which' the contract of sale and deed of conveyance of certain real estate in Kanawha county, made by Worthington and others to R. H. Collins, was cancelled and annulled; as were the notes and bonds executed by Collins for the balance of the purchasemoney; aud the cause was remanded to the Circuit Court of Kanawha county with instructions to place the vendee, Collins, and his vendors and grantors, Worthington and others, in statu quo and to take such account or accounts as might be necessary for that purpose, according to the rules and principles of courts of equity in cases of the rescinding of contracts, and further to proceed with the cause according to the principles settled in the opinion of the court and according to the principles and rules governing courts of equity. The cause came back, this mandate was entered, and, the death of Richard H. Collins haying been suggested, the cause was revived as to such defendant in the name of Roman Pickens, sheriff of Kanawha county and as such administrator of the personal estate of the decedent, R, H. Collins; and the Circuit Court referred the cause to Commissioner D. C. Gallaher, to take the accounts directed to be taken; but he having resigned leaving the orders unexecuted, on December 16, 1890, the cause was referred to Commissioner Fontaine, to act in the place of Commissioner Gallaher, and he was ordered and directed to take and report such accounts as had been ordered by this Court to be taken, in order to place vendee and vendor in statu quo in reference to the contract of sale which had been rescinded.
On the 3d day of December, 1892, the commissioner returned, and filed his report, together with the testimony taken and written evidence read by him touching the matters referred, in which he gives a full history of the case in both branches, as far as here involved, and gives as the conclusion to which lie has been brought, that the only thing now to be done in the case to place defendant R. H. Collins and his grantors, Worthington and others, in statu quo is to require Henry Worthington to repay the administrator of the estate of Collins the money, which was paid by Collins on account of the purchase with interest from the date of payment, viz., two thousand dollars with interest from the 1st day of April, 1858, to December 1, 1892, making a total on that day of six thousand one hundred and sixty dollars. To this report Henry Worthington excepted, but the Circuit Court on final hearing of the cause on the 11th day of February, 1893, overruled the exceptions and gave a decree in favor of Collins's administrator against Worthington for the sum of six thousand one hundred and eighty three dollars and thirty three cents, that being the aggregate of principal and interest to that date. From this decree, Henry Worthington obtained this appeal.
The ground of complaint is that he conveyed the land to Collins, full of cannel coal, and covered with its virgin forest of valuable timber, but, when the deed was rescinded, the land was returned to him without its coal, stripped of.the timber and otherwise comparatively worthless; and while to return to Collins the purchase money with its interest, would put him in statu quo, it would not put Worthington where he stood before the sale. This presents the question the only one now involved: Did Collins, while vendee under the rescinded contract, take coal or timber or in any way receive any rents, issues or profits from the land; or did any one commit such waste or secure such profits, for which Collins ought in equity to be held responsible to Worthington, the vendor?
To this question the commissioner makes answer that Collins is not chargeable with any of these tilings. The land was in a state of nature, and so remained until the contract of sale to Collins was rescinded, except the one hundred acres sold by Collins to Staunton. That a considerable amount of cannel coal and timber was taken oft the one hundred acre-tract by Staunton, and a considerable amount of timber from the residue of the tract by Staunton, but neither coal nor timber was ever taken off either tract by Collins, or by any one for him; or that Collins ever received any benefit from coal or timber thus taken, or is in any way responsible therefor. The inducement to Collins to buy the undivided half of that half lying south of the red line was the cannel coal, and the inducement to Staunton to buy the one hundred acres was the cannel coal. But it turned out that the'Work & Curran lot had not been partitioned by the red line had not been partitioned at all; and that, when it was partitioned, Collins did not get the land he bought, nor Staunton all of the one hundred acres he bought, ami this put it out of the power of Worthington and others to fullfi.ll their contract of sale to Collins, and that contract was rescinded; therefore it was not in power of Collins to fulfill his contract of sale to Staunton, nor could Worthington, who had guarantied it, fullfill it.
The written agreement of September 5, 1859, contained the following covenant:
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