Worthy v. Jonesville Oil Mill

• Citation: 57 S.E. 634,77 S.C. 69
• Parties: WORTHY v. JONESVILLE OIL MILL.
• Decision Date: 01 May 1907
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

57 S.E. 634

77 S.C. 69

WORTHY v. JONESVILLE OIL MILL.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 1, 1907

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Union County; Memminger Judge.

Action by Silas Worthy, by his guardian, against the Jonesville Oil Mill. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

J Ashby Sawyer and D. A. Townsend, for appellant. Carrel H Foster and De Pass & De Pass, for respondent.

WOODS J.

While plaintiff was engaged as a laborer feeding cotton seed cakes to the mill which ground them into meal, his arm was caught in the machinery and so mangled that it became necessary to amputate it. He recovered judgment against defendant cotton oil mill company for $500 damages, under the allegation that the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant in the following particulars: "In failure to inform plaintiff of the danger attendant upon his work; he being a new hand and unacquainted with said danger. In negligently and carelessly allowing a large quantity of cotton seed hulls, dirt, dust, and trash to accumulate about and upon said cogwheels which caught plaintiff's hand which almost entirely hid said cogwheels from view, and rendering it impossible for him to see said cogwheels in their rapid revolutions and avoid the danger of coming in contact with them. In carelessly and negligently failing to furnish sufficient light in the apartment where said 'mill' was situated, to enable plaintiff to see how to perform his aforesaid duties. In carelessly and negligently failing to inspect said room and machinery, which inspection could have disclosed the aforesaid defects. In negligently and carelessly failing to furnish plaintiff with safely protected machinery, and in failing to furnish him a safe place to work." The defendant appeals, and alleges error, first, in the refusal of the circuit judge to grant a nonsuit on the grounds: (1) The plaintiff had executed a release and had not repaid or tendered $10, the consideration received therefor; and (2) there was no evidence of negligence.

1. As to the first point, it is to be observed the plaintiff was an infant, not only at the time he signed the release, but also when the action was brought. The general rule laid down in Levister v. Railroad, 56 S.C. 508, 35 S.E. 207, and in Riggs v. Association, 61 S.C. 455, 39 S.E. 614 that, where a release of liability for a tort has been given, no action can be maintained for damages until the consideration received for the release has been repaid or tendered. But this rule does not apply to an infant who brings suit before he attains his majority. An infant's contract relating to the settlement of torts are no more binding than those relating to other business affairs. Deal v. Hanks, 3 McCord, 257; Baker v. Lovett, 6 Mass. 78, 4 Am. Dec. 89. The law, however, will not allow an infant to perpetrate a fraud; and, where he executes a release for value, the jury should inquire to what extent he has been really benefited by the consideration paid and take that into account in finding a verdict in his favor for damages. On this principle, in Scott v. Scott, 29 S.C. 420, 7 S.E. 811, an infant who repudiated and had annulled a purchase on her behalf of a house and lot was required to account for rents for the time she was in possession of the property. The real benefit, however; with which the infant must be charged is not measured by the amount of money paid to him, for the whole of it may have been squandered. The just rule is that the infant should be required to account for so much of the consideration received by him as has been used for purposes the court would sanction as being necessary for him, and so much as may still be in his hands in such form that the court could control it for his benefit if his majority has not been attained, or, if it has, for so much as the infant elected to...