Worthy v. Shields
| Decision Date | 28 February 1884 |
| Citation | 90 N.C. 192 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | J. A. WORTHY v. H. B. SHIELDS, Guardian. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
EJECTMENT tried at December Special Term, 1883, of MOORE Superior Court, before MacRae, J.
The defendant appealed.
Messrs. J. W. Hinsdale, McIver & Black and W. A. Guthrie, for plaintiff .
Messrs. M. S. Robins and W. E. Murchison, for defendant .
The plaintiff asserts title to the land described in the complaint, and demands the recovery of possession and damages for the wrongful withholding by the defendants. He also alleges that the defendants claim under a deed, in form and effect a mortgage (of which he annexes a copy), made by the former owner, D. R. McDonald, to the defendant A. R. McDonald, who, being a lunatic, is represented by his guardian, the defendant H. B. Shields, on February 11th, 1870, by virtue of which the mortgagee entered upon the premises, and from the value of the use and occupation as rents has received a larger sum than the secured debt and interest. He therefore asks for an account, and proffers to pay any deficiency found after applying the rents to the debt. The answer of the lunatic and guardian controverts the allegation of ownership, declares the deed to be and intended to be a conveyance of the land for the sum recited to be the consideration, with a condition by which the bargainor might, if he chose, within the period of one year thereafter, redeem, on restoring the purchase money and interest, but meanwhile was under no obligation to do so, or to pay the money. The others, tenants under their associate defendant, disclaim any independent title in themselves.
When the cause came on for trial, the defendant proposed to prepare and submit to the jury issues arising out of the controverted allegations contained in the pleadings, which the judge refused to allow, assigning as his reasons therefor that the claims mentioned in one of the articles in the answer in general terms, with the explanatory statements of counsel, grow out of the execution of a deed from the sheriff of Moore county to the said A. R. McDonald, pursuant to a sale under execution against said D. R. McDonald, of the estate and interest remaining in the latter in the disputed land, after his deed to the former, and are, as is the action in its scope, wholly equitable in their nature and proper to be tried and determined by the court without a jury.
To this ruling the defendant's exception taken in limine presents the only question we find it necessary to consider.
In Goldsborough v. Turner, 67 N. C., 403, where the purpose of the action was to set aside a deed for fraud practiced in inducing its execution, and a series of inquiries had been put to the jury and answered, RODMAN J. says in terms that “the judge may himself decide the issues of fact made in a case like this,” under sections 224 and 225 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that while he may seek the aid of a jury in determining matters of fact for his own guidance, he is not bound by the findings, but may arrive at and act upon different conclusions of his own--pursuing the former practice in courts of equity; yet this view of the relative administrative functions of the judge and jury, under the constitution and superseding system, was disavowed by the court in the opinion of the Chief-Justice delivered at the succeeding term in Lee v. Pearce, 68 N. C., 76.
Referring to the preceding case, he says: §18.
The words which are quoted by the Chief-Justice from section 10 are omitted from the correspondent section 9 contained in the amended constitution, and in place is substituted this sentence: “And the jurisdiction of said court over “issues of fact' and ‘questions of fact’ shall be the same exercised by it before the adoption of the constitution of one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight.”
The result upon the judicial power of this court produced by this change in the organic law came up for examination in Jones v. Boyd, 80 N. C., 258, and the distinction in the appellate jurisdiction over causes brought up for review on rulings in the courts of law and courts of equity, is plainly marked. It is there said that under the former system...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Erickson v. Starling
...of Stokes County v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77; Boles v. Caudle, 133 N.C. 528, 45 S.E. 835; Ely v. Early, 94 N.C. 1; Worthy v. Shields, 90 N.C. 192; Chasteen v. Martin, 81 N.C. Where issues of fact are raised by the pleadings in a cause and trial by jury is not waived, the verdict of......
-
Smith v. State
...Realty Corp. v. Kalman, 272 N.C. 201, 159 S.E.2d 193 (1967); Deal v. Sanitary District, 245 N.C. 74, 95 S.E.2d 362 (1956); Worthy v. Shields, 90 N.C. 192 (1884). In construing the limits of its original jurisdiction over claims against the State prior to 3 November 1970, this Court repeated......
-
Mcguinn v. City Of High Point, 666.
...found in those cases, formerly cognizable exclusively in equity, which are submitted on written and documentary proofs. Worthy v. Shields, 90 N.C. 192. The trial court determines the facts upon contradictory evidence or upon evidence permitting different inferences, as we are not authorized......
-
Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp.
...a jury trial necessarily attaches and any limitation on the amount of damages rests with the jury and the trial court.5 See Worthy v. Shields, 90 N.C. 192, 196 (1884) ("jury verdict cannot be disregarded"). To hold otherwise would constitute an impermissible interference with the jury's abs......