Wozniak v. US

• Decision Date: 09 December 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-0572-Y.
• Citation: 701 F. Supp. 259
• Parties: Mary J. WOZNIAK, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Edward S. Wozniak, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

701 F. Supp. 259

Mary J. WOZNIAK, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Edward S. Wozniak, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 88-0572-Y.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 9, 1988.

Frank L. Fragomeni, Jr., Flash and Athas, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Marianne Bowler, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

The plaintiff Mary J. Wozniak has brought suit against the defendant United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "Act") claiming that the defendant's negligence in allowing her husband to fall from a therapy table during treatment caused his death. The United States has moved to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff failed to comply with a jurisdictional prerequisite of the Act.

I. BACKGROUND

Edward Wozniak died on April 11, 1983 at the Jamaica Plain Veterans Administration Medical Center. Nearly two years later, on April 9, 1985, his widow, Mary Wozniak, filed an administrative claim alleging negligence on the part of hospital personnel. Mrs. Wozniak described herself on the claim form as administratrix of her husband's estate. In fact, she was not so appointed until October 14, 1986. The administrative claim was denied by the Veterans Administration on April 17, 1986 due to a jurisdictional deficiency, viz., Mrs. Wozniak's failure to provide documentation of her authority as administratrix to file the claim. The claim was denied a second time after reconsideration on November 6, 1987.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Mrs. Wozniak's Ability to Bring the Underlying Administrative Claim.

The United States contends that this suit is jurisdictionally deficient because 28 U.S. C. sec. 2675 and 28 C.F.R. sec. 14.3(c) (1986) require that the prerequisite administrative claim must be brought by the executrix or administratrix of the estate or by any person legally entitled to assert such a claim in accordance with applicable state law. Because Mrs. Wozniak had not been appointed administratrix during the two year period she had to file a claim, see 28 U.S.C. sec. 2401(b), the United States argues, she has failed to satisfy the Act's jurisdictional requirements.

As a preliminary matter, the Court observes that claims under the Act are governed by the law of the state in which the wrongful act occurred, in this case, Massachusetts. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152-53, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1852, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(b). In considering the government's argument, the Court is mindful of the First Circuit's admonition in Lopez v. United States, 758 F.2d 806 (1st Cir.1985) that the Act was intended to afford injured parties an opportunity for recovery "`as a matter of right,'" id. at 809 (citing S.Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, 31 1946), and not to "put up a barrier of technicalities to defeat their claims," id. at 809.

The argument of the United States fails for two reasons. First, 28 C.F.R. sec. 14.3 permits Mrs. Wozniak, regardless of her status as an administratrix, to bring an administrative claim. As noted, the regulation permits "any other person legally entitled to assert such a claim in accordance with applicable State law" to bring one. 28 C.F.R. sec. 14.3. Courts have interpreted this passage to mean that individuals, who are beneficiaries under the applicable state wrongful death statute, are competent to bring such administrative claims in satisfaction of 28 C.F.R. sec. 14.3. Van Fossen v. United States, 430 F.Supp. 1017, 1021 (N.D.Cal.1977) (holding that "any person who is intended to be the legal beneficiary of a wrongful death action under the substantive law of the place of the accident, is entitled to file an administrative claim"); see also Del Valle Rivera v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 347, 349 (D.P.R.1986) (following Van Fossen). Mrs. Wozniak, as the decedent's wife, is a beneficiary under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. See Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 229, secs. 1, 2. Her filing of an administrative claim thus satisfied 28 C.F.R. sec. 14.3 and 28 U.S.C. sec. 2675. This result is in keeping with the congressional intent behind the mandatory administrative claims procedure. As the Van Fossen court observed, the mandatory administrative claims procedure is designed to result in a more expeditious settlement of meritorious claims prior to trial. This procedure is "meant to benefit claimants and in no way is it designed to preclude claimants from their day in court." Id. at 1021-22.

Second, for the purposes of the Act, this Court holds that Mrs. Wozniak satisfies the administratrix requirement of sec. 14.3 in that her later appointment as an administratrix "related back" to her prior actions on behalf of the estate under Massachusetts law. See Pflugh v. United States, 124 F.Supp. 607 (W.D.Pa.1954) (finding the jurisdictional requirements of the Act satisfied where Pennsylvania law recognizes the relation back doctrine); cf. Avila v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 731 F.2d 616, 619-20 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that a father's claim for money expended in locating his retarded son deported to Mexico by the INS related back to his son's claim which had been filed within two years of the incident). Indeed, Massachusetts has long recognized the doctrine of relation back. See, e.g., Hatch v. Proctor, 102 Mass. 351 (1869); Alvord v. Marsh, 12 Allen 603 (1866); Shillaber v. Wyman, 15 Mass. 321, 324-25 & 325 note (unnumbered) (1818). The doctrine stands for the proposition that the actions of an individual, taken before appointment as administratrix of an estate, are made valid as the acts of a duly-appointed administratrix retrospectively upon the later appointment of the individual as administratrix. Thus, Mrs. Wozniak's filing of the administrative claim became the act of an administratrix under Massachusetts law at the time of her appointment fifteen months later.

Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972), relied on by the defendant, is inapplicable. In Gaudette, the defendant's wife filed suit for the wrongful death of her husband on behalf of her children. After the statute of limitations expired she was named administratrix of the estate. The case is inapposite because, unlike the administrative claim in the instant matter, the claim in Gaudette was filed after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 62, 64, 284 N.E.2d 222. Thus, there was no valid claim to which her later appointment as administratrix could relate back. Indeed, apparently recognizing this problem, the plaintiff there did not seek recovery for herself, but only for her children. Id. at 72 n. 8, 284 N.E.2d 222. The action with respect to the children was found to survive because the statute of limitations had not yet begun to run due to their disability as minors. See Mass.Gen. Laws ch. 260, sec. 7.

Pringle v. United States, 419 F.Supp. 289 (D.S.C.1976), on which the defendant also relies, is also inapposite here. In Pringle, the court, acting after the two year period had run, refused to allow the appointment of the plaintiff as administratrix of the decedent's estate to relate back to the plaintiff's administrative claim brought within the two year period because South Carolina law did not recognize the relation back doctrine. Id. at 291. Indeed it appears that, had South Carolina law been different, so would the outcome there.

Thus, Mrs. Wozniak satisfies sec. 14.3, either as an administratrix, or as a "person legally entitled to assert such a claim in accordance with applicable state law." This result works no prejudice on the government. It had notice of the claim within the two-year period and an opportunity to settle the matter.¹

B. The Loss of Consortium Claim.

The government also asserts that Mrs. Wozniak's claim for loss of consortium must be dismissed because it was never properly presented to the Veterans Administration. As a result, the Veterans Administration never had the opportunity to evaluate her claim.

It is well settled in Massachusetts that one spouse's claim for loss of consortium is separate and independent from the claim of the physically injured spouse. See, e.g., Feltch v. General Motors Corp., 383 Mass. 603, 606-08, 421 N.E.2d 67, 70-71 (1981); cf. Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 262, 271, 493 N.E.2d 206, 212 (1986) (holding that a child's claim for loss of consortium is separate and independent from the injured parent's claim), rev. denied, 398 Mass. 1103, 497 N.E.2d 1096 (1986). It is also well settled by an impressive number of cases that, where loss of consortium is a separate and independent claim under the applicable state law, it must be expressly raised in an administrative claim to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. See, e.g., Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831, 840 (8th Cir.1987); Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir.1983); Allen v. United States, 625 F.Supp. 841, 843 n. 1 (D.D.C.1986); Murray v. United States, 604 F.Supp. 444, 446 (E.D.Pa.1985); Swizdor v. United States, 581 F.Supp. 10, 12 (S.D.Iowa 1983); Collins v. General Motors Corp., 101 F.R.D. 1 (W.D.Pa.1982); Sheehan v. United States, 542 F.Supp. 18, 21 n. 2 (S.D.Miss.1982), aff'd sub nom. Gamspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom. Sheehan v. United States, 466 U.S. 975, 104 S.Ct. 2354, 80 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984); Stephan v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 323, 324 (W.D.Mich.1980); Walker v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 38, 42 (M.D.Fla.1978); Ryan v. United States, 457 F.Supp. 400, 402-03 (W.D.Pa.1978); Heaton v. United States, 383 F.Supp. 589, 590-91 (S.D.N.Y.1974).²

A rare exception to the courts' remarkable uniformity on this issue is Ottem by Ottem v. United States, 594 F.Supp. 283 (D.Minn.1984). There, the court refused to dismiss one plaintiff's loss of consortium claim, holding that although she did not file the required administrative claim, the government agency involved nevertheless...