Wozniak v. Wozniak (In re Wozniak)

• Decision Date: 29 December 2020
• Docket Number: D074813
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.5th 120,273 Cal.Rptr.3d 421
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Anna and Grzegorz WOZNIAK. Anna Wozniak, Appellant, v. Grzegorz Wozniak, Respondent.

59 Cal.App.5th 120

273 Cal.Rptr.3d 421

IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Anna and Grzegorz WOZNIAK.Anna Wozniak, Appellant,

v.Grzegorz Wozniak, Respondent.

D074813

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed December 29, 2020

A. Stephen Rocha for Appellant.

Richard G. Prantil, San Diego, for Respondent.

AARON, J.

I.INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a judgment in a marital dissolution action between Anna and Grzegorz Wozniak.¹ Anna challenges the trial court's characterization of a particular residence as the parties' community property. The record demonstrates that the property was originally owned by Anna as her separate property, but that at some point prior to 2006, Anna transmuted this property into community property. In 2006, Grzegorz prepared and executed an interspousal transfer deed, which, if effective, would have passed his community property interest in the residence to Anna. At trial, the parties disputed Anna's response to Grzegorz's attempted delivery of the interspousal transfer deed; Grzegorz testified that Anna rejected the deed, and Anna testified that she was surprised when Grzegorz presented the executed deed to her but that she ultimately took possession of it. Over the next six years, the deed was not recorded and both parties appear to agree that it remained in the marital residence. In 2012, after an incident in which a protective order was granted in favor of Grzegorz and against Anna, Anna took possession of the deed and recorded it.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court stated in its findings that it found Grzegorz's testimony about the deed to be credible and concluded that Anna had rejected the deed in 2006, and that as a result, no transmutation had been consummated between the parties at that time. The court further found that when Anna recorded the deed in 2012, Grzegorz no longer had the intent to transmute his community property interest to Anna. The trial court ultimately concluded that the property at issue was community property.

On appeal, Anna contends that the trial court erred in concluding that this residence was community property. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its analysis of the law regarding the transmutation of property between spouses and that the court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anna and Grzegorz were married for just under 16 years prior to their separation and the dissolution of the marriage. Because the parties were unable to reach a settlement as to the division of their assets during their dissolution proceedings, they proceeded to trial on multiple issues pertaining to the division of their property. The trial took place over two days in June 2018.

The issues on appeal involve the trial court's characterization of real property located in La Mesa, California (the La Mesa property) as community property at the time of the parties' separation.²

Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the La Mesa property had been Anna's separate property prior to the parties' marriage. However, at some point during the marriage, Anna converted title in the property to a joint tenancy with Grzegorz. According to Anna's trial testimony, she put Grzegorz on the title to the La Mesa property only for the purpose of refinancing a mortgage on that property.

At trial, there was a conflict in the testimony regarding what occurred after Grzegorz was placed on the title to the La Mesa property. According to Grzegorz, in 2006, he executed an interspousal transfer deed that would have transferred his community property interest in the La Mesa property to Anna, such that the La Mesa property would again be her separate property. According to Grzegorz, he prepared and executed the deed "in an attempt to put an end to the arguments and conflicts" between the parties. Grzegorz further testified that when he attempted to give the interspousal transfer deed to Anna, she "was surprised and questioned the deed," and "outright and immediately rejected the deed."

Grzegorz also testified that "he was convinced that [Anna] did not want the inter-spousal transfer deed and was not going to record it" because, in part, "a few months after he offered [Anna] the inter-spousal transfer deed [she] told him that she wanted everything to be community property." According to Grzegorz, as a result of this conversation, he executed a deed in May 2007 adding Anna to the title of a property that had previously been his separate property.

Anna testified that she had been given a deed by Grzegorz in 2006 in which he "relinquish[ed] back all of [his] interest to [Anna] to the [La Mesa property] without her involvement [ ]or knowledge beforehand of his actions as to this deed." Grzegorz's presentation of the deed "surprised" her. Anna understood that Grzegorz had prepared the deed and presented it to her in order to "maintain the parties' pre-marital real properties as separate properties of the respective parties who acquired them originally." According to Anna, she "accepted and took possession of the deed in 2006 and maintained it in her belongings ...."

Both parties agree that it was not until 2012 that Anna recorded the interspousal transfer deed. Grzegorz testified that in April 2012, Anna perpetrated domestic violence against him, and he obtained a protective order against her. According to Grzegorz, during the time that this protective order was in place, Anna entered the family residence in violation of the protective order and took the deed. At some point in 2012, Anna recorded the deed. Anna conceded at trial that she did not record the deed until 2012, after she and Grzegorz had separated.

In setting forth its "Decision After Trial," the trial court made the following statements, findings and conclusions regarding the La Mesa property:

"The [La Mesa] property was owned by petitioner³ prior to marriage. During marriage it was converted to a joint tenancy and refinanced and respondent was placed on the deed. Thus, under Family Code Section 2581, the home is presumed community property unless petitioner can meet the rebuttal burden. See, Rutter: California Practice Guide at Section 8:316. The court finds the petitioner did not sustain her burden of proof to rebut the presumption during the trial. Petitioner did not submit evidence sufficient to sustain her burden of proof to show a traceable Family Code Section 2640 reimbursement for the separate property contribution to this community asset.

"Respondent testified the community benefited from this refinance as the rate was lower. The best evidence of the value of the property is the Devlin appraisal of $570,000 from 2017. The property currently has a loan against it in the amount of $224,000 and a second in the amount of $52,178.

"Considerable time during the trial was spent on the issue of respondent's re-conveyance of the property to petitioner. In 2006, respondent executed an inter-spousal transfer deed to petitioner. He testified she refused the deed at that time. She did not record it upon receipt. Six years later, petitioner was the perpetrator of domestic violence against respondent. She was arrested and a restraining order was issued. She thereafter recorded the deed from 2006.

"The court finds that the petitioner has not overcome the presumption of undue influence for this transaction and moreover that a transmutation was not intended by the parties at the time of recordation and was not consummated in 2006. In re Marriage of Haines [ ] (1995) 33 C.A. [Cal.App.] 4^th 277, 293 . The court found the testimony of the respondent credible and the petitioner's testimony less than credible surrounding the circumstances of the alleged transmutation. As a result, the court finds that the attempted transmutation in 2006 was not consummated as the petitioner refused the deed. A transmutation may have been offered in 2006, but it was not accepted. Petitioner then recorded the rejected deed years later after perpetrating domestic violence against respondent at a time when there was no intent to effectuate a transmutation.

" ... The [La Mesa] property is awarded to petitioner as her sole and separate property and the equalizing payment is discussed below. Petitioner shall use her best efforts to re-finance the property or otherwise remove respondent from the current loan(s) secured by the property."

The court's "Decision After Trial" was entered on July 10, 2018, and constitutes the judgment in this case. Anna filed a timely notice of appeal on September 7, 2018.

III.DISCUSSION

On appeal, Anna argues that the trial court erred in concluding that no valid transmutation of Grzegorz's interest in the La Mesa property occurred during the parties' marriage. According to Anna, Grzegorz's execution of the interspousal transfer deed in 2006 was sufficient, by itself, to effectuate a transmutation of Grzegorz's interest in the property, and the trial court should not have incorporated "gift law" into transmutation law by focusing on whether she had rejected or accepted the deed at the time it was offered. Effectively, Anna argues that the transmutation of one spouse's property interest to the other's spouse property interest "is a unilateral act completed by the one spouse transferring the interest to the other spouse." (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) Anna further contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that she did not overcome the presumption of undue influence that arises when one spouse transfers property to the other so that the recipient obtains an advantage over the other in the transaction (see Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b) ).

1. Relevant legal standards

a. Ascertaining the characterization of property upon dissolution of a marriage

The characterization of property involves " ‘the process of classifying property as separate, community, or quasi-community.’ [Citation.]" ( In re Marriage of Ciprari ...