WP v. Poritz
| Decision Date | 01 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 96-97. |
| Citation | 931 F. Supp. 1199 |
| Parties | W.P., et al., Individually and as Representatives of a Class Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs, v. Deborah PORITZ, Attorney General of New Jersey; Jeffrey S. Blitz, Atlantic County Prosecutor; Charles R. Buckley, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor; Stephen G. Raymond, Burlington County Prosecutor; Joseph P. Audino, Acting Camden County Prosecutor; Stephen D. Moore, Cape May County Prosecutor; Neil S. Cooper, Acting Cumberland County Prosecutor; Clifford J. Minor, Essex County Prosecutor; Harris Y. Cotton, Gloucester County Prosecutor; Carmen Messano, Hudson County Prosecutor; Sharon B. Ransavage, Hunterdon County Prosecutor; Marryann K. Bielamowicz, Mercer County Prosecutor; Robert W. Gluck, Middlesex County Prosecutor; John Kaye, Monmouth County Prosecutor; W. Michael Murphy, Jr., Morris County Prosecutor; Daniel J. Carluccio, Ocean County Prosecutor; Ronald S. Fava, Passaic County Prosecutor; Ronald A. Epstein, Salem County Prosecutor; Melaine B. Campbell, Acting Somerset County Prosecutor; Dennis O'Leary, Sussex County Prosecutor; Edward Neafsey, Acting Union County Prosecutor; and John J. O'Reilly, Warren County Prosecutor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender by Michael Buncher, Chief Counsel, Edward Barocas, Special Counsel, Special Hearings Unit, Office of Public Defender, Trenton, New Jersey, for Plaintiffs.
Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General, by Jane Grall, Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorneys General, Rhonda S. Berliner-Gold, B. Stephan Finkel, Deputy Attorneys General, Trenton, New Jersey, for Defendant Deborah Poritz.
Clifford J. Minor, Essex County Prosecutor by Jane Deaterly Plaisted, Assistant Prosecutor, Newark, New Jersey, for Defendant County Prosecutors.
Dennis O'Leary, Sussex County Prosecutor by Thomas E. Bracken, Assistant Prosecutor, Newton, New Jersey, for Defendant Sussex County Prosecutor.
Ronald K. Chen, Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey, for amicus curiae ACLU.
Faith S. Hochberg, United States Attorney by George S. Leone, Assistant United States Attorney, Newark, New Jersey, for amicus curiae United States of America.
In their Second Amended Complaint the plaintiffs in this class action assert that the New Jersey Registration and Community Notification Laws (hereinafter "Megan's Law") is unconstitutional as applied retroactively to the plaintiff class because it violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution (Count II), its double jeopardy clause (Count III) and the procedural due process protections of the fourteenth amendment (Count IV). Count I sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pendente lite. That relief has previously been granted as reflected in prior Opinions and Orders of this Court. Shortly after the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, this Court certified the following plaintiff class, constituting:
All persons required to register as a sex offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 et seq. and whose offenses were committed prior to October 31, 1994, the effective date of the New Jersey Registration and Community Notification Laws, and who have been or will be classified as tier II or tier III offenders.
(Order, March 15, 1996).
Presently before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendant Deborah Poritz's motion for summary judgment on all Counts seeking final relief: Counts II, III and IV. All additional defendants, the county prosecutors, have joined in Attorney General Poritz's motion. Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(3). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion is denied and defendants' motion is granted.
Society's concern about sex offenders is an issue which is extremely important in modern society. The many efforts to address this issue have failed as often as they have succeeded. There is still much to be learned about the cause of these acts and how best to combat them.
The lack of societal success in this area is demonstrated nowhere more poignantly than in the death of seven-year-old Megan Kanka. The shock that the community would normally feel at the brutal death of a child was magnified tenfold by the fact that the alleged perpetrator was a twice-convicted sex offender. Thus, it is natural and appropriate that this incident would spur the public to demand quick and decisive actions on the part of its government to curtail such tragedies in the future.
However, government is at all times constrained by the limitations placed on it by the United States Constitution and the balancing of political and societal values contained on its pages. The rights which this Court examines today "are towering constitutional provisions of great importance to individual dignity, freedom, and liberty." Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 43, 662 A.2d 367 (1995).
It must be clearly and emphatically stated that what the Court here undertakes is not a balancing of the rights of sex offenders against the rights of their victims. Rather, it is an analysis of the breadth of the rights which every American holds, and the constitutional limitations on a government's power to infringe them. When the government violates an individual's constitutional rights, regardless of the propriety of its motivation, it is this Court's duty, if requested, to identify and redress such a violation.
In order to evaluate the statutes involved in this case it is necessary to review the circumstances that surrounded their passage. In the summer of 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted, molested and strangled near her home. (Cert. of Jane Grall, ¶ 2). The man accused of this reprehensible act, Jesse Timmendequas, was previously convicted of sex offenses involving young girls. (id.) The Kankas and many of the other neighborhood residents were unaware of the criminal history of Timmendequas and the other two convicted sex offenders with whom he lived. (Id.) Public reaction to this crime was intense and Governor Whitman and the State Legislature quickly responded to the clamor. Within one week of the discovery of Megan's body, both political branches had proposed extensive legislative and regulatory packages to address the issue. (Id., ¶¶ 4-6).
Within a month, the first versions of the Community Registration and Notification laws passed the General Assembly and the Senate. (Id., ¶¶ 13-15). In the General Assembly, the bills were declared "emergency" and therefore bypassed committee and were put to a vote the same day as the second reading. (Id., ¶ 13). The bills were conferenced and amended, and ultimately were signed into law on October 31, 1994. (Id., ¶¶ 13-19). The Registration and Notification statutes are two of ten statutes signed the same day which are collectively referred to as "Megan's Law" in memory of Megan Kanka. (Defendant's Br. at 3).
Megan's Law requires a system of registration for sex offenders and other offenders who have committed crimes against children1. (Id.) Once the individual has registered, he is then placed into one of three Tiers based upon the risk of reoffense, Tier I (low risk), Tier II (moderate risk), and Tier III (high risk). N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8. These classifications are made by the county prosecutors utilizing a "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale" developed by the Attorney General. (Id. at 3). Based upon the Tier Classification, segments of the public are provided with information about the registrant: law enforcement for Tier I; law enforcement and certain community organizations for Tier II; law enforcement, community organizations, and individuals likely to encounter the registrant for Tier III. (Id.)
Shortly after its passage, Megan's Law was challenged in both the federal and state courts. The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 662 A.2d 367 (1995). The Doe Court upheld the statute against ex post facto, double jeopardy, equal protection, administrative procedure act, privacy and due process challenges. See Doe, 142 N.J. at 12, 662 A.2d 367. That Court, however, found the statute to be lacking in its original form, and crafted a procedure of judicial review which it felt would adequately protect the liberty interests involved. Doe, 142 N.J. at 28-40, 662 A.2d 367. This holding was later augmented by that Court through a judicial order of October 23, 1995 specifically outlining the procedure to be followed in such review.
(Appendix to Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Plaintiffs' App.") at A-306-28). The Doe v. Poritz Court also limited the scope of notification under Tier II and Tier III to those organizations and persons "likely to encounter" the registrant. Doe, 142 N.J. at 35-38, 662 A.2d 367.
Prior to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Doe, the constitutionality of Megan's Law was addressed in this District in Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F.Supp. 666 (D.N.J.1995). Alexander Artway was found guilty of a sex offense and sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute. (Id. at 668). The trial judge found his conduct to be "characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior." (Id.) Prior to registration, Artway filed an action for a Declaratory Judgment to invalidate Megan's Law on the same grounds asserted by plaintiffs in the case at bar.
Judge Politan found the law to be violative of the ex post facto clause of Article I of the United States Constitution. In doing so, he applied the multifactor test enumerated by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). (Artway, 876 F.Supp. at 688-92). Specifically, the court...
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