Wren v. U. S. Dep't of Justice

Decision Date19 October 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 16–2234 (ABJ)
Citation282 F.Supp.3d 216
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
Parties Dajuan Lamarr WREN, Plaintiff, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.

Dajuan Lamarr Wren, Lisbon, OH, pro se.

Wyneva Johnson, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

On October 14, 2015, plaintiff Dajuan Lamarr Wren, a federal prisoner, filed a request under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a,1 and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"), seeking information from the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") about a particular Special Agent's training, employment history, and experience testifying in criminal trials. Compl. [Dkt. # 1] at 1–3; Ex. A to Compl. ("FOIA Request"). After the DEA denied plaintiff's request, he filed this lawsuit, pro se , against the DEA and the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"). Compl. at 1–2. In response to the lawsuit, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which is now pending before the Court. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 12] ("Defs.' Mot").

While this lawsuit was pending, defendants provided plaintiff with much of the information that he sought in his FOIA request. For the limited information that remains at issue, the Court will grant defendants' motion. The government is not required to disclose information under FOIA where no such record exists. And because plaintiff is not eligible or entitled to fees, the Court will deny that request as well.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 14, 2015, plaintiff submitted a request under FOIA and the Privacy Act to the DEA, seeking information about Special Agent Bryan Sartori, who had testified in plaintiff's criminal trial. Compl. at 4; FOIA Request. Plaintiff requested the following information:

(a) The date Special Agent Sartori was hired by the DEA;
(b) His law enforcement experience, including his dates of employment prior to joining the DEA;
(c) The dates he was trained at Quantico, Virginia;
(d) His history of field postings following training; and
(e) A list of criminal cases in which he has testified, including the case names, case numbers, and the court(s) name and location(s).

See FOIA Request. In a letter dated November 5, 2015, the DEA responded that it would not conduct any searches for the requested records without "consent, proof of death, ... or an overriding public interest" because "any non-public records responsive to [plaintiff's] request would be categorically exempt from disclosure" under FOIA Exemption 7(C). Ex. B. to Compl. [Dkt. # 1].

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal by letter dated November 19, 2015, asserting that the requested information was "neither non-public in nature nor an invasion of ... personal privacy," and he pointed out in that letter that Special Agent Sartori had already testified to much of this information during plaintiff's January 2011 criminal trial in "the Eastern Judicial District of Michigan, Criminal Case number 10–20137." Ex. C to Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. The DOJ's Office of Information Policy rejected plaintiff's appeal, citing FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Ex. D to Compl. [Dkt. # 1] ("Because any non-public records responsive to your request would be categorically exempt from disclosure, the FBI2 properly asserted [FOIA] Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and was not required to conduct a search for the requested records."); see also Decl. of Katherine L. Myrick [Dkt. # 12–1] ("Myrick Decl.") ¶ 9.

Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit and defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposed the motion, and in his opposition, he attached pages of the transcript from the criminal trial in which Special Agent Sartori testified as to many of the facts covered by his request. Pl.'s Opp. to Defs.' Mot. ("Pl.'s Opp."); Ex. 1 to Pl.'s Opp. [Dkt. # 14]. In their reply brief, defendants represented that plaintiff had, "for the first time, provided portions of the transcript from his criminal trial," in which Special Agent Sartori "testified about the biographical information that [p]laintiff sought in his FOIA request." Reply in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 20] ("Defs.' Reply") at 1–2. While defendants maintained their position that the information would likely still be protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C), in the interest of avoiding "needlessly extend[ed] litigation," they provided the information sought by the first four parts of plaintiff's FOIA request. Id. at 2–3; see also Decl. of Diane E. Filler [Dkt. # 20–1] ("Filler Decl."). The Court appreciates the defendants' decision to review their initial position and to make material available to plaintiff.

The only information that remains at issue is a list "of criminal cases in which [Special Agent Sartori] has testified, including case name and case number, and the court(s) name and location(s)." See FOIA Request. Defendants claim that the DEA does not maintain a system of records that contains that information, and that even if such information existed, it would be exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See Myrick Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a surreply; he did not respond to defendants' position on the remaining category of documents, but he did argue that he is entitled to fees in light of what he deems to be the government's bad faith in responding to his request. Pl.'s Surreply [Dkt. # 21] at 2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a FOIA case, the district court reviews the agency's decisions de novo and "the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) ; Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment." Brayton v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep. , 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must "designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The mere existence of an alleged factual dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is "material" only if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In the FOIA context, "the sufficiency of the agency's identification or retrieval procedure" must be "genuinely in issue" in order for summary judgment to be inappropriate. Weisberg v. DOJ , 627 F.2d 365, 371 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1980), quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat'l Sec. Agency , 610 F.2d 824, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing a party's motion, the court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.’ " Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (alterations omitted), quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam).

"Summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits" in FOIA cases when those affidavits "contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements," and when "they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith." Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv. , 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013), quoting Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. Dep't of Agric. , 455 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2006). However, a plaintiff cannot rebut the good faith presumption afforded to an agency's supporting affidavits through "purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents." SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991), quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA , 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Even if the nonmoving party fails to respond to the motion for summary judgment, or portions of that motion, a court cannot grant the motion solely on the basis that it was conceded. Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean , 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016). That is because the "burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why summary judgment is warranted." Id. , quoting Grimes v. District of Columbia , 794 F.3d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J., concurring). A district court "must determine for itself that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and then ‘should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.’ " Id. at 509, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Finally, the Court must take care to construe plaintiff's filings liberally, because complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Schnitzler v. United States , 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ; Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520–21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

ANALYSIS

FOIA requires the release of government records upon request. Its purpose is "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to...

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