Wrenn v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 15-162 (CKK)
Decision Date | 15 April 2016 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-162 (CKK) |
Citation | 179 F.Supp.3d 135 |
Parties | Brian Wrenn, et al., Plaintiffs v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Alan Gura, Gura & Possessky, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew J. Saindon, Chad Alan Naso, D.C. Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
In this case, Plaintiffs Brian Wrenn, Joshua Akery, Tyler Whidby, and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., challenge several provisions of the District of Columbia's licensing scheme for carrying handguns in public, including the permissive nature of the scheme and the “good reason/other proper reason” requirement for obtaining a concealed carry handgun license. On March 7, 2016, the Court denied Plaintiffs' [6] Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and the Court has set an Initial Scheduling Conference for May 9, 2016. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs have filed an interlocutory appeal of the Court's order denying the motion for preliminary injunction and have moved this Court to stay this case pending the resolution of the interlocutory appeal. Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record for purposes of this motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' [59] Motion to Stay Proceedings.
The Court reviewed the background of this case in its Memorandum Opinion regarding the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. See Wrenn v. D.C. , No. CV 15162 (CKK), 2016 WL 912174, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2016). The Court reserves further discussion of the relevant background for its discussion of the motion now before the Court.
' Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller , 523 U.S. 866, 880, 118 S.Ct. 1761, 140 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1998) (quoting Landis v. North American Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254–255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) ); see also Clinton v. Jones , 520 U.S. 681, 706, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). Moreover, a party requesting a stay of proceedings “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis , 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. 163.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize, as Plaintiffs do, that Plaintiffs are requesting a stay of further proceedings in this case, not a stay of this Court's prior Order. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to stay these proceedings pending the resolution of Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”), with respect to this Court's denial of their request for a preliminary injunction. Both sides refer the Court to various other cases in which a court has stayed its proceedings pending the outcome of other proceedings—whether on appeal or otherwise. However, the question of whether to stay a particular case is inextricably intertwined with the nature of the specific case. Accordingly, a lengthy discussion of other cases where courts have granted or refused stays would not facilitate the resolution of the essential question before this Court: have Plaintiffs shown that a stay is proper in this case, at the present time, given the interlocutory appeal now before the D.C. Circuit? With that in mind, the Court proceeds to consider the circumstances in this case, “weigh[ing] competing interests and maintain[ing] an even balance,” as the Court must. Air Line Pilots Ass'n , 523 U.S. at 880, 118 S.Ct. 1761.
Plaintiffs argue that the D.C. Circuit's resolution of the appeal will, at a minimum, provide substantial guidance to this Court going forward and, moreover, will “all but certainly resolve” the merits of this case. Pls.' Reply at 5. Therefore, they argue, a pause of proceedings before this Court is in the interest of judicial economy. Plaintiffs also argue—consistent with their general position—that discovery is unnecessary for a determination on the merits in this case. Defendants argue, in response, that the D.C. Circuit's decision on the interlocutory appeal is unlikely to be dispositive with respect to the merits of this case; that continuing with these proceedings is in the interest of judicial economy; and that additional delay will prejudice the District. Therefore, Defendants seek to proceed to a period of discovery, followed by the briefing of dispositive motions. See Parties' Local 16.3 Report, ECF No. 61.
The Court turns first to Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the place of discovery in this case. While the motion to stay does not directly ask the Court to resolve questions regarding discovery, it is necessary to address the question of discovery at a basic level because the Court's evaluation of the motion to stay depends, in part, on the nature of the proceedings that would take place absent a stay. In other words, it is possible—although not certain—that the equities regarding a stay would differ regarding cases proceeding directly to discovery and cases proceeding to dispositive motions. Moreover, the Court has the benefit of the parties' Local 16.3 Rule Report, prepared in advance of the Initial Scheduling Conference, in which the parties set out their positions regarding discovery and other future proceedings. See ECF No. 61. Therefore, the Court considers the place of discovery in this case before turning to the parties' other arguments regarding the requested stay.
With respect to discovery, Plaintiffs suggest that the record in this case is limited to the materials before the Council of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Council”) when it enacted the challenged legislation. See Pls.' Reply at 4. Yet, as this Court previously noted, the D.C. Circuit has emphasized that it is necessary to assess the evidentiary record assembled by the parties in order to determine whether the means chosen by the District of Columbia contribute to the governmental interests identified by the District “ ‘in a direct and material way,’ whether in one of the ways anticipated by the D.C. Council or otherwise.' ” Heller v. District of Columbia , 801 F.3d 264, 275 (D.C.Cir.2015)(Heller III ) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC , 512 U.S. 622, 662–64, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (Turner I )); see also Wrenn , 2016 WL 912174, at *10. In other words, the District is not limited to defending the challenged statutory scheme on the basis of information that was before the D.C. Council at the time of enactment. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, in what is known as Heller II, remanded the case to the district court for further evidentiary development because it could not adequately assess the constitutionality of certain provisions of the statutory scheme governing gun ownership on a record limited to the materials before the D.C. Council. See Heller v. District of Columbia , 670 F.3d 1244, 1258 (D.C.Cir.2011) (Heller II ). Indeed, on the appeal that followed that remand, in Heller III, the D.C. Circuit upheld certain elements of the statutory scheme explicitly on the bases of the evidence developed on remand, while it also concluded that other evidence developed was insufficient to uphold other features of the statutory scheme. Compare Heller III , 801 F.3d at 277 () with id. at 278–79 () (citations omitted); see also Heller v. D.C. , 814 F.3d 480 (D.C.Cir.2016) (Mem.) ( )(emphasizing “shortcomings in the record” before the Heller III court that undergirded that court's conclusions that certain provisions, including the one-pistol-per-month provision, were unconstitutional).
In light of the foregoing precedent from the D.C. Circuit, the Court is bound to permit a period of discovery. The nature and contours of that period will be discussed and determined at the May 9, 2016, Initial Scheduling Conference. However, the Court does not intend to entertain further argument on the necessity of discovery itself.
Before returning to the core question presented in Plaintiffs' motion to stay, the Court adds a final word with respect to Plaintiffs' argument regarding experts. Even beyond their commentary on the pointlessness of discovery in general, Plaintiffs further suggest that experts are improper in this case. See Pls.' Reply at 3-4 (). Clearly, it is not the place of experts to opine on the ultimately legality of the challenged statutory scheme. But that basic proposition is immaterial here because experts can , in the proper circumstances, comment on other matters within their technical expertise that may arise in this case. Indeed, on the remand that followed the D.C. Circuit's decision in Heller II, the district court admitted expert testimony upon conducting the required analysis under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (19...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Sai v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
... ... of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 14-1876 (RDM)United States District urt, District of Columbia.Signed April 15, 2016179 F.Supp.3d 129Sai, ... ...
-
United States ex rel. Vt. Nat'l Tel. Co. v. Northstar Wireless, L.L.C., Civil Action No. 15–728 (CKK)
...of whether a stay is warranted "is inextricably intertwined with the nature of the specific case." Wrenn v. District of Columbia , 179 F.Supp.3d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2016) (Kollar–Kotelly, J.). Accordingly, Defendants must show "that a stay is proper in this case, at the present time," given th......
-
Banks v. Booth
...make discovery conducted in the interim unnecessary or different in scope. Pls.' Opp'n at 1, 9; see, e.g., Wrenn v. Dist. of Columbia, 179 F. Supp. 3d 135, 139 (D.D.C. 2016) ("If it were certain that the D.C. Circuit's resolution of the interlocutory appeal would resolve this case, then the......