Wri Opportunity Loans II LLC v. Cooper
Decision Date | 23 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. B191590.,B191590. |
Citation | 154 Cal.App.4th 525,65 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | WRI OPPORTUNITY LOANS II LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald COOPER et al., Defendants and Appellants. |
Robert A. Lisnow, Los Angeles, and Randi R. Geffner for Defendants and Appellants.
Blue & Schoor and Charles D. Schoor, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellants Ronald I. Cooper and Ellen M. Cooper challenge summary judgment in favor of respondent WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC. (WRIO) in its action for payment of a loan guaranteed by appellants. We reverse.
There are no material disputes about the following facts: In 1999, the Coopers were the sole principals in Cooper Commons, LLC. (CC), which planned to build residential townhouses and condominiums on a property in West Hollywood.1 According to the budget for the project, the property was purchased for $5,979,066, and CC expected that the units, when completed, would sell for a total of $25,762,005. The senior and junior secured lenders on the project were, respectively, Comerica Bank—California (Comerica) and WRIO.
In November 1999, WRIO loaned $2,490,000 to CC. Under the loan documents, the loan matured in March 2002, and interest on the principal balance accrued at a rate equal to 2.0 percent above a reference rate set by the Bank of America (reference rate). The loan documents also contained provisions that accorded WRIO "additional interest." These provisions entitled WRIO to 4.0 percent of the gross sales price of each unit when it was sold to third parties not affiliated with CC; in addition, they awarded WRIO sums calculated according to a fixed schedule if other contingencies were to occur. By a written agreement, the Coopers personally guaranteed the performance of GC's obligations under the loan documents.
In June and December 2001, WRIO and CC amended the loan documents. The amendments increased the principal loan amount to $3,178,000, raised the interest rate to the greater of (i) 2.0 percent above the reference rate or (ii) 10.0 percent, and set the maturity date of the loan as June 12, 2002. In addition, the amendments increased the additional interest owed to WRIO upon sale of the unite to nonaffiliated parties: WRIO's share of the gross sales price of the first 15 units to be sold was raised to 5.0 percent, and its share of the gross sales price of the remaining units was raised to 4.5 percent. The Coopers expressly approved these amendments and agreed to guarantee CC's obligations, as amended.
On February 22, 2002, CC filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, and subsequently stated in that proceeding that WRIO held a secured claim for $3,178,000. No payment on WRIO's loan was made after the maturity date of June 12, 2002. In September 2002, the bankruptcy court authorized CC to obtain additional funding from Comerica to complete the construction of the project. The units in the project were completed and sold for a total of approximately $31.8 million. On March 2, 2005, WRIO demanded that the Coopers, as CC's guarantors, pay the amounts owed under the loan, but they did not respond.
On March 14, 2005, WRIO filed a complaint for breach of a written guaranty against the Coopers, and subsequently sought summary judgment, asserting that the Coopers were obliged to pay the principal and interest—including the so-called additional interest—that CC owed under the loan. When the Coopers opposed summary judgment on the ground that the loan was usurious, WRIO contended in its reply that the Coopers had waived a usury ; defense, and that the loan otherwise fell within an exemption to California usury law for shared appreciation loans (Civ. Code, § 1917 et seq.2). After the parties submitted additional briefing on the issues raised in WRIO's reply, the trial court granted summary judgment. On March 29, 2006, a judgment was entered awarding WRIO $6,634,300.82 plus additional accrued interest and costs.
The Coopers contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We agree.
(Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089.) We thus apply "" (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal. App.4th 1654, 1662, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 669.) The three steps are (1) identifying the issues framed by the complaint, (2) determining whether the moving party has made an adequate showing that negates the opponent's claim, and (3) determining whether the opposing party has raised a triable issue of fact. (Ibid.)
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) Once the plaintiff makes an adequate initial showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a triable issue of fact "as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." (Code.Civ.Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)
Aside from challenging one item of interest valued at $19,014.45, the Coopers do not contend on appeal that WRIO failed to carry its initial burden on summary judgment. Their central contention is that there are triable issues as to their usury defense. Before the trial court, they pointed to WRIO's investment analysis for the loan, as originally made, which projected that the loan would earn $1,441,418 over its 23-month term—including $1,032,080 in so-called "additional interest"—resulting in an interest rate of 38 percent, which exceeds the rate permitted by California usury law. In this connection, they submitted evidence that the maximum interest rate allowable under the usury law during the applicable period was 11.5 percent. WRIO did not dispute the Coopers' factual showing regarding the loan's interest rate, but asserted that the provisions for additional interest in the loan rendered it a shared appreciation loan exempt from the usury law. The trial court agreed with WRIO.
In view of the Coopers' factual showing regarding usury, we conclude they raised triable issues regarding the existence of a usury defense unless—as the trial court determined—the defense fails as a matter of law. Because neither party submitted extrinsic evidence bearing on the meaning of the loan documents and the pertinent historical facts regarding the loan are undisputed, the interpretation of the loan's provisions and its status as a shared appreciation loan are questions of law that we resolve de novo. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839 [contract interpretation]; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800-801, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 960 [ ].)3 We therefore begin our inquiry by examining the applicable legal principles.
Generally, 4 (Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1534-1535, 5 Cal. Rptr.3d 835 (Jones).) To be usurious, a contract "must in its inception require a payment of usury"; subsequent events do not render a legal contract usurious. (Sharp v. Mortgage Security Corp. (1932) 215 Cal. 287, 290, 9 P.2d 819; Strike v. Trans-West Discount Corp. (1979) 92 Cal App.3d 735, 745, 155 Cal.Rptr. 132.) The essential elements of a claim of usury are: (Ghirardo v. Antonioli supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 798, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 960.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, (Ghirardo v. Antonioli supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 798, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 960.)
The usury law is subject to numerous exceptions and statutory exemptions. (Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction Corp. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 701, 705-706, 274 Cal.Rptr. 404, 798 P.2d 1247; Jones, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1534-1535, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 835.) Because interest is usurious only when it is "absolutely repayable by the...
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