Wright v. Caffey, 41558

• Decision Date: 24 October 1960
• Docket Number: No. 41558,41558
• Citation: 123 So.2d 841,239 Miss. 470
• Parties: Mrs. Bettye WRIGHT v. Mrs. Ray CAFFEY.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 841

123 So.2d 841

239 Miss. 470

Mrs. Bettye WRIGHT v. Mrs. Ray CAFFEY.

No. 41558.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 24, 1960.

Frank O. Wynne, Jr., Cleveland, for appellant.

Maynard, Fitzerald & Maynard, Clarksdale, for appellee.

LEE, Justice.

Mrs. Bettye Wright sued Mr. and Mrs. Ray Caffey to recover damages for personal injuries and hospital bills on account of an injury which she sustained, allegedly, as a result of the negligence of the defendants. The allegations of her declaration were to the following effect:

Mrs. Wright, 80 years of age, the mother of Mrs. Caffey, lived in Cascilla, Mississippi. The Caffeys lived in Rosedale. On May 4, 1959, Mrs. Caffey invited her mother to visit her. Upon the mother's acceptance, Mrs. Caffey, in her car, brought her to Rosedale. The room in which the visitor was to stay was located on the southwest corner of the house. Access into and from the room was through the kitchen. It was Mrs. Wright's practice to remain in bed in the morning until 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock. To conform to this practice, Mrs. Caffey told her mother to remain in bed each morning and she would prepare breakfast and bring it to her. This course was followed for several days. At length Mrs. Wright became ill, and, on the advice of a doctor, she was confined to her bed. During this time, Mrs. Caffey prepared meals and served them to her mother in bed. Mrs. Caffey operated a beauty shop in the east side of the house, and had an early engagement with two of her customers on the morning of May 23, 1959. For that reason, she could not prepare breakfast for her family that day. She rose early and went to town to buy food for the day's dinner. On her return, she prepared dinner, placed it in the oven to cook, and went immediately to fulfill her engagements in the beauty parlor. Mrs. Caffey, the night before, for the purpose of feeding her son's dog, placed on the floor two bowls, one containing food and the other water. Mrs. Wright, after waiting some time for her breakfast, wanting to be helpful and not to disturb her daughter, arose and went to the kitchen to prepare her breakfast. As she was doing this, she stepped into the bowl of dog food, lost her balance, and fell with great violence. As a result, she averred that she was seriously and permanently injured, and was required to incur large hospital and medical bills.

The defendants answered in detail and denied that they were guilty of negligence. By demurrers therein, they also set up that the declaration did not in law state a cause of action.

Before the hearing, the plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal as to defendant, Ray Caffey. On the hearing of the demurrer of Mrs. Caffey, the same was sustained. When Mrs. Wright declined to plead further, the cause was finally dismissed; and she has appealed here.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer for the following reasons: (1) She went upon the premises as an invitee of the appellee. (2) If the court takes the position that she was a social guest and a bare licensee, still, when she became ill and the appellant undertook the duty of caring for her during her illness, then her status changed and she became an invitee of the appellee. And (3) If her status did not change to that of an invitee, the appellee was guilty of affirmative negligence in placing the bowl of dog food on the floor of the kitchen, knowing that the appellant, in order to leave her room, would go through the kitchen, and, in all probability, would not discover the hazardous condition for herself, due to her age and physical condition.

On the other hand, the appellee contends that the demurrer was properly sustained because: (1) Her duty to the appellant was that of a licensee only. (2) Such duty was to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring her. And (3) she was in fact guilty of no negligence.

The appellant, in her contention that she was an invitee, cites Patterson v. Sayers, 223 Miss. 444, 78 So.2d 467. In that case, Mrs. Patterson, an employee of Mississippi Automobile Club, called Sayers about his renewal membership in the club which had not been paid, and he told her to come to see him that afternoon at his office in the lobby of the Concord Hotel. He therefore knew that the business about which she wished to see him was their mutual interest in that membership. The opinion, in holding that Mrs. Patterson was an invitee, cited Nowell v. Harris, 219 Miss. 363, 68 So.2d 464, 467, as follows: 'An 'invitee' is defined as a person who goes on the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the business of the owner or occupant or for their mutual advantage.'

See also 65 C.J.S. Negligence Sec. 32a, p. 483, where it is said, generally speaking a 'licensee is on the premises by permission or sufferance only, and not by virtue of any business or contractual relation with the owner or occupant inuring to the mutual benefit of both.'

There is no sound basis on which it can be said that Mrs. Wright, on this visit to her daughter's home, was on the business of Mrs. Caffey, or for their mutual advantage.

Appellant also cites Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693, 696, 25 A.L.R.2d 592. In that case Mrs. Laube made occasional visits to the home of her daughter, Mrs. Stevenson, at which time she assisted with the household duties and the care of the baby. She had never used the stairs but once, and that was about a year and a half before. Actually the stairs had been in a defective and dangerous condition for all of that time, and the defendant knew about it. Mrs. Stevenson requested her mother to get a blanket from the cellar, but did not warn her of the dangerous stairs. The opinion, in pointing out that the phrase 'gratuitous licensee' includes 'social guests who, in a sense, are persons temporarily adopted into the possessor's family,' held that the daughter, under the circumstances, was under a duty to warn her mother of the danger.

But in 65 C.J.S. Negligence Sec. 32e, p. 489, it is said that 'One who comes on premises as a guest of the owner or occupant, or to receive a gratuitous favor, is usually regarded as a licensee.' In Sec. 35a, pp. 491-492 thereof, it is said that 'As a general rule, the owner or occupant of premises owes no affirmative duty of care with respect to a mere licensee on the premises, or, as usually stated, owes no duty to the licensee, except to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him; and, accordingly, a mere licensee generally has no cause of action because of an injury received through the negligence of the owner or occupant of the premises to which the license extends. * * *

'The most usual statement of the general rule is that no duty exists toward a mere licensee except to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him, or as otherwise stated, to refrain from injuring the licensee through such gross negligence as is equivalent to willfulness or wantonness, or to abstain from the doing of any...