Wright v. Castles

• Decision Date: 10 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 830878,830878
• Citation: 232 Va. 218,349 S.E.2d 125
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Richard B. WRIGHT, Jr. v. John G. CASTLES, et al. Record

Page 125

349 S.E.2d 125

232 Va. 218

Richard B. WRIGHT, Jr. v. John G. CASTLES, et al.

Record No. 830878.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Oct. 10, 1986.

Matthew B. Murray (Joseph W. Richmond, Richmond and Fishburne, Charlottesville, on brief), for appellant.

W.F. Drewry Gallalee (William D. Bayliss, Browder, Russell, Morris and Butcher, P.C., Richmond, on brief), for appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

STEPHENSON, Justice.

This appeal involves the res judicata effect of a chancery cause for injunctive relief on a subsequent action at law for compensatory and punitive damages. The same events gave rise to both proceedings.

The present case is an action at law brought in 1982 by Richard B. Wright, Jr., owner of Clare Mont Farm, against John G. and Dorothy T. Castles (collectively, Castles), owners of Santee Farm, a property adjoining Clare Mont Farm. In his motion for judgment, Wright alleged first that Castles falsely and maliciously slandered his title on several occasions by interfering with the use of Santee Park Road, a right of way across Santee Farm to Clare Mont Farm.

Wright next alleged that Castles wrongfully and tortiously interfered with the consummation of a contract by telling a potential buyer of Clare Mont Farm the right of way could not be used for heavy hauling such as fuel trucks. Finally, Wright requested $58,950 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Castles filed a plea of res judicata based on a prior equity proceeding. The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed the action for damages with prejudice.

In the previous chancery cause, Wright sought to enjoin John G. Castles from interfering with Wright's use of the road. Castles had erected a large sign at the entrance of the right of way stating that heavy hauling was prohibited over Santee Park Road.

Wright's bill of complaint asserted a right to injunctive relief based on the equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and laches. In his bill, Wright also prayed for "such other and further relief in the premises as the nature of the case may require or to equity may seem meet." The bill contained no prayer for an assessment of damages.

Evidence in the chancery cause was heard ore tenus. The evidence showed that the original deed to the predecessor in title of both Wright and Castles created two rights of way through Santee Farm to Clare Mont Farm, one of which was Santee Park Road. The original conveyance also contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting heavy hauling over Santee Park Road. However, when Wright bought Clare Mont Farm in early 1963, Santee Park Road was the only usable ingress to and egress from Clare Mont Farm.

Immediately after Wright bought the property, Castles advised him that previous Clare Mont Farm owners had used Santee Park Road for heavy hauling in violation of the restrictive covenant, and Castles had not complained. However, Castles said he now wished to reach an agreement with Wright concerning the road's use and maintenance. Although the parties made no agreement, Wright continued to use the road for all purposes with no complaint from Castles until 1978.

The evidence showed that Castles first erected the sign in 1978 after Wright moved from Clare Mont Farm and listed the property for sale. During the winter of 1978-79, Castles prevented a fuel truck from delivering heating fuel to the Clare Mont Farm residence, causing pipes to freeze and burst. In June 1979, Castles blocked the path of a tenant's moving truck with an automobile. One potential buyer testified he withdrew his offer to purchase Clare Mont Farm because of the sign. A real estate agent testified that the sign frightened potential buyers, and as a result, Wright had reduced the price of the property from $379,500 to $325,000.

At the conclusion of Wright's case, Castles made a motion to strike evidence relating to financial loss, which the court sustained after the following colloquy:

[Counsel for Wright]: Of course, we pray that the temporary injunction be made a permanent injunction to the complainant on the Santee Park Road for all purposes, including heavy hauling, and that is all.

The Court: All right, sir, you are not requesting any financial loss in this?

[Counsel for Wright]: Not in this case, Your Honor.

The Court: I will sustain the motion.

Subsequently, the parties compromised the chancery suit, and the court entered a final consent decree on August 26, 1981, permanently enjoining Castles from interfering with Wright's residential, agricultural, and equestrian use of the Santee Park Road right of way.

At the outset, we reject Castles' contention that the prayer for general relief in Wright's bill of complaint was sufficient to include the allegations and claims set forth in Wright's motion for judgment. Under a prayer for general relief, a court may grant only relief that is germane to the subject matter of the specific relief sought and when the plaintiff asserts some right arising from the specific allegation made. See Layton v. Seawall Enterprises, Inc., 231 Va. 402, 406, 344 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1986).

Castles also contends that when a plaintiff initiates an equity suit, he must seek in that proceeding all monetary damages to which he may be entitled. If the plaintiff fails to do so, Castles argues, he is precluded by res judicata from maintaining an action at law to recover such damages. Citing foreign authority, Castles appears to invite us to abrogate the long-standing distinction between law and chancery and adopt a "unified system."

We decline the invitation. The marked distinction between law and chancery, a product of the English legal system, continues to exist in the Commonwealth.

When a party seeks monetary damages caused by another's tortious conduct, he must bring his action on the law side of the court, and either party has a right to a jury trial. See Stanardsville Vol. Fire Co. v. Berry, 229 Va. 578, 583, 331 S.E.2d 466, 469-70 (1985); O'Brien v. Snow, 215 Va. 403, 405, 210 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1974). On the other hand, when a party seeks injunctive relief, he must sue in equity. In equity, a litigant has no constitutional right to trial by jury, Forbes & Co. v. So. Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 263-64, 108 S.E. 15, 21 (1921), and, absent a plea in equity, see Code § 8.01-336(D), no statutory right.

Moreover, a chancery suit is not res judicata to a subsequent law action unless the very matter in controversy in the pending action was decided in the prior suit. Pleasants v. Clements, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 474 (1831) (a chancery proceeding to rescind a contract does not bar a subsequent law action to recover damages for breach of warranty on the same contract). For res judicata purposes, four elements must concur: (1) identity of the remedies sought; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Mowry v. City of Virginia Beach, 198 Va. 205, 211, 93 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1956).

Castles, however, contends that in Patterson v. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 74 S.E.2d 204 (1953), we "held that a decree refusing an injunction against cutting timber was res judicata of a subsequent damage action for cutting the same timber." Castles suggests that Patterson supports his contention that Wright was required to prosecute his injunction suit and his damage claim in the same proceeding. We view Patterson differently.

The plaintiff in Patterson brought a law action to recover monetary damages for timber the defendant had cut from land allegedly owned by the plaintiff. The defendant filed a plea of res judicata based on a prior equity proceeding in which the plaintiff had sought to enjoin the defendant from cutting the same timber from the same land. The chancellor had denied the injunction because the plaintiff failed to prove his title to the land.

In the Patterson law action, whether the plaintiff owned the land was essential to determining whether he was entitled to damages. Because the issue of the plaintiff's title had been fully litigated and resolved against him in the equity proceeding, we held that the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining an action at law for damages for the cut timber. Id. at 612, 74 S.E.2d at 208. Thus, Patterson actually rests upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel, ^* not res judicata (res judicata was a misnomer). Neither Patterson nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel has any bearing on the present appeal.

Castles finally contends that "[t]o allow Wright to seek damages in a law action would be contrary to the well established doctrine of res judicata which prevents splitting of a cause of action." In support of this contention, Castles relies upon Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 168 Va. 284, 191 S.E. 608 (1937).

Jones involved two law actions based on one installment contract containing an acceleration clause making all monies immediately due upon default. In the first action, the creditor sued the debtor for a judgment...