Wright v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 14 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 53013,53013
• Citation: 164 N.W.2d 180
• Parties: Cherry WRIGHT, Administratrix of the Estate of Irma Daniels, Appellant, v. Melvin DANIELS, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 180

164 N.W.2d 180

Cherry WRIGHT, Administratrix of the Estate of Irma Daniels, Appellant, v. Melvin DANIELS, Appellee.

No. 53013.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 14, 1969.

Gene L. Needles, Des Moines, for appellant.

Mitchell, Mitchell & Murray, Fort Dodge, for appellee.

SNELL, Justice.

Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of Irma Daniels, deceased, appealed from the trial court's ruling sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss.

There is no factual dispute and the case is before us on an agreed record from which the following appears.

Irma Daniels, now deceased, and Melvin Daniels, defendant herein, were wife and husband.

Defendant inflicted grievous injuries on his wife resulting in her death. Defendant was tried for murder and convicted of manslaughter.

Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Irma Daniels, sought recovery for her untimely death from her surviving husband.

Plaintiff's petition is in two separately numbered divisions. In Division I plaintiff alleged defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of decedent's untimely death.

Division II alleged defendant's assault was willful and malicious. Actual and exemplary damages were sought.

Defendant's motion to dismiss urged that under the doctrine of interspousal immunity there was no right or cause of action against defendant for willful or negligent torts committed during coverture.

On appeal plaintiff argues that statutory changes abrogate the rule in Iowa.

Whether or not the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been changed by statute in Iowa is the only issue before us.

I. Interspousal immunity in civil cases is of early common law origin. For willful injuries inflicted upon a spouse the guilty party might be subjected to the penalties prescribed by criminal law but was not subject to suit for damages.

Under the common law prior to Lord Campbell's Act causes of action in tort died with the injured party. Lord Campbell's Act created a new cause of action in favor of those who suffered financial loss resulting from the wrongful death.

Iowa was one of the early states to abolish the common law rule that civil liability of a tortfeasor died with the death of the injured party, but ours are survival statutes. See sections 611.20 and 611.22, Code of Iowa. These statutes do not create new causes of action. They preserve rights. In the case before us if no cause of action existed in favor of the deceased wife there was nothing preserved for her administratrix.

The right of civil remedy is not merged in a public offense. Section 611.21, Code of Iowa.

The developments in the law as to measure of damage and the right to recover for loss of consortium are not involved in the problem before us. The issue before us is the existence of a cause of action and not the measure of damage. Neither are the various married woman's statutes removing the common law disabilities of married women. Interspousal immunity applies to married status and does not depend on sex.

The issue here is confined to the statutory right of a husband or wife or a decedent's fiduciary, for the benefit of the decedent's estate, to maintain an action for tortious injuries inflicted during coverture. In Iowa as well as in many jurisdictions there has been no right to maintain such an action. None of the changes or developments mentioned invades the common law rule of interspousal immunity.

In the case before us plaintiff's petition alleged both negligence and willful injury. The trial court dismissed both claims. Logically, there would be far more reason to recognize a claim based on willful and malicious conduct that one based on mere negligence. If there was no cause of action under Division II of plaintiff's petition there could be no cause of action under Division I. We will accordingly direct our primary attention to cases where an intentional injury or malice was necessarily involved.

II. In Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa 383, 384 (decided in 1871), after discussing common law disabilities this appears:

'* * * by our statutes the whole policy of the common law in respect to these disabilities of married women has been changed.'

On page 387 it is held that a married woman's right to sue for injuries is a property right.

In Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (decided in 1875) a wife claimed damages from her husband, from whom she was separated, for eleven distinct assaults and batteries. On page 183 this appears:

'Whilst it must be admitted that very radical changes have been made in the relation of husband and wife, still it seems to us that these changes do not yet reach the extent of allowing either husband or wife to sue the other for a personal injury committed during coverture.'

It was argued that under the Musselman case, supra, the right to maintain an action necessarily followed recognition of a property right. The court said that 'this course of reasoning assumes the very thing to be established.' (loc. cit. 184) The court rejected the argument and held that the wife could not sue her husband for a tort.

III. In Re Estate of Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553, decided in 1927, was a proceeding in probate for establishment of a claim for damages. The wife was shot and killed by her husband who then shot himself. The wife's administrator sued the husband's executor. The sole question before the court was: 'May the wife maintain an action against her husband for personal injuries negligently or willfully inflicted upon her by her husband?' The court said that no such action would lie at common law. After analyzing the statutes the court held that an action would not lie thereunder.

IV. In Aldrich v. Tracy, 222 Iowa 84, 269 N.W. 30, decided in 1936, the wife was murdered through accomplices. Her husband was convicted of murder and hanged. The wife's administrator brought action for damages. After the husband's execution his executor was substituted as defendant. The court posed the question in these words:

'On the merits of the case itself, one proposition only is presented for our consideration: Did the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Mabel B. Tracy, deceased, have the right to maintain an action against her surviving husband, Reginald S. Tracy, because of the wrongful injuries and death inflicted upon Mabel B. Tracy by the defendant, Reginald S. Tracy?' (loc. cit. 86--87, loc. cit. 31 of 269 N.W.)

The court answered the question:

'If either a man or a woman be single, he or she may maintain such action against any other person; but if either a man or woman be married, he or she cannot maintain such an action against his or her wife or husband.' (loc. cit. 91, loc. cit. 33 of 269 N.W.)

In the case before us it is neither claimed nor argued that these pronouncements have ever been overruled or modified in Iowa by judicial pronouncement. Reversal is sought solely on the claim of change by statute.

V. The soundness of the judicial doctrine of interspousal immunity is not argued.

In Newmire v. Maxwell, Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 74, 80, this appears:

'We are firmly commited to the rule that, * * * we may not reverse on grounds not stated or argued * * * (Citations).'

VI. The argument that interspousal immunity has been abrogated by statute is answered in Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 133 N.W.2d 907, decided in 1965. In that case a wife sued her husband for damages resulting from his negligent operation of his automobile. Willfulness was not involved. The authorities, statutes and legislative intent were considered. We said:

'As so amended this statute has remained unchanged and is now Code section 613.11 I.C.A. The amendment gives no indication of any legislative intent to abrogate the interspousal immunity rule. If it is to be done we are committed to the proposition the legislature must do so in such clear language as to leave no doubt in the mind of anyone. We find no such expression in our present statutes.' (loc. cit. 555, loc. cit. 912 of 133 N.W.2d)

VII. For a discussion as to the nature of wrongful death actions in Iowa see Cardamon v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 256 Iowa 506, 519, 520, 128 N.W.2d 226. We reaffirmed the rule that ours are survival statutes keeping alive a decedent's right to recover. The nature of our statute is important. See Division IX, infra.

VIII. In Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 149 N.W.2d 789, we considered what is now a part of section 613.15, Code of 1966. We said that the amendment by the 61st General Assembly was to equalize the measure of damage for wrongful injury or death of a woman and those attendant upon the injury or death of a man. (loc. cit. 793) We also said:

'It remains we are committed to the rule that damages are essentially a part of the remedy.

'In the field of jurisprudence, the term 'right' connotes the capacity of asserting a legally enforceable claim.' (loc. cit. 792)

In the case before us if plaintiff's decedent had no legally enforceable claim, plaintiff's action for damages cannot be maintained. Decedent's estate was the party plaintiff and nothing survived.

IX. In 22 Am.Jur.2d, Death § 80, this appears:

'Where the statutes removing the disabilities of married women do not give the wife a right to sue the husband for a personal tort, it has been held that an action cannot be maintained against him for causing her death by wrongful act. * * *

'It has been said that the disability of the wife to sue is personal to her and does not inhere in the tort itself, that an assault on her is wrongful even though she is under a personal disability to sue, and that the reasons for the rule of immunity between husband and wife do not exist where the husband kills the wife and thus destroys the marital relationship. Accordingly, it has been held that a daughter could recover against her stepfather for damages for killing her mother. It may be noted that this decision was made in a state in which the statutory beneficiary's cause of action is independent of...