Wright v. Dept. of Corrections
| Citation | 48 S.W.3d 663 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. S.D. 2001) Richard M. Wright, Appellant Pro Se, v. Department of Corrections, Respondent. WD59077 0 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 2001 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Byron L. Kinder
Counsel for Appellant: Party Acting Pro Se
Counsel for Respondent: Frank A. Jung
Opinion Summary: Richard Wright filed a petition for Declaratory Judgment in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri. Thirteen days after the petition was filed and prior to Respondent entering its appearance and filing any motions or responsive pleadings, the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed Wright's petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Wright appeals that determination.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Division I holds: Wright's allegations in his petition made it clear that there was a justiciable issue that was presently appropriate for judicial review. Thus, the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was, in essence, a ruling on the merits of Wright's claim. The trial court's implicit disposition on the merits was not procedurally consistent with a dismissal for failure to state a claim and thus constituted reversible error.
Richard Wright appeals the dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On July 20, 2000, Wright filed a petition for Declaratory Judgment in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri. In his pro se petition, he alleged he was confined in the Missouri Department of Corrections. The petition then generally alleged the following facts. On June 26, 1996, Wright committed the class C felony of forgery (Offense I), for which he was sentenced on January 6, 1997, to five years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. On April 5, 1997, Wright committed the class B felony of burglary in the first degree (Offense II), for which he was sentenced on June 2, 1997, to eight years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. These two sentences were to run concurrently. On July 24, 1998, while serving those concurrent terms, Wright committed the class C felony of tampering with a motor vehicle (Offense III), for which he was sentenced on January 19, 1999, to three years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. This third sentence was to run consecutive to the sentences Wright received for Offenses I and II. Wright further alleged that the Missouri Department of Corrections was improperly interpreting section 558.019, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1999, and denying him parole consideration until he served forty percent (40%) of his sentence on Offense III. He asserted the Department's conduct violated the "ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution," as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the plain language of section 558.019, RSMo Cum Supp. 1999. Wright's petition prayed for a declaratory judgment that the Department's denial of parole consideration violated all of the constitutional and statutory provisions previously alleged.
On August 2, 2000, thirteen days after the petition was filed and prior to Respondent entering its appearance and filing any motions or responsive pleadings, the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed Wright's petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Wright appeals that determination.
In determining the sufficiency of a petition for declaratory judgment, we deem all well-pleaded facts in the petition to be true and construe the averments liberally, drawing all reasonable and fair inferences from the facts pleaded. Roy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 23 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). "'If the allegations in the petition invoke principles of substantive law which, if proved, entitles the pleader to a declaration of rights or status, the pleading is sufficient and must not be dismissed.'" Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Missouri Atty. Gen., 922 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)). The petition must contain facts to support its allegations, not mere conclusions. Id. "To be ripe for declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy must exist." Farm Bureau Town and Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Angoff, 909 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Mo. banc 1995). "'If the facts demonstrate any justiciable controversy, the trial court should declare the rights of the parties.'" Roy, 23 S.W.3d at 742-43 (quoting Jones v. Carnahan, 965 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998)). "Declaratory judgment actions should not be resorted to for the purpose of giving advisory opinions." Angoff, 909 S.W.2d at 353.
The crux of Wright's complaint relates to the legislative amendment of section 558.019 in 1998. Prior to the amendment, section 558.019.2, RSMo 1994, provided:
The provisions of this section shall be applicable to all classes of felonies except those set forth in chapter 195, RSMo, and those otherwise excluded in subsection 1 of this section. For purposes of this section, prior remands to the department of corrections shall not include commitment to a regimented discipline program established pursuant to section 217.378, RSMo. Other provisions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, any defendant who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of a felony other than a dangerous felony as defined in section 556.061, RSMo, and is committed to the department of corrections shall be required to serve the following minimum prison terms:
(1) If the defendant has one previous remand to the department of corrections for a felony offense, the minimum prison term which the defendant must serve shall be forty percent of his sentence or until the defendant attains seventy years of age, and has served at least forty percent of the sentence imposed, whichever occurs first;
(2) If the defendant has two previous remands to the department of corrections for felonies unrelated to the present offense, the minimum prison term which the defendant must serve shall be fifty percent of his sentence or until the defendant attains seventy years of age, and has served at least forty percent of the sentence imposed, whichever occurs first;
(3) If the defendant has three or more previous remands to the department of corrections for felonies unrelated to the present offense, the minimum prison term which the defendant must serve shall be eighty percent of his sentence or until the defendant attains seventy years of age, and has served at least forty percent of the sentence imposed, whichever occurs first.The 1998 amendment changed section 558.019.2 to read as follows:
The provisions of this section shall be applicable to all classes of felonies except those set forth in chapter 195, RSMo, and those otherwise excluded in subsection 1 of this section. For the purposes of this section, "prison commitment" means and is the receipt by the department of corrections of a defendant after sentencing. For purposes of this section, prior prison commitments to the department of corrections shall not include commitment to a regimented discipline program established pursuant to section 217.378, RSMo. Other provisions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, any defendant who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of a felony other than a dangerous felony as defined in section 556.061, RSMo, and is...
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