Wright v. Fulton County, (No. 7158.)
| Decision Date | 19 October 1929 |
| Docket Number | (No. 7158.) |
| Parties | WRIGHT, Comptroller General, v. FULTON COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Virlyn B. Moore, Judge.
Proceedings by Fulton County and others against W. A. Wright, Comptroller General, etc. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Troutman & Troutman, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Chas. B. Shelton, of Atlanta, Henry Reeves, of La Grange, and Ralph H. Pharr, of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
HINES, J. [1] 1. It is well settled by its decisions that this court will not declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional and void unless the repugnancy between the act and the constitution is clear and palpable. This court will never set aside a legislative enactment in a doubtful case. This principle is especially applicable in cases where the constitutionality of tax acts is questioned. Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229, 116 S. E. 795.
2. The county insists that the act of August 24, 1927, which imposes upon each distributor of motor fuels, engaged in such business in this state, an occupation tax of 4 cents per gallon for each and every gallon of such fuel imported and sold within this state, or imported and withdrawn for use within this state, or manufactured, refined, produced, or compounded within this state, and sold for use or consumption within this state, or used and consumed within this state by the manufacturer, refiner, producer, or compounder, is unconstitutional and void because it violates article 3, section 7, paragraph 8, of the Constitution of Georgia, which declares in part that, "No law or ordinance shall pass which * * * contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof." The specific contention is that the title of the act imposes a tax of 31/2 cents per gallon on motor fuels, whereas the body of the act imposes a tax of 4 cents on gasoline and 1 cent on kerosene; that the title levies a tax only upon fuel distributors engaged in business, while the body levies a tax upon all fuel distributors whether engaged in business or not; that the title attempts to levy an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this state, while the body in sections 1 and l(b) attempts to levy a tax upon a political subdivision which is not engaged in business, but which merely withdraws its own fuel for its own use, and that there is nothing in the title of the act to indicate that a political subdivision of the state would be required to pay an occupation tax.
The title of this act is as follows: "An Act providing for an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State, distributing two and one half cents per gallon of said motor-fuel tax for use in construction of the State-aid system of roads, and one cent to the several counties of this State; requiring such distributors to register, make returns, and give bond; providing penalties for violations of this Act, and for other purposes." It is insisted that this caption states the amount of the occupation tax to be levied un-der it at 31/2 cents per gallon. This contention is not well founded. The title of the act first recites that it provides for an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this state. So far the title does not fix the amount of tax to be levied. Under this part of the caption the Legislature could in the body of the act fix the tax without offending the above provision of" the Constitution. But it is insisted that the provision of the caption referring to the distribution of 21/2 cents per gallon of said tax for use in the construction of the state-aid roads, and 1 cent thereof to the several counties of this state, limits the total amount of the tax to be levied to the sum of the two portions of the tax thug distributed. This reasoning is not sound. The title of this act states that its purpose is to levy an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this state, without specifying the amount of such occupation tax. It then states that there is to be a distribution of 21/2cents per gallon for use in construction of roads and 1 cent to the several counties. The provision for such distribution was not intended to fix or indicate the total amount of the tax, but was intended to put the members of the Legislature on notice that 21/2 cents per gallon of whatever tax was imposed in the body of the act would be used in the construction of the state-aid road system, and that 1 cent per gallon of such tax, as fixed by the body of the act, would go to the counties of the state. The imposition of the tax and the distribution thereof or of portions thereof are separate and distinct things. It cannot reasonably be said that the provisions in the title of this act for the distribution of 21/2 cents per gallon of said tax for road purposes and of 1 cent thereof to the several counties were intended to indicate or fix the amount of the tax to be imposed by the body of the act. It follows that it cannot be held that section 2 of the act, which imposes upon distributors 4 cents per gallon for each and every gallon of motor fuel distributed by them, and section 2-A of the act, which imposes a tax of 1 cent per gallon on kerosene distributed by them, contain matter different from what is expressed in the caption.
It is next insisted that the caption of the act recites that it is one "providing for an occupation tax upon all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State, " and that this provision of the title is not broad enough to cover the imposition of an occupation tax upon political subdivisions of this state. This position is not sound. The caption states that the purpose of this act is to impose an occupation tax upon all distributors engaged in the business of distributing these products. The expression "all distributors" is broad enough to cover political subdivisions of the state. It is true that, if the body of the act had not gone further in its Iangauge in imposing the tax than the above language of the caption, the courts would not construe the act to embrace political subdivisions of the state. In other words, the act must be broad enough in its terms to show clearly that it was the intention of the Legislature to impose a tax on such subdivisions; and if this does not clearly appear from the terms of the act, the courts would not construe it to impose an occupation tax upon such political subdivisions. Where, however, the words of the caption indicate the imposition of an occupation tax upon all distributors engaged in business in this state, and the body of the act defines distributors as including political subdivisions of the state, and clearly imposes such tax upon subdivisions, the act will not be declared unconstitutional because it contains matter different from what is expressed in the title.
This section of the Constitution does not require that the title should contain a synopsis of the law. Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21, 27, 50 Am. Dee. 306. The general object of the law is all that need be indicated by the title. Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224, 227, 51 Am. Rep. 259. Minute details should be omitted. Provisions germane to the general subject-matter embraced In the title of an act, and which are designed to carry into effect the purpose for which it is passed, may be constitutionally enacted therein, though not referred to in the title otherwise than by the use of the words "and for other purposes." Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S. E. 74, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007. A title which reasonably expresses the general subject of legislation covers all matters properly connected with the general subject and germane thereto. Martin v. Broach, Howell v. State, supra; Davis v. Warde, 155 Ga. 749, 771, 118 S. E. 378; Wilson v. Supreme Forest, 156 Ga. 403, 407, 119 S. E. 394. Titles exceedingly brief, general, and indefinite have been held sufficient. Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38; Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 700, 30 S. E. 759, 42 It. R. A. 181. Under the caption of an act "to provide for the collection of the special taxes imposed by law on dealers in spirituous or malt liquors, or intoxicating bitters, and for other purposes, " a provision in the body that upon a failure to pay such tax a dealer could be indicted and punished for a misdemeanor was not obnoxious to this part of the Constitution. Brown v. State, supra.
We can see no valid reason why the Legislature in the body of an act cannot define words or terms used in the caption. This is now very common in legislative practice. So where the Legislature in the caption of an act recites that its purpose is to levy an occupation tax on all distributors engaged in business in this state, it could in the body of the act constitutionally define the word "distributors" and the expression "engaged in busi-ness, " without thereby making the act obnoxious to this provision of the Constitution. Definitions in the body of the act of words or general terms appearing in the caption do not infringe this constitutional provision. So under the caption of this act it was competent for the Legislature in the body of the act to define the expression "all distributors of motor-fuels and kerosene engaged in business in this State, " and to declare that this term should embrace political subdivisions of the state, although such subdivisions were not engaged in selling such products to the public for gain, but were merely importing and withdrawing them from the tank cars or other original containers or packages, in which they were imported for their own use in this state. In Tarver v. Albany, 160 Ga. 251, 127. S. E. 856, 857, this court held that...
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