Wright v. Griffey

• Decision Date: 26 October 1893
• Citation: 35 N.E. 732,147 Ill. 496
• Parties: WRIGHT v. GRIFFEY et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

147 Ill. 496

35 N.E. 732

WRIGHT

v.GRIFFEY et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 26, 1893.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.

Bill by A. S. Wright against G. W. Griffey and the Silver Islet Mining & Milling Company to compel Griffey to transfer to complainant 100 shares of stock in said company, and to enjoin the company from transferring the stock on Griffey's order. Complainant alleged that Griffey held title to said stock in trust for him. This was denied by Griffey, who alleged that he and complainant were originally joint owners of all the stock of the company, and that these shares were his portion of what stock was left after several sales of stock had been made. Complainant had previously sued Griffey in assumpsit on a claim of $4,317.67. This action had resulted in a judgment for Griffey for $418.70. The circuit court held that this judgment was a bar to complainant's suit, and accordingly dismissed the bill for want of equity. This decree was affirmed by the appellate court. Complainant appeals. Affirmed.G. W. & J. T. Kretzinger, for appellant.

Runnells & Burry, for appellee.

SHOPE, J.

The single question presented by this record is whether complainant is estopped from the further prosecution of this cause by the judgment in the common-law suit brought by him against appellee in the superior court of Cook county. There is a well-founded distinction between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel to the prosecution of a second suit for the same cause of action, and its effect as an estoppel where the same question is again brought in issue, in another suit between the same parties, upon a different cause of action. Where the former adjudication is relied upon as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, it must be shown that the cause of action and thing to be recovered are the same in both proceedings. While the particular form of action may not be important, there must be, as is generally laid down, as between the two actions, identity of parties, of subjectmatter, and of cause of action, to constitute the first a bar to the second. Where, however, some controlling fact or question, material to the determination of both of the causes, has been adjudicated in the former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the same fact or question is again at issue between the same parties, its adjudication in the first will, if properly presented, be conclusive of the same question in the latter suit, irrespective of whether the cause of action is the same in both suits or not. The latter is, in some of the cases, designated as ‘estoppel by verdict.’ Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351;Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596;Tilley v. Bridges, 105 Ill. 336;Attorney General v. Chicago & E. R. Co., 112 Ill. 520;Umlauf v. Umlauf, 117 Ill. 583, 6 N. E. 455; Freem. Judgm. 254-260; Bigelow, Estop. 36 et seq., and cases cited. In Hanna v. Read, supra, we said: ‘Whether the adjudication relied on as an estoppel goes to a single question, or all the questions, involved in a case, the fundamental principle upon which it is allowed in either case is that justice and public policy alike demand that a matter consisting of one or many questions, which has been solemnly adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be deemed finally and conclusively settled in any subsequent litigation between the same parties, where the same question or questions arise, except when the litigation is a direct proceeding for the purpose of reversing or setting aside such adjudication.’ And in Attorney General v. Chicago & E. R. Co., supra, after quoting from the opinion in the case last mentioned, this court, by the late Mr. Justice Scholfield, said: ‘This doctrine is limited to matters necessarily involved in the litigation; but it is equally applicable whether the point was itself the ultimate vital point, or only incidental, but still necessary to the decision of that point.’ The defense interposed in this case clearly falls within the class of estoppels last referred to, and the objection to its interposition for the reason that the cause of action was not the same in both suits cannot prevail.

It is also insisted that the judgment in the common-law action is not conclusive, in this suit, of the matter there determined, because the parties are not identical. The point made is that, the Silver Islet Mining & Milling Company being a party to this, and not to the former, proceeding, the judgment therein is not admissible to conclude the complainant. The contention is without merit. The company, by its answer, disclaimed any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, and stands indifferently between the parties, ready to conform to any decree the court may enter between the parties to the controversy. The only relief asked against it is to preserve the right of complainant in statu quo as against the defendant Griffey, or by way of execution of the decree to be obtained against him. The company is, at best, but a nominal party. The entire litigation is between Wright and Griffey, and if they have litigation over the same question or matters in another suit, in a court of competent jurisdiction, where they have been adjudicated, there is neither reason nor authority for holding that they are not concluded by such adjudication because the complainant sees proper, or deems it necessary, to join a mere nominal party, having no interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Thompson v. Roberts, 24 How. 233; Follansbee v. Walker, 74 Pa. St. 306; Hitchin v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 779; Lawrence v. Vernon, 3 Sum. 20; Hanna v. Read, supra; Bigelow, Estop. (2d Ed.) 46 et seq.

It remains, therefore, to be seen, whether any matter material to the issue in the common-law suit was necessarily determined in that action which, as evidence, is conclusive of the right to the relief sought by the complainant in his original bill. Ordinarily, the pleadings in the former suit, when introduced, will show what was within the issue tried and determined therein. A fact or question is no less at issue or within the conclusive effect of the verdict and judgment because the averment of the declaration and traverse are general. The difference between cases when the issue is thus general, and those where it is limited by the pleading to a single point, is that the matter...