Wright v. Interurban Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1920
• Docket Number: No. 33507.,33507.
• Citation: 179 N.W. 877,189 Iowa 1315
• Parties: WRIGHT v. INTERURBAN RY. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

189 Iowa 1315

179 N.W. 877

WRIGHT

v.INTERURBAN RY. CO.

No. 33507.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 20, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Hubert Utterback, Judge.

The plaintiff brings this action at law under the federal Employers' Liability Act, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by him by reason of the defendant's negligence. On trial to a jury there was a directed verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Samuel A. Anderson, of St. Paul, Minn., and J. E. Holmes, of Des Moines, for appellant.

W. H. McHenry, A. B. Howland, C. R. Bennett, and C. Woodbridge, all of Des Moines, for appellee.

WEAVER, C. J.

The defendant owns and operates an interurban electric railway extending from the city of Des Moines to the city of Colfax. At the intermediate town of Mitchellville it maintains a station building, one room or distinct part of which is usually occupied by what is spoken of in the record as a “substation.” In the substation, when in use, are electric wires, transformers, and other items of equipment employed in operating the road. The two main or primary wires so used enter the room at a point about 16 feet above the floor. In June, 1918, defendant undertook to reconstruct or make quite extensive changes in the substation. To accommodate that work a portable substation was arranged in a car located on the railway track wholly outside of the building; the primary wires were cut off at or near the point where they entered the room, and provided with a disconnecting switch, which, when open, arrested the current and enabled the employee to work with safety in all parts of the room. During all the period from June, 1918, until plaintiff was injured in February, 1919, the substation room remained dismantled of its electrical equipment, and no use was made therein of the current. It appears, however, to have been the custom of the foreman to open the switch after the day's work was ended, and to disconnect it again each morning before work was resumed. During all the time this work of reconstruction was in progress no part of the work of operating the railway or controlling the movement of cars or trains therein was carried in or through said substation, but all work and business of that nature was done and carried on in and through the temporary or portable substation alone by employees other than plaintiff. For a year or more plaintiff had been employed by the defendant at other places on its line, when early in February, 1919, he was sent by defendant to Mitchellville to help in the completion of the work being done on the substation. A few days later he was assisting in putting up an iron “pipe rack,” bolting it to the inner wall of the building at or near the place of the disconnecting switch above mentioned. It was yet early in the morning, and it so happened that the foreman, contrary to his custom, had failed to disconnect the switch, and plaintiff, not noticing the failure, undertook to climb to his place of work on the pipe rack, thus coming in contact with some wire or other conductor heavily charged with electricity, and was very severely injured.

In this action plaintiff charges the defendant with negligence in failing to open the switch in the morning in question, and in ordering or directing him to work while the current was on, and without any warning to plaintiff of the fact.

Plaintiff further alleges that at the time of his injury the railway company was engaged in the business of interstate commerce, and that the work in which he was employed by the defendant was a part of such business of interstate commerce, and that he is therefore entitled to maintain this action under the federal Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665).

The defendant denies any negligence on its part, denies that plaintiff was employed in any work or service of interstate commerce, and pleads contributory negligence and assumption of risk.

[1][2] I. Was plaintiff, at the time of his injury, engaged in work of interstate commerce? It is stated in the record that the defendant is a common carrier of freights and passengers on its line between Des Moines and Colfax, and at times receives freights at its stations consigned to points outside of the state of Iowa and freights brought into the state by other carriers and delivered to it for carriage to stations on its own line; and that in rare instances it has sold passenger tickets to points outside of the state, but that it neither owns nor operates cars or trains outside or beyond the boundaries of the state of Iowa.

Upon the question whether a given act or employment partakes of the character of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court of the United States is the court of last resort. It has dealt with this subject on several occasions, and has declared the test is to be found in the answer to the question:

“Was the employé at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?” Shanks v. Railroad Co., 239 U. S. 556-558, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 189 (60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797).

Without attempting to enlarge upon this definition, can it be said that at the time when this plaintiff was injured he was engaged in a work so closely related to interstate commerce as to be practically a part of it?

Upon both principle and precedent we are of the opinion that this inquiry must be answered in the negative. It is doubtless true that this statute is intended for the protection and benefit of laborers in a hazardous employment of the highest importance to the public, and as such it should be liberally construed by the courts to promote its beneficent purpose. The federal court has in fact so construed it, and the test which it applies in the above quotation from the Shank Case is evidence of a purpose to make the statute as effective as its terms will warrant.

In the record now before us it cannot fairly be said that when injured plaintiff was engaged in work having any close or immediate relation to interstate commerce, or even to commerce of an intrastate character. The substation in which plaintiff was then at work was not being used for any purpose in connection with the work of...