Wright v. Maddox
Decision Date | 03 November 1926 |
Docket Number | (No. 7026.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Citation | 288 S.W. 560 |
Parties | WRIGHT v. MADDOX et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Royal R. Watkins, Judge.
Suit by Annie Maddox and husband against G. G. Wright. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
See, also, 286 S. W. 607.
John W. Pope and J. L. Zumwalt, both of Dallas, for appellant.
Miller & Godfrey, of Dallas, for appellees.
Suit by Annie Maddox and husband against G. G. Wright for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision between the car in which Mrs. Maddox was sitting parked at a curbing and a Pierce Arrow belonging to Wright, and being driven by his negro chauffeur, Lemon Bland. Trial to jury. Judgment for plaintiff under special issue verdict.
Appellant has filed thirty-two assignments of error; all of which are insisted upon in his brief. These assignments may be classified under five heads: (1) Those dealing with the overruling of special exceptions to plaintiffs' petition; (2) those dealing with the instructions to the jury in refusing a peremptory instruction, refusing a special issue, and complaining of special issues upon the subject of the liability of appellant for the acts of his chauffeur; (3) those relating to the court's special issues on the subject of negligence; (4) an assignment complaining of improper argument by plaintiffs' counsel; and (5) an assignment complaining of a special issue on the measure of damages.
The four special exceptions are so manifestly without merit that we do not deem it necessary to discuss them.
Under the second class of assignments appellant contends, in the first place, that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that Lemon Bland at the time of the collision was acting within the scope of his authority, and that appellant, under the undisputed evidence, is not responsible for his acts. The car had been left at a welding shop for repairs, and was later being driven to appellant's home by the chauffeur when the accident happened. Appellant's contentions are that the evidence conclusively shows that the chauffeur had no authority to get the car and drive it home; and, further, that the evidence conclusively shows that at the time of the accident the chauffeur was on a mission of his own, he having picked up a friend whom he had agreed to drive home.
There are a number of assignments relating to the manner in which this issue was submitted to the jury and other assignments questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings. By the thirty-second assignment appellant complains of the following statement made by appellees' counsel in his closing argument to the jury:
"Gentlemen of the jury, if you answer special issues Nos. 3 and 4 `No,' then this little woman has no case."
The trial court instructed the jury that this argument was improper; but it is contended, nevertheless, that its prejudicial effect was not thereby removed. Special issues Nos. 3 and 4 related to the matter of defendant's liability for the acts of his chauffeur.
We have reached the conclusion that under the evidence appellant was liable as a matter of law for the chauffeur's negligence, and this holding renders immaterial the assignments complaining of the charge in this regard and the assignment complaining of argument addressed alone to this particular phase of the case.
With reference to the liability of appellant for the chauffeur's negligence, the record shows the following: The accident occurred about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1922, on North Walton street, just north of Elm street, in Dallas, Tex. Appellant lived in a northeasterly direction from this point on Worth street. Lemon Bland was at that time in the employ of appellant as chauffeur. He had been in his employ continuously for several years and at different times since about 1912. His general duties were to look after appellant's automobiles, of which he had three, a Pierce Arrow, Hudson, and Ford; keep them in order and repair as far as his skill would permit; drive the several cars when directed by appellant or other members of his family; and do such other work around the place as he might be called upon to do. When a car needed repair necessitating its being taken to a shop, it was his duty to report to appellant, and appellant would give him instructions. At noon on the day of the accident, he reported to appellant that the Pierce Arrow needed repairs in reference to a pit cock on the gasoline tank and a brace on the running board; quoting from his testimony:
We quote the following other extracts from his testimony:
We quote the following from appellant's testimony:
About 6 o'clock in the evening Lemon went to the Southern Welding Company, and got the car and started to drive it home. From that point he drove east a short distance to Crowdus street, south on Crowdus one block to Main, east on Main two blocks, where he turned north into South Walton street. Just after he made this turn a negro friend of his, by the name of Walter Fish jumped on the running board and asked to be driven home. He lived on College street, and, in order to take him home, Lemon would have had to turn east on Indiana street and come back into Worth street from College instead of proceeding on North Walton street to Worth street. The following diagram shows the relative position of the several points...
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