Wright v. Miller
| Decision Date | 14 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 37486-9-I,37486-9-I |
| Citation | 93 Wn.App. 189,963 P.2d 934 |
| Parties | Dennis O. WRIGHT and Mary L. Wright, husband and wife, Respondents, v. Catherine D. MILLER and Kenneth Stocks, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Jane Elizabeth Rosenstein, Donald Clark Harrison, Jeffrey T. Broihier, Broihier & Wotipka, Seattle, for Respondents.
Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Seattle, for Appellants.
The Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973's (RLTA) proscription of lease provisions obligating a tenant to pay the landlord's attorney fees does not prohibit a lease provision providing attorney fees to the prevailing party in a dispute arising out of the agreement. The evil that the RLTA's proscription was designed to prevent, fee shifting to a party with little or no bargaining power, irrespective of the merits of a dispute, is not present in the context of prevailing party provisions. A subsequently enacted statute, RCW 4.84.330, specifically provides reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in any action on a lease, where such lease provides for fees and costs incurred in enforcing provisions of the lease. The trial court here correctly held that the tenants in this case failed to improve their position at trial following arbitration. As a result, the landlords are entitled to their attorney fees for the trial in an amount to be determined on remand, as well as fees and costs incurred on appeal.
The precise nature of the dispute that arose between the parties is unimportant to its resolution. Catherine Miller leased a residence owned by Dennis and Mary Wright. Later, Miller was joined in Seattle by her spouse Kenneth Stocks. While the lease was for a specific term, there were discussions between Dennis Wright and Catherine Miller about the Wrights' intentions with respect to the sale of the residence. Miller and Stocks claim there was an oral promise by the Wrights that they would not sell the house during the term of the lease. Circumstances changed and the Wrights put the house on the market during the term of the lease.
The Wrights' actions, or those of their agents, caused Miller and Stocks to believe it was necessary for them to move out of the leased premises before the expiration of the term. They paid rent for the period of their occupation, but not beyond. The residence was not relet or sold within the remaining period of the lease.
The Wrights brought suit for breach of contract, property damage, harassment, and infliction of mental distress. Miller and Stocks filed an answer denying the landlords' claims and asserting affirmative defenses. They also counterclaimed for breach of contract, outrage, harassment, barratry, quiet enjoyment, breach of the warranty of habitability, and a personal injury claim as a result of a fall inside the leased premises.
The case went to mandatory arbitration and was heard in January 1995. On February 1, 1995, the arbitrator found for the Wrights in the principal amount of $2,425, plus $151.50 in statutory costs, and $1,310.45 in attorney fees. The arbitrator reduced the award by $100 for the Wrights' failure to issue a proper tenant information statement as required under the Seattle Municipal Code. The total amount of the award filed on February 3, 1995 was $3,786.95.
Twenty days later, Miller and Stocks filed a request for a trial de novo. The notice was served and received by each party, but no proof of service was filed with the court within the 20-day period following the filing of the award.
Before trial, the extraneous cross claims for personal injuries, outrage, harassment In addition to appealing the face amount of the award, Miller and Stocks argued to the trial court that the arbitrator improperly granted attorney fees in the arbitration. The basis for recovery was RCW 59.18.310(2)(a), which Miller and Stocks claim does not provide for attorney fees, unlike RCW 59.18.310(2)(b), which grants reasonable attorney fees as part of compensatory damages. The trial court disagreed, finding that the prevailing party provision of the residential lease permitted an award of attorney fees. The court then held that Miller and Stocks failed to improve their position after trial de novo and, pursuant to Superior Court Mandatory Arbitration Rule (MAR) 7.3, awarded the Wrights $38,734.37 in attorney fees for services rendered following the entry of the arbitration award. The court also included the $1,310.45 imposed by the arbitrator as attorney fees, as well as the costs incurred at arbitration and at trial. Judgment was entered in the amount of $44,095.20. Miller and Stocks appeal.
and/or negligent infliction of emotional or mental distress were dismissed on summary judgment, leaving only the cross claims of breach of contract or abandonment and damage to the property. On the remaining claims the jury found for the Wrights in the principal amount of $2,467, including $143 in damages to the rental property. This amount is $42 greater than the arbitrator's award.
While recognizing that they were the parties requesting a de novo appeal to the superior court under MAR 7.1, and that they failed to file a proof of service with the court within the requisite time period, Miller and Stocks now claim the trial court should have dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because proof of service was not timely filed. 1 Based on case law this reasoning appears sound, but only in the abstract. Here, Miller and Stocks failed to file timely proof of service, pursued their claims at a trial de novo, and failed to question the defect in service until after they lost at trial. This court will not permit Miller and Stocks to benefit from an error they invited. 2 They waived the jurisdictional requirement, and the trial court did not err in going forward.
Miller and Stocks contend that the arbitrator and the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees, as fees are prohibited by RCW 59.18.230(2)(c), and further because liability arose under RCW 59.18.310(2)(a), which does not specifically provide for attorney fees. They argue they would have prevailed at trial if the trial court had properly concluded that the arbitrator erred in awarding the Wrights attorney fees. This improved position would result in an award of attorney fees to them rather than the Wrights.
The liability of the tenant for default and abandonment of the leased premises and the landlord's remedies are set forth in RCW 59.18.310. 3 The statute grants the lesser of either the remaining rent or mitigated damages plus attorney fees. This particular provision does not provide attorney fees if liability is based on the rent due for the remainder of the term. Accordingly, we agree that RCW 59.18.310 limits attorney fees where residential tenants fail to pay rent or abandon the premises. In fact, RCW 59.18.230(2)(c) is seemingly in accord with such a conclusion. 4 But the policy behind the prohibition of one-way attorney fees does not necessarily require the construction Miller and Stocks urge here.
RCW 59.18.310 is not the exclusive remedy concerning the award of attorney fees under lease agreements, even considering the proscriptions of RCW 59.18.230. RCW 4.84.330 mandates attorney fees to the prevailing party in disputes over a lease that includes a prevailing party provision. 5 Thus, we are confronted with two statutory provisions that seemingly conflict or are inconsistent on their face.
Statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read together and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to the provisions of each. 6 These provisions may be harmonized by putting them in historical context. RCW 59.18.230 of the RLTA, as enacted in 1973, was generally concerned with the evils of the substantial inequality in the bargaining position of the two parties, particularly one-way agreements favoring landlords then otherwise permitted by law. Landlords were allowed to shift fees to tenants possessing little or no bargaining power regardless of the merits of a claim. In enacting RCW 4.84.330 in 1977, the Legislature mandated the award of attorney fees and costs in any action on a contract or lease entered into after September 21, 1977. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of prior statutes and their judicial construction. Absent an express indication otherwise, new legislation will be presumed to be consistent with prior legislation. 7 Two statutes that relate to the same subject and are not actually in conflict are interpreted to give meaning and effect to each. 8
The lease before us does not limit the award of fees to the landlord only or shift fees from the landlord to the tenant, as would be proscribed by RCW 59.18.230. But it provides for an attorney fee award to the prevailing party, either landlord or tenant. RCW 4.84.330 manifests a legislative determination that the evil is removed in leases and elsewhere where the potential award is two-way, permitting awards to either the landlord or tenant depending on who prevails. Thus the policy behind the wording of the statutory prohibition of the RLTA does not apply to prevailing party provisions permitted by RCW 4.84.330, and specifically does not apply to the lease provision here.
Even if we view the statutes as irreconcilable, rules of statutory construction bolster our reasoning. In general, the rules of statutory construction give preference to the later-adopted statute 9 and to the more specific statute 10 if two statutes appear to conflict. 11 RCW 59.18.230 and .310 were enacted in 1973; RCW 4.84.330 was enacted four years later, in 1977, and is therefore entitled to greater weight. Additionally, RCW 4.84.330 is specific as to attorney fees in lease agreements, in contrast to the general proscription of one-way agreements in the RLTA. The more specific statute prevails.
Reasonable attorney fees under RCW 4.84.330 shall be granted...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lian v. Stalick
...of habitability under the RLTA. See Howard v. Horn, 61 Wash. App. 520, 525, 810 P.2d 1387 (1991); see also Wright v. Miller, 93 Wash.App. 189, 200-01, 963 P.2d 934 (1998), review denied, 138 Wash.2d 1017, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999) (citing both Stuart and Howard with approval). But, in Atherton C......
-
Pinckney v. Smith
...warranty of habitability unless the condition is so severe that the dwelling is actually unfit to live in. See Wright v. Miller, 93 Wash. App. 189, 200-01, 963 P.2d 934 (1998). Conversely, division three courts hold that the warranty applies whenever the defects of a structure pose an actua......
-
Pulich v. Dame
...who went to trial absent filing of proof of service request waived post-verdict objection to MAR 7.1(a) defect); Wright v. Miller, 93 Wash.App. 189, 195, 963 P.2d 934 (1998), review denied, 138 Wash.2d 1017, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999) (holding that under doctrine of invited error party waived pos......
-
Johnson v. Miller
......Smith, 484 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181-82 (W.D. Wash. 2007) ("In Washington, the warranty of. habitability has been legislatively codified in the. RLTA."); Tucker, 118 Wn.App. at 256. (recognizing cause of action for implied warranty of. habitability under RLTA); Wright v. Miller, 93. Wn.App. 189, 200, 963 P.2d 934 (1998) ("landlord may be. liable to a tenant for injuries caused by a defect in the. rental unit if there was a violation of the rental agreement,. a violation of the common law duty of ordinary care, or if. the defect was ......