Wright v. Patrick

Decision Date09 May 1974
Docket NumberNo. 19823,19823
Citation205 S.E.2d 175,262 S.C. 434
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesMargaret Patrick WRIGHT, Appellant, v. W. M. PATRICK, Respondent.

Melvin L. Roberts and Levy S. Alford, York, for appellant.

George A. Gill, Jr., Rock Hill, and Robinson, McFadden, Moore & Pope, Columbia, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

This is an action in equity for the specific performance of an oral contract to make a will alleged to have been entered into by the plaintiff-appellant, Margaret P. Wright, with her grandmother, Mrs. Margaret A. Patrick, who died intestate on October 8, 1972. The defendant-respondent, W. M. Patrick is the plaintiff's father and the son and sole heir at law of Mrs. Patrick.

Pursuant to the provisions of South Carolina Code § 10--1057 (1962), and with the consent of counsel for both sides, certain issues were submitted to a jury, and a special verdict on the basic factual questions involved in the litigation was rendered by it favorable to the plaintiff. It is from the trial judge's order granting the defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto that the plaintiff has appealed.

While six questions are propounded by the plaintiff in her brief, under the view we take we need answer only a single inquiry: Upon a consideration of all of the facts and surrounding circumstances, did the trial court err in refusing to lend to the plaintiff its equitable power to specifically enforce a contract to make a will?

In her complaint the plaintiff alleged that in July 1970 she and Mrs. Patrick agreed that in exchange for the plaintiff coming to the city of Rock Hill, South Carolina, with her husband and child, and devoting her time to helping Mrs. Patrick in her home and in her business, taking care of her during illness, and looking after her general welfare and comfort for the remainder of her life, Mrs. Patrick would bequeath and devise certain personal and real property to the plaintiff. It was further alleged that the plaintiff accepted, and fully performed her part of, the contract, but that Mrs. Patrick died about 27 months later, without leaving a will or other instrument conveying said property to the plaintiff.

The defendant's answer, although detailed in nature, may be fairly summarized as a denial of all of the material allegations of the complaint.

Mrs. Patrick was seventy-seven years of age at the time of her death. She had been a widow for many years, living in a large residence on Oakland Avenue in Rock Hill. There were five rooms or apartments in the dwelling and either seven or nine mobile homes on the premises which she rented. Several of the mobile homes on the premises were the property of the defendant. The plaintiff lived with Mrs. Patrick from the time she was an infant until she was married to Jimmie Wright in 1961. This was due to the fact that the defendant and his wife were separated while the plaintiff was an infant, and there is no question but that the relationship of the plaintiff and Mrs. Patrick was substantially that of daughter and mother. The plaintiff and Jimmie Wright were divorced in 1968, and shortly thereafter she moved to Florida to live with her mother and remained about three months. In January or February of 1969, she returned to Rock Hill and moved back into the house of Mrs. Patrick. After returning to Rock Hill, she began commuting to work in Charlotte, North Carolina, where she was employed until April of 1970. In July 1970, the plaintiff remarried Jimmie Wright and thereafter lived either with Mrs. Patrick in her Oakland Avenue home in Rock Hill or in Mrs. Patrick's cabin on the Catawba River, several miles away.

The principle witness for the plaintiff was her husband, Jimmie Wright. He testified that in July of 1970, on a Sunday afternoon, Mrs. Patrick told the plaintiff in his presence that she was not going to have anybody to take care of her when she was older and that if plaintiff, her husband, and their son would stay with her and help her, she would leave her property to the plaintiff with the exception of some property on Blackmon and Workman Streets, which she wanted to leave to the defendant. He stated that the plaintiff agreed to this at the time. He further testified that the plaintiff's duties were to do housework, cooking, helping Mrs. Patrick when somebody moved out of the apartments, and other general duties relating to the rental of the property and to Mrs. Patrick's welfare.

Mrs. Patrick was an industrious, independent, business woman possessed of considerable vigor up until shortly before her death. The plaintiff devoted time and attention to her after July 1970, but not greatly, if at all, different from the time and attention she devoted prior thereto. It is a fair summary of the testimony that during a good part of the time from July 1970 to the date of Mrs. Patrick's death, the plaintiff and her family maintained residence at the river cabin rather than at Mrs. Patrick's home on Oakland Avenue. The plaintiff admits residing at the river, but testified that she came daily to the home of Mrs. Patrick to assist with chores. Her activities were such as to lead the trial judge to the conclusion that the evidence did not support the finding that she complied with her part of the alleged contract.

While the complaint asserts that part of the alleged agreement between the plaintiff and Mrs. Patrick was that the former would come to Rock Hill and perform certain duties, it is uncontradicted that the plaintiff was living in Rock Hill with Mrs. Patrick and had been for some time prior to July 1970, the date of the alleged contract. It further appears from the testimony that the plaintiff had ceased to work in Charlotte in April of 1970, and that she was not induced by the alleged contract to quit work.

The other principle witness relied upon by the plaintiff was her cousin, Ronnie B. Hall, who testified that Mrs. Patrick had confirmed to him a few months after July 1970 that she had agreed with the plaintiff to will all of her property to her except the lots hereinabove mentioned, if the plaintiff would stay with her and perform certain services.

At the time of Mrs. Patrick's death, the defendant was seriously ill in the Veterans Hospital in Columbia. The plaintiff attempted to obtain letters of administration on the estate, but was unsuccessful due to the priority of appointment allowed the defendant.

As indicated hereinabove, the issues were submitted to a jury, and the following verdict was rendered by it on the factual questions submitted by the court:

'Question Number One: Did Margaret Patrick Wright, the Plaintiff, and Margaret A. Patrick, deceased, enter into a contract or agreement in July, 1970, whereby Maggie A. Patrick agreed to Will to Margaret Patrick Wright certain property at her death in consideration of Margaret Patrick Wright performing certain personal services for her during the remainder of her life?

'Answer: Yes.

'Question Number Two: If the answer to Question Number One is yes, did Margaret Patrick Wright, Plaintiff, fully perform the services for which she...

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8 cases
  • Crewe v. Blackmon
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 23 Abril 1986
    ... ... Hayes, 161 S.C. 293, 159 S.E. 620 (1931). Likewise, actions involving specific performance are equitable. Wright v. Patrick, 262 S.C. 434, ... 205 S.E.2d 175 (1974); Aiken Mortgage Co. v. Jones, 197 S.C. 245, 15 S.E.2d 119 (1941). We conclude that even ... ...
  • First State Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Nodine
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 28 Enero 1987
    ...1, we treat the case as one tried in equity, and will review the record and determine the facts for ourselves. Wright v. Patrick, 262 S.C. 434, 205 S.E.2d 175 (1974). Frances first argues that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in ruling that any testimony given by her concerning a......
  • Durham v. Blackard, 2086
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 6 Octubre 1993
    ...reviewed the entire record and determined the facts according to our view of the preponderance of the evidence. See Wright v. Patrick, 262 S.C. 434, 205 S.E.2d 175 (1974). Under the provisions of the Statute of Elizabeth, every conveyance made "... for any intent or purpose to delay, hinder......
  • Wright v. Trask
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 5 Noviembre 1997
    ...evidence. We disagree. An action for specific performance of a contract to make a will is an action in equity. Wright v. Patrick, 262 S.C. 434, 205 S.E.2d 175 (1974); Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 90 S.E. 177 (1916). "Because this is a proceeding in equity, we have the authority to find th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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