Wright v. Philadelphia Gas Works, CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-2655 (E.D. Pa. 10/2/2001)
| Decision Date | 02 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-2655. |
| Parties | NATHAN WRIGHT, v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Nathan Wright filed this action on May 30, 2001, against Philadelphia Gas Works ("PGW"), seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as employment reinstatement, attorney's fees, and costs, for violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count I), the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II), and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, as amended, Philadelphia Code, ch. 9, §§ 1100-1110 et seq (Count III).
Now before the court is Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint or in the Alternative to Dismiss Specific Allegations and/or Counts, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6), on the following grounds: 1. Plaintiff's complaint improperly attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1367, when in fact no such statute exists; 2. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to averments contained in Plaintiff's complaint in paragraphs 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, and 27; and 3. Plaintiff's complaint improperly seeks the imposition of punitive damages under civil rights legislation against a local government agency, where Defendant, a wholly-owned municipal entity, is not subject to the imposition of punitive damages. Defendant's motion is denied in part, to the extent that the court recognizes that "42 U.S.C. § 1367" is a typographical error and thus reads the plaintiff's invocation of supplemental jurisdiction as appropriately pled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For the reasons that follow, the remainder of Defendant's motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
Wright was hired to work for PGW in August 1984, as a telephone representative in the PGW Credit Collection Department. On January 11, 2000, PGW suspended Wright's employment for approximately 20 days, allegedly for making personal telephone calls at his work station and/or rolling customers' calls. Upon his return to work on February 8, 2000, Wright was required to sign a "Last Chance Agreement" ("LCA") in order to continue his employment.
Wright alleges, but does not specify, that white co-workers were not similarly suspended or required to sign an LCA to continue employment for conduct which was more egregious than that of which plaintiff was accused. He further alleges that he and other black employees were subjected to a hostile environment on account of their race, which included being subjected to racially derogatory terms — e.g., a supervisor named Hans on one occasion referred to plaintiff as a "boy." Wright complained to the Director of Collections, Paul Donahue, about Hans' conduct. The complaint does not specify as to whether Donahue took any positive action on the report of alleged misconduct, but avers that on May 8, 2000, PGW terminated Wright's employment. According to PGW, the termination was in response to customer complaints and/or allegations that he was rude and abusive to customers. The complaint avers that the termination was in retaliation for Wright's complaints about his supervisor's derogatory comment. (Compl. ¶ 18.)
Wright further avers that PGW received customer complaints about white employees, including customer complaints that the employees used racially derogatory terms, and did not terminate those white employees.
On November 6, 2000, Wright filed a Charge of Race Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which charge, as is that agency's practice, it filed jointly with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission ("PHRC") and the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations ("Commission"). In the EEOC charge, Wright alleged that on January 10, 2000, he was suspended for 20 days for making three or four personal telephone calls while at his workstation, and for allegedly "rolling" customers' calls, both work rule violations, and was required to sign an LCA upon his return to work. He further alleged that, on May 8, 2000, he was called into Human Resources and told that complaints had been received about his work performance on May 4 and 5, and was terminated on that day. Wright asserted that his discharge was racially motivated, in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA" or "Act"), 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951 et seq., because white employees, Daniel Keogh and Kevin Danhardt, who had more work infractions than he, and who had also violated their LCA's, were not terminated from PGW. The EEOC charge did not include any other allegations. On March 6, 2001, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter.
The instant complaint alleges racially motivated discharge, hostile work environment, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance ("PFPO"), as amended, Philadelphia Code, ch. 9, §§ 1100-1110 et seq. The latter two allegations were not referenced in his EEOC charge.
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if, accepting the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it appears that a plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle it to relief. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997); Unger v. National Residence Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1394-95 (3d Cir. 1990).
Motions to strike matters from pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(f), are disfavored by the courts and should not be granted, even in cases where averments complained of are literally within provisions of federal rule providing for striking of redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter, in absence of demonstration that allegations attacked have no possible relation to controversy and may prejudice other party. United States v. $200,226.00 in U.S. Currency, 864 F. Supp. 1414 (D.P.R. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 57 F.3d 1061 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 200 (D.N.J. 1993). Because none of plaintiff's allegations, as pled, is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous, or unrelated to the controversy alleged, defendant's motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) is denied.
The court now considers defendant's remaining arguments in support of the alternative motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
PGW argues that, although a single charge of discrimination was filed with the EEOC, which also became filed with the PHRC on plaintiff's behalf, it alleged only racially motivated discharge and did not allege hostile work environment or retaliation. Thus, PGW urges that those allegations must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is well settled that as a pre-condition to filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must first file charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 28 U.S.C. § 2000E-5(e); Charles v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 24 F. Supp.2d 484, 486 (D.V.I.) (citing Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1997). Since the EEOC charge is devoid of all claims except racially motivated discharge, the Title VII claims of hostile work environment and retaliation are dismissed with prejudice.
Similarly, a pre-condition to filing a lawsuit under the PHRA is the filing of a charge of discrimination with the PHRC or one of its local counterparts. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 959(h), 962(c); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997); Vincent v. Fuller, 616 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. 1992). Although Wright did not state a cause of action under the PHRA, but rather under the PFPO, defendant argues that this too requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The PHRA established the PHRC, which has the power and duty, inter alia, "[t]o initiate, receive, investigate, and pass upon complaints charging unlawful discriminatory practices." 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 957(f). In addition, the Act authorizes local governments to establish human relations commissions with powers and duties similar to those exercised by the PHRC. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 962.1(d). Under this authority, Philadelphia County established the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations ("Commission") to administer and enforce all statutes and ordinances prohibiting discrimination. The Commission is thus empowered to enforce Chapter 9-1100 of the PFPO, which, like the PHRA, prohibits employment discrimination based on race.
The PFPO outlines procedures for filing complaints of unlawful employment practices with the Philadelphia Commission, Philadelphia Code § 9-1107(1), similar to those required for filing complaints with the PHRC, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 959; however, section 9-1110 of the Philadelphia Code states that "notwithstanding . . . [these] provisions. . . any person aggrieved by a violation of this ordinance shall have a right of action in a court of competent jurisdiction and may recover for each violation. . . ." Plaintiff argues that since the PFPO provides for this private right of action in court, and because the PHRA (Pl. Resp. at 4-5.)
This court's review of Pennsylvania law reveals no Supreme Court precedent on the issue of whether an aggrieved party under the PFPO must first exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding to court. In order to predict how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would resolve this question of unsettled state law, the court should...
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