Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 August 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-7930,89-7930 |
| Citation | 937 F.2d 1556 |
| Parties | Sidney H. WRIGHT, III, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PREFERRED RESEARCH, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
George L. Beck, Jr., Dennis R. Pierson, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant-appellant.
Sidney H. Wright, III, pro se.
James A. Ward, III, Dothan, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Before JOHNSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
We consider Wright's motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Finding the motion meritorious, we dismiss the appeal.
The only background relevant to this case is its procedural history, which we will relate in some detail. In the district court plaintiff-appellee Sidney H. Wright, III (Wright), pursuant to a jury verdict, was awarded $7,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages. The judgment, set forth on a separate document in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, was entered on July 14, 1988, the day after the jury rendered its verdict. One week later, defendant-appellant Preferred Research, Inc. (Preferred) filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), for new trial, and for a stay of the proceedings. The district court granted Preferred's motion to stay the proceedings pending the disposition of Preferred's other motions.
On December 13, 1988, the district court denied the motion for JNOV and also denied the motion for new trial on condition that Wright consent to a remittitur of $1,350,000 not later than December 28, 1988. If Wright refused to consent, the court stated that it would order a new trial on the issue of damages. Wright filed both a consent to the remittitur and a motion to reconsider the remittitur order on December 28.
On January 4, 1989, Preferred filed its first of three notices of appeal. Two days later, the district court denied Wright's motion to reconsider the order of remittitur, but allowed Wright additional time in which to brief his request for equitable relief contained in the motion to reconsider the remittitur order. On January 31, 1989, the district court denied Wright's motion for reconsideration "in all remaining respects."
In April 1989, Wright filed a motion to dismiss Preferred's January 4, 1989 appeal as premature. In July 1989, upon consideration of that motion, a panel of this court entered an order dismissing Preferred's appeal. The panel reasoned that because Preferred filed its notice of appeal prior to the disposition of Wright's motion for reconsideration, the notice was premature. See Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc., No. 89-7014 (11th Cir., July 27, 1989). Preferred filed a timely petition for rehearing.
While the petition for rehearing was pending, counsel for Wright discovered that the only judgment entered in this case that was set forth on a separate document was the original judgment for $1,507,000. Wright's counsel made counsel for Preferred aware of this fact. Thereafter, both counsel requested that a new judgment on a separate document be entered. The district court complied with this request, stating in an order, "The parties having orally requested that the court enter a new judgment reflecting the remittitur in this case, it is ORDERED that the attached judgment is therefore entered." R.2-115-1. The attached judgment, set forth on a separate document, related Preferred's liability to Wright in accordance with the order of remittitur.
Twelve days later, Wright filed a motion to quash the December 1, 1989 judgment. On December 21, Preferred filed its second notice of appeal. On January 11, 1990, this court denied Preferred's petition for rehearing in a published opinion, Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc., 891 F.2d 886 (11th Cir.1990). The panel reaffirmed its earlier decision that Preferred's first notice of appeal was filed prematurely and was without effect. 1
On January 17, 1990, the district court denied Wright's motion to quash the December 1, 1989 judgment. The district judge was somewhat incredulous in noting that R.2-126-1. Finally, on February 1, 1990, Preferred filed its third notice of appeal in this case.
Preferred contends that because a separate document setting out the remitted judgment was not entered in compliance with Rule 58 until December 1, 1989, the time for appeal did not begin to run again until that date. Therefore, Preferred argues its December 21, 1989 notice of appeal was timely. Alternatively, Preferred asserts that if Wright's December 12, 1989 motion to quash tolled the time for appeal, then Preferred's February 1, 1990 notice of appeal was timely. Under either scenario, this court has jurisdiction over Preferred's appeal.
Wright argues that the judgment in this case became final on January 31, 1989, when the district court denied Wright's motion to reconsider the order of remittitur. Therefore, Wright contends, Preferred had 30 days from January 31, 1989 to file its notice of appeal; because Preferred failed to do so, its later notices of appeal are untimely and this court is without jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional question in this case can be simply stated. When a district court amends a judgment, for example by remitting the amount of the judgment, does Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 require that a separate document setting out the terms of the remitted judgment be entered before the time for appeal begins to run? If the answer is yes, we have jurisdiction over this appeal; if the answer is no, we are without jurisdiction.
The question presented is one of first impression in this circuit. We will first examine the language of Rule 58, then turn to case law interpreting the rule.
Rule 58 provides in relevant part:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the clerk, unless the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction by the court; (2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 (emphasis added). 2
The absence of any mention of remitted or amended judgments is one indication that the rule does not apply to amended judgments. Similarly, the notes accompanying the rule fail to mention remitted or amended judgments. Therefore, the language of the rule and the accompanying notes tell us the rule may not apply to amended judgments, but we cannot draw any concrete conclusions from the language and notes. 3 We turn to Supreme Court cases interpreting the rule.
Two Supreme Court cases delineate the basics of Rule 58. In United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973), the Court discussed the purpose of the 1963 amendment to the rule, which added the "separate document" requirement.
The reason for the "separate document" provision is clear from the notes of the advisory committee of the 1963 amendment. Prior to 1963, there was considerable uncertainty over what actions of the District Court would constitute an entry of judgment, and occasional grief to litigants as a result of this uncertainty. To eliminate these uncertainties, which spawned protracted litigation over a technical procedural matter, Rule 58 was amended to require that a judgment was to be effective only when set forth on a separate document.
Id. at 220, 93 S.Ct. at 1564 (citations omitted). The Indrelunas Court established that the rule must be mechanically applied in order to notify the parties regarding when the time for post-trial motions and appeal begins to run.
The Court revisited Rule 58 in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978). In Mallis, the Court held that where (1) the district court intends a document to be a final judgment and; (2) the judgment is entered in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a) and; (3) one party appeals despite the absence of a separate document, and; (4) the appellee does not object to the lack of a separate document, an appellate court may deem Rule 58's separate document requirement waived and take jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 386-88, 98 S.Ct. at 1121. The Court noted that "[t]he sole purpose of the separate document requirement, which was added to Rule 58 in 1963, was to clarify when the time for appeal ... begins to run." Id. at 384, 98 S.Ct. at 1120. The Court also remarked that the " " Id. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1121 (quoting 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice p 110.08. Unfortunately, the Court has never, either in Indrelunas and Mallis, or in any other case, discussed the precise question we confront today.
Our circuit has never addressed this issue either, and the law on the issue in other circuits is sparse. The Seventh Circuit has apparently concluded that Rule 58 does require the entry of a separate document where a judgment has...
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