Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 27 May 1977
• Parties: Gregory H. WRIGHT, Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 824

374 A.2d 824

Gregory H. WRIGHT, Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Dec. 15, 1976.

Decided May 27, 1977.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

John B. Kennedy, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.

Merritt Burke, III, and Lawrence B. Steele, III, Deputy Attys. Gen., Georgetown, on behalf of the State of Delaware, Georgetown, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, DUFFY and McNEILLY, Justices.

McNEILLY, Justice:

Defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of murder in the first degree, 11 Del.C. § 636, ¹ and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal he raises nine contentions, including the propriety of exclusion of evidence of medical malpractice and maltreatment as an intervening cause of death in a murder case, which we will consider in this opinion. We affirm the conviction.

I.

Defendant spent the night of January 28, 1974, at the apartment of friends in Laurel. The following morning he and a friend, who was staying in the same apartment, got up at about 10:30 or 11:00 a. m., drank a half pint of ginger brandy together, and went to a sandwich shop. While there they met a group of workmen on their lunch hour, including the victim, Elmer Caudill, who were acquaintances of the defendant, exchanging greetings and some ordinary conversation.

Testimony of witnesses indicates that defendant acted in an abusive manner while in the sandwich shop, although no unpleasantness was directed toward the victim. The group left the shop together, the victim getting into the passenger side of a truck driven by one of the other workmen. Defendant then walked over to the driver's side of the truck, asked the driver whom he had with him, to which the driver responded, "I got Elmer Caudill." At this point defendant reached his hand across the driver's chest and shot the victim with a .25 caliber handgun.

An ambulance was called for the victim, but because it did not arrive quickly enough, one of the workmen took the victim to Nanticoke Memorial Hospital. The victim was admitted about 12:15 p. m., operated on about 1:33 p. m., and died about 31/2 hours later. According to the State Medical Examiner, the victim died of "irreversible shock due to a massive hemorrhage due to a gun shot wound that involved the aorta and the inferior vena cava as well as various other organs in his body."

At trial, the defendant asserted two primary defenses, (1) that the cause of the victim's death was medical malpractice or maltreatment rather than his acts, and (2) that he did not have the malice aforethought required for first degree murder because he acted while suffering from an epileptic seizure. The Trial Court prohibited proof of the first and the jury resolved the second against defendant.

II.

Defendant contends that he was denied his right to due process, a fair trial, and the Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf as a consequence of the Trial Court's refusal to permit him to introduce evidence relating to the malpractice of the physicians and maltreatment of the hospital personnel when this directly concerned the ultimate issue: the cause of death of the victim.

A.

Set forth in more detail, defendant asserts the following:

Defendant called as his witness Dr. Penserga, the physician in charge of the victim's treatment at Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, and subpoenaed Drs. Rosales and Cooper, who had participated in the treatment, for the purpose of establishing malpractice and maltreatment of the victim by the physicians and the hospital personnel. This testimony was offered to prove that defendant did not cause the death and to negative the element of "intentionally" causing death, which is required under 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(1) for a first degree murder conviction.

Dr. Penserga testified that, (1) a surgical procedure (splenectomy) which had been performed was omitted from the medical records, (2) the wording of the medical records had been changed prior to trial (superior to inferior vena cava), (3) other omissions were made from the record, (4) a mistake was made regarding a blood transfusion, and (5) he was mistaken as to the time of victim's arrival and the operation. Proof was also offered that the hospital delayed giving emergency medical treatment, and defendant asserted that there were other serious unspecified omissions from the surgical procedures undertaken.

The Trial Court struck the testimony of Dr. Penserga from the record and prohibited further testimony by defense witnesses on the issue of cause of death. Defendant asserts that this was error under Delaware law permitting proof that the cause of a victim's death was medical malpractice or maltreatment. See Quillen v. State, Del.Supr., 10 Terry 114, 110 A.2d 445, reh. denied, 10 Terry 163, 112 A.2d 848 (1955); State v. Johnson, Del. Oyer and Terminer, 6 W.W.Harr. 341, 175 A. 669 (1934); State v. Morahan, Del. Oyer and Terminer, 7 Pennewill 494, 77 A. 488 (1895).

B.

The Johnson and Morahan cases, supra, set forth the text of jury instructions, requiring that for medical malpractice or maltreatment to relieve a defendant of homicide liability, the malpractice or maltreatment must have been the sole cause of death. State v. Johnson, supra, at 670; State v. Morahan, supra, at 489. Stated conversely, if a wound, even if not mortal, is a causal factor in bringing about death, a defendant will be liable for homicide.

In Quillen v. State, supra, this Court failed to reach the question of the propriety of a charge given pursuant to Morahan, because the defense failed to present any evidence tending to show an independent cause of death. The victim in Quillen died suddenly of an embolism resulting from a skin graft necessitated by the wound received by the victim; there was no suggestion of maltreatment. The Court stated:

"In light of the undisputed facts, the difference of opinion upon the origin of the blood clot was wholly immaterial. A malady or disorder attributable to orthodox treatment of a wound is not in law an independent cause of death. If the death of the wounded person results from or in the course of treatment by medical men who follow the usual course of practice that good practitioners adopt in endeavoring to heal the patient, the person who has inflicted the wound is chargeable with the death." 110 A.2d at 454.

The rationale for the Quillen rule is that treatment is a natural and probable result of a wounding, and death is a probable incident of treatment; therefore, the defendant should be responsible for the natural consequences of his act. Id., quoting Wharton on Homicide § 199. The rule of Quillen is that where no malpractice or maltreatment is shown and usual procedures are followed, medical treatment will not be considered an intervening cause of death. Since there was no issue of malpractice or maltreatment in Quillen, the question presented by defendant is one of first impression for this Court.

The law of other jurisdictions comports with the rule of Johnson and Morahan. Generally, a defendant is liable for homicide even though subsequent malpractice or maltreatment is shown to be a causal factor in the death of the victim. See 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure §§ 201-02; 40 Am.Jur. Homicide § 19; 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 11, Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 769, Homicide: Liability Where Death Immediately Results from Treatment or Mistreatment of Injury Inflicted by Defendant. Where a defendant inflicts a wound calculated to endanger or destroy life, or a wound from which a victim would have died without treatment, he is usually liable for homicide even though the immediate or a contributing cause of death was erroneous or unskillful treatment by the victim or medical personnel. Ingram v. State, 29 Ala.App. 144, 194 So. 694, 695 (1939), cert. denied, 239 Ala. 244, 194 So. 694 (1940); Hall v. State, 199 Ind. 592, 159 N.E. 420, 426 (1928); see Wharton, supra, § 201; 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 11. The rationale for the rule is that negligent treatment is a foreseeable consequence of a wounding and therefore is deemed to be within the contemplation of a defendant when he acts. Wharton, supra, § 201; Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d at 773, § 2; see People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d 229, 187 P.2d 706 (1947); Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A.2d 291, 294 (1966) (defendant liable on "chain of causation" theory where victim of stabbing, suffering from hallucinations, the cause of which was disputed, removed a tube leading to his stomach allowing gastric juices to enter his lungs and resulting in death); State v. Tomasi, 137 Conn. 113, 75 A.2d 67, 70 (1950) (one who inflicts wound calculated to destroy life cannot escape liability for ensuing death by placing blame on carelessness of victim or unskillful treatment); King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1046 (1941); Baker v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 292 P. 82 (1930).

A limitation on the rule is generally recognized where a wound is not in itself mortal and the victim dies solely as a result of unskillful treatment. In such a case a defendant will not be liable for homicide. Wharton, supra, § 201; 40 C.J.S., supra; Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d at 786, § 7; State v. Jackson, Iowa Supr., 223 N.W.2d 229 (1974); State v. Myers, 59 Ariz. 200, 125 P.2d 441 (1942); Crews v. State, 44 Ga.App. 546, 162 S.E. 146 (1932); Hall v. State, supra, 159 N.E. at 426 n. 1; People v. Kane,213 N.Y. 260, 107 N.E. 655 (1915); Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn. 60, 157 S.W. 419 (1913).

We summarize and approve the rules of causation as follows: Where a wound is dangerous or calculated to destroy life, negligence, mistake, or lack of skill by treating medical personnel will not be an intervening cause of death and the person causing the wound will be liable for homicide. Where, however, a wound is not dangerous or calculated to produce death, and the victim dies solely as a result of improper or negligent...