Wright v. State Bd. of Engineering Examiners, 2--57795
| Citation | 250 N.W.2d 412 |
| Decision Date | 16 February 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 2--57795,2--57795 |
| Parties | Earl Otis WRIGHT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF ENGINEERING EXAMINERS, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Gary S. Gill, of Swift, Brown & Winick, Des Moines, for appellant.
David J. Grace, of Davis, Scott & Grace, Des Moines, and William Bartley, Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by MOORE, C.J., and MASON, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ.
The trial court sustained a certiorari challenge to the revocation of plaintiff's registration as a professional engineer by defendnat state board of engineering examiners. The determinative questions on appeal are whether the trial court erred in interpreting the statutory grounds of revocation and in holding the revocation was unsupported by substantial evidence. We reverse.
Registration of professional engineers and land surveyors in Iowa is regulated in Code chapter 114. At all times material here plaintiff Earl Otis Wright was a registered professional engineer. In 1972 written charges were filed against Wright with the board by Gary W. Nelson, alleging Wright was guilty of gross negligence, incompetence and misconduct in submission to city building inspectors of structural designs for buildings to be constructed in Iowa City and Dubuque. The charges were tried in a contested proceeding before the board in accordance with Code § 114.22.
The board held the evidence was insufficient to establish the charge in relation to the Iowa City design but did establish Wright was guilty of misconduct with respect to the Dubuque design. His registration as a professional engineer was revoked.
Wright subsequently challenged the legality of the revocation order in a certiorari proceeding in district court. He obtained a temporary stay of the order and, upon trial, the trial court sustained the writ. The principal grounds of the court's holding were that the board erred in not requiring a showing of gross misconduct as a ground for discipline and that the evidence before the board was insufficient to support revocation. These determinations are attacked in this appeal. The first question requires statutory interpretation and the second requires examination of the evidence before the board.
I. The statutory provision applicable here is § 114.21, The Code, 1971:
The board shall have the power by a four-fifths vote of the entire board to suspend for a period not exceeding two years, or to revoke the certificate of registration of, or to reprimand any registrant who is found guilty of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a registration, any fraud or deceit in his practice, Or any gross negligence, incompetence, or misconduct in his practice, or who has been found to have been convicted of any felony or any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. (italics added).
The italicized language is the same in the present code. See § 114.21, The Code, 1975.
The trial court interpreted the statute to require gross misconduct rather than lesser misconduct as a basis for discipline. In so doing, the court found the adjustive 'gross' modified the words 'negligence', 'incompetence' and 'misconduct', in the phrase 'any gross negligence, incompetence, or misconduct.'
Wright defends the court's interpretation by relying on the rule of Noscitur a sociis. Under this guide to interpretation the meaning of a word is ascertained in the light of the meaning of words with which it is associated. See State v. Bauer, 236 Iowa 1020, 20 N.W.2d 431 (1945). Wright contends only gross incompetence and gross misconduct have gravity equivalent to gross negligence, and he reasons that the legislature did not intend to authorize revocation of a professional engineer's registration on less serious grounds.
General principles of statutory interpretation are summarized in Iowa National Industrial Loan Company v. Iowa State Department of Revenue, 224 N.W.2d 437, 439--440 (Iowa 1974). Their purpose is to provide guidance in searching for legislative intent. The rule of Noscitur a sociis is simply one of any devices which are available to assist in that search. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.16 (Fourth Ed.1973). Applying these principles in the present case, we conclude the trial court erred in holding the statute requiries a finding of gross misconduct as opposed to ordinary misconduct as a ground for discipline. We believe the adjective 'gross' modifies only the negligence ground.
Permissible discipline under § 114.21 ranges from reprimand to revocation. It logically follows that grounds of discipline were intended to range from slight to serious breaches of professional duty. It is unlikely the legislature intended misconduct less than gross misconduct would not be subject to so much as a reprimand.
Examination of the ground of incompetence makes this even clearer. Under Wright's interpretation an engineer could not be disciplined for incompetence less than gross incompetence. We do not believe the legislature intended to absolve any professional engineers who are incompetent from the risk of discipline. By definition a professional engineer is required to be competent. § 114.2, The Code. Unless he is competent he is not to be registered. § 114.14, The Code. It would be inconsistent for the legislature to require a demonstration of competence as a prerequisite to registration but not to authorize discipline for a demonstration of incompetence after registration.
Application of the rule of Noscitur a sociis does not support Wright's contention. Incompetence and misconduct are breaches of professional duty at least as serious as gross negligence. Gross negligence is substantially greater than simple inadvertence but falls short of intentional wrong. Young v. City of Worcester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N.E. 204 (1925). Misconduct implies the willful doing of an act with a wrongful intention. It involves intentional wrongdoing. Mandella v. Mariano, 61 R.I. 163, 200 A. 478 (1938). Black's Law Dictionary 1150 (Fourth Ed.1968) defines misconduct as '(a) transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; * * *.' The same authority defines incompetency as '(l)ack of liability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty.' Id. at 609. Judging the meaning of the word 'misconduct' by its relationship to associated words in § 114.21, we do not believe it is limited to gross misconduct.
The trial court erred in holding otherwise.
II. In finding Wright was guilty of misconduct, the board relied on the following evidence. The building code of the City of Dubuque required roofs of buildings, whether flat or pitched, to be designed for a snow load of not less than 30 pounds per square foot of horizontal projection. This capacity is in addition to the weight of the roof itself, called dead load, and in addition to wind or other loads. No reduction in snow load capacity was authorized. The Dubuque building inspector at the time of these events was not a professional engineer.
In February 1972 Wright filed plans with the inspector for a pole building to be constructed for a Dubuque yacht club. On the first page of the plans, under a heading 'TRUSS DESIGN CRITERIA AND REFERENCES,' he showed:
LOADING: WIND -- 85 M.P.H., 25 psf.
SNOW -- 30 psf Zone II
DEAD -- 3.0 psf (Truss spacing
8'0" oc.)
Then he described the materials to be employed, references, a load test, and finally:
w equals 17.5 plus 3.0 or
20.5 psf.
* * * * * * * * Stapled to the second page of the plans as an addendum was a letter stating in part, 'This nailed and glued plywood gusset truss is designed for 30 lbs. per square ft. live snow load and 85 mph windload in accordance with the Iowa State University, Midwest Plan Service bulletin # TR--1.'
The Dubuque building inspector told Wright that any plans furnished under the certificate and seal of a registered engineer would be accepted. In fact, Wright's plans were so certified...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Kipf
...(1985); Third National Bank v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). See Wright v. State Bd. of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 1977). Each of the words in the phrase "indecent, lewd, lascivious, or obscene," found in the first prohibition of §......
-
Briggs v. Sterner
...the meaning of a particular word to be ascertained in light of those with which it is associated, Wright v. State Board of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Iowa 1977), the Court believes that the legislature intended to exempt only those experienced institutional investors who do......
-
Duncan v. Missouri Bd. for Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 52655
...extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care." This approach has been adopted by some courts. See Wright v. State Board of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 1977) ; Vivian v. Examining Board of Architects, etc., 61 Wis.2d 627, 213 N.W.2d 359 (1974) A second category of cas......
-
Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of Hamburg
...J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:16, at 355 (7th ed. 2007); accord Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Exam'rs, 250 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1977). For several reasons, we believe this is one of those occasions when the canon is not applicable. First, applicat......