Wright v. State, No. 05-03-01040-CR (TX 11/19/2004)
| Decision Date | 19 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-03-01041-CR.,No. 05-03-01040-CR.,05-03-01040-CR.,05-03-01041-CR. |
| Parties | ANTWONNE DEON WRIGHT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F-0250861-HIMTMTM and F-0301024-HM.
Affirmed.
Before Justices O'NEILL, LANG, and LANG-MIERS.
Antwonne Deon Wright, appellant, was indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, which were enhanced by a prior conviction. He appeals the jury's verdicts of guilty for aggravated robbery and a 40 year prison sentence for each count.
Before trial, appellant requested the trial court to sever his trial from that of Johnny Shanada Humphrey. The trial court overruled his request. Appellant and Humphrey were tried jointly as codefendants. During the trial, appellant objected to the admission of extraneous transactions and the trial court overruled his objection.
Appellant brings six issues on appeal, which essentially argue three points. First, appellant argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery. Second, appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of extraneous transactions. Third, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a severance from Humphrey's trial.
After reviewing appellant's claims, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient; appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of extraneous transactions and assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred, there was no harm; and appellant failed to preserve error based on the trial court's denial of his request for a severance and assuming, without deciding, that the trial court did err and that the error was not waived, there was no harm. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
Antonio and Aurelio Barsenas, brothers, returned to their apartment complex around 3:00 a.m. Antonio got out of the car and was standing next to the open passenger door when Humphrey suddenly appeared and put a gun to his head. Humphrey detained Antonio until appellant arrived and pointed his gun at Antonio. Then, Humphrey got into the car with Aurelio.
Appellant demanded Antonio's money. Antonio gave appellant his wallet, which contained his credit card, driver's license, and some personal papers. Appellant continued to insist that Antonio Also, appellant took Antonio's necklace and made him take off his shoes and socks. Appellant kicked Antonio and threw him to the ground.
Meanwhile, Humphrey got into the car, pointed his gun at Aurelio, and demanded that Aurelio give him the car keys, his wallet, and his money. Humphrey "pulled at" Aurelio, but Aurelio got out of the car. Humphrey went around the front of the car and grabbed Aurelio. Aurelio handed Humphrey his wallet, which contained three "antique" Mexican pesos and his credit cards. Humphrey demanded that Aurelio turn over his gold bracelet, but Aurelio did not understand Humphrey's demand until Antonio translated it into Spanish. Then, Aurelio complied. Humphrey told Aurelio to take off his shoes, he complied, and Humphrey hit Aurelio on the head with his gun.
Norma Hartfield pulled up in a tan, four-door Intrepid and yelled "Let's go, let's get out of here." Appellant and Humphrey got into the Intrepid and drove off. Aurelio ran after the Intrepid to try to get the license plate number. Then, the Intrepid reversed. Aurelio hid behind some boxes where the mail is placed. Apparently, because the assailants could not discover Aurelio's location, they left the apartment complex in the Intrepid. Antonio ran to the apartment he shared with Aurelio and called 9-1-1. He provided the 9-1-1 operator with a description of the suspects and the getaway car.
The police arrived at the apartment complex and found Antonio and Aurelio Barsenas waiting for them. One of the officers spoke to the Barsenas brothers in Spanish. That officer translated the Barsenas brothers' description of the suspects and the getaway car into English, and the other officer transmitted the information to the dispatcher by radio.
Meanwhile, Hartfield drove appellant and Humphrey to a nearby restaurant, but they decided to leave because it was too crowded. When they left, Humphrey drove the Intrepid rather than Hartfield.
Two police officers on patrol received information from the dispatcher regarding a possible car-jacking or robbery. The officers observed a tan, Dodge Intrepid that matched the description and was in the general area stated by the dispatcher. They activated their emergency lights and pursued the car. At the same time, another patrol car, which had received the dispatch, began pursuing the Intrepid. The Intrepid pulled over. Humphrey was in the driver's seat, Hartfield was in the front passenger seat, and appellant was in the back seat. As one of the police officers approached the Intrepid, he observed appellant making some hand movements near a crease in the back seat cushion. After stopping the Intrepid, the police officers received from the dispatcher additional information on the robbery and the description of the suspects. The police officers observed that appellant, Humphrey, and Hartfield matched the description of the robbers.
The police searched appellant and Humphrey. They found a gold necklace in appellant's left front pocket and a gold bracelet in Humphrey's left front pants pocket. The police searched Hartfield and found some "antique" pesos in her front shirt pocket, and $725, checkbooks, identification cards, and credit cards belonging to various other people in her purse. In the back of the Intrepid, the police found a driver's license and credit card laying on the backseat, and stuffed in the crease of the back seat the police found a check or bank card. None of the identification, credit cards, or checkbooks found belonged to appellant, Humphrey, or Hartfield. Also, the police found the guns used in the robbery hidden under the carpet in the trunk of the Intrepid. No drugs were found.
The police transported Antonio and Aurelio Barsenas to the location where the Intrepid was stopped. The Barsenas brothers identified appellant and Humphrey as the robbers. Later, the Barsenas brothers identified some of their stolen property among the items found by the police.
Appellant was indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, which were enhanced by a prior conviction for delivery of a simulated controlled substance. Humphrey was indicted for the same offense. Before the trial, the trial judge asked if appellant or Humphrey objected to being tried jointly as codefendants. Appellant objected and requested that the trial court sever his trial from Humphrey's trial. The trial court overruled appellant's objection.
After the State rested its case-in-chief, appellant indicated that he would testify and Humphrey indicated that he would not testify. Appellant did not reassert his request for a severance. Appellant testified in his own defense. After appellant testified, the State recalled one of the police officers as a rebuttal witness. The police officer testified to the items found in Hartfield's purse. Appellant objected to the testimony and the trial court overruled his objection.
At the conclusion of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the jury found appellant and Humphrey guilty of aggravated robbery. During the punishment phase, appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraphs. The jury sentenced appellant to 40 years of imprisonment for each count of aggravated robbery. Appellant appeals the final judgments convicting him of aggravated robbery.
In his first issue on appeal, appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery. The State responds that the evidence is factually sufficient to uphold appellant's convictions and that appellant's arguments are without merit because his testimony was "riddled with logical inconsistencies."
There is only one question to be answered by the reviewing court in a factual sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
A review of the evidence for factual sufficiency is guided by three principles. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). First, deference is given to the findings of the fact finder; the evidence will not be reweighed. Id. at 407. Second, a finding of factual insufficiency must be supported by a detailed explanation because the fact finder can accept witness testimony or reject it. Id. However, the existence of contrary evidence is not enough to support a finding of factual insufficiency. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Third, all of the evidence is viewed in a neutral light. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 481; see Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408; Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11; Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
The evidence weighed by the fact finder tending to prove the existence of the fact in dispute is compared to the evidence tending to disprove that fact. Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This standard is applied to both circumstantial and direct evidence. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Smith v. State, 895 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, pet. ref'd). Reversal for factual...
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