Wright v. State, A11A2262.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A11A2262.,A11A2262. |
| Citation | 723 S.E.2d 59,12 FCDR 451,313 Ga.App. 829 |
| Parties | WRIGHT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
12 FCDR 451
313 Ga.App. 829
723 S.E.2d 59
WRIGHT
v.
The STATE.
No. A11A2262.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jan. 31, 2012.
[723 S.E.2d 60]
Ashley Wedrell McLaughlin, McRae, for appellant.
Timothy Grady Vaughn, Dist. Atty., Joshua Wade Powell, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
PHIPPS, Presiding Judge.[313 Ga.App. 829] A jury found Tred Wright guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Wright appeals, asserting that the conviction was based upon improperly admitted similar transaction evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense charged. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,1 the record shows that on January 8, 2009 law enforcement officers received information from a reliable confidential informant that Wright would be transporting cocaine between McRae and Milan in a vehicle being driven by Wright's wife. A deputy with the Telfair County Sheriff's Office initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was traveling without a working tag light. Wright's wife was driving, [313 Ga.App. 830] Wright was in the front passenger seat and another passenger was in the back “passenger area.”
After speaking with Wright's wife about the tag light, the deputy asked her if she would consent to a search of the vehicle. She consented. The deputy found in the
[723 S.E.2d 61]
center console area between the driver and passenger area, “laying in the top of [a] purse,” a baggie containing a substance that was later determined to be 1.96 grams of cocaine. Wright had $1,572 cash in his pocket and wallet. All three occupants of the vehicle were arrested and charged in the case.
Wright's wife testified that the cocaine was not hers and that after the arrests Wright told her that he had placed the cocaine in her purse because the police were “not supposed” to search her purse. She testified that Wright told her that he wanted her “to take the charges for him because he was a repeat offender and [she] didn't have any charges.”
An investigator with the Oconee Drug Task Force testified that the other passenger had told him (after being advised of Miranda rights) that Wright told him he had placed the cocaine in his wife's purse, that the officers would charge her, and that he had “too many dope charges now.”
The sheriff's deputy testified that in his experience investigating drug cases, drugs in the quantity found would be possessed for sale or distribution rather than for personal use, as cocaine is typically purchased for personal use in an amount weighing less than a gram. The drug task force investigator similarly testified that, based on his knowledge and experience, the amount of cocaine found in the vehicle was indicative of distribution rather than personal use.
Regarding the similar transaction, at trial the sheriff's deputy testified that on August 22, 2009, he equipped a confidential informant with a hidden camera and money to purchase drugs; the informant left and returned with cocaine about 20 to 25 minutes later. The informant did not know the name of the person from whom he bought the drugs, but he described the seller and stated that he lived in McRae. The deputy viewed the videotape of the transaction and affirmed that he was “made aware of” the identity of the “individual” in the videotape, stating that two other officers identified the individual in the videotape as Wright. In connection with that incident, Wright was indicted for sale of cocaine, a charge that was pending at the time of trial.
1. Wright contends that the court erred in admitting at trial evidence of the August 2009 incident. He asserts that the court's decision to allow the evidence was based solely upon hearsay and the testimony of unreliable witnesses; he adds that the court improperly considered testimony regarding the similar transaction without requiring admission of the videotape depicting the transaction, and [313 Ga.App. 831] allowed the deputy's opinion regarding the meaning of the language used in the videotape. According to Wright, his conviction was the product of this improperly admitted similar transaction evidence.
(a) First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
The conduct of an accused in other transactions is generally irrelevant and inadmissible. Evidence of similar transactions may be admissible, however, contingent upon three affirmative showings: (1) the evidence must be admitted for a proper purpose; (2) there must be sufficient evidence to establish the accused committed the independent act; and (3) there must be a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.2
Before admitting similar transaction evidence the trial court must hold a hearing where the state bears the burden of showing that the evidence of similar transactions is admissible under the three-prong test.3 When reviewing the trial court's factual findings regarding whether the state satisfied the three-prong test, we apply the “clearly erroneous” standard. 4 The decision to admit
[723 S.E.2d 62]
similar transaction evidence which satisfies the three-prong test is within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.5
In this case, the state gave notice of its intent to introduce at trial evidence that Wright had sold cocaine to the confidential informant in August 2009; the purpose was to show Wright's course of conduct or intent.6 At the pre-trial hearing on the matter, the deputy and the confidential informant testified that the confidential informant had purchased cocaine from Wright in an undercover operation in August 2009. The court expressly found that the similar transaction was...
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