Wright v. State
| Decision Date | 04 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-00166 |
| Citation | 108 N.E.3d 307 |
| Parties | David WRIGHT, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Chris M. Teagle, Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 05A02-1610-CR-02397
Nearly a century ago, this Court adopted and applied the exclusionary rule to Indiana's jurisprudence. The rule provides: When, in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the State gains evidence by illegal means (i.e., an unreasonable search or seizure), it may not then use that evidence against the defendant. Through the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, we've extended the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence directly or derivatively obtained from the illegal conduct. This present case tests that rule's limits. Specifically, this case asks, as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, does an illegal seizure and search irreparably stain all derivative evidence the police gain afterwards, making it inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, or can the evidence be sufficiently separated from that primary taint to be admissible? In simpler terms, does the attenuation doctrine apply in Indiana constitutional law?
While the Court of Appeals previously confronted these questions—and split over the answers—they are novel questions for us that we answer today. We hold the attenuation doctrine can apply under the Indiana Constitution. Evidence found after an unreasonable search or seizure can become attenuated from that illegality, meaning the evidence itself or the circumstances in which the evidence was discovered were sufficiently distinguishable or separated from the search or seizure. In this particular case, we find the challenged evidence—the defendant's statements to law enforcement—were amply attenuated from the illegal search. We, therefore, affirm the defendant's child-molestation convictions.
Defendant David Wright lived with his best friend's young family in an apartment located at 220 East Water Street in Hartford City, Indiana. Wright and the family were home on the afternoon of Friday, January 22, 2016, when the FBI and Indiana State Police SWAT, in the course of a federal child pornography investigation, knocked on the door.
Based upon information that an IP address located and billed to 220 ½ East Water Street, Hartford City, Indiana, accessed known child pornography websites, FBI Special Agent Jeffrey Robertson secured a federal search warrant for the home. Upon arriving, Robertson realized the large home housed two smaller apartments, upstairs and downstairs units. The upstairs apartment's street address being 220 ½ East Water Street and the downstairs apartment's address being 220 East Water Street—Wright's residence.
While searching the upstairs apartment and seizing the computer equipment therein, Agent Robertson learned both apartments shared the same internet connection, all occupants knew the password, and all occupants used the connection. Rather than securing a second search warrant for 220 East Water Street and instead of having 220's occupants sign written consent forms he kept in his vehicle, Robertson gave 220's occupants (including Wright) two options: (1) verbally consent to a search of their computer equipment, surrender those devices that day, and receive them back quickly; or (2) leave the residence and stay away until he secured and executed another federal search warrant. 220's occupants (including Wright) verbally consented to the search, handed over their computers, and provided Agent Robertson with their usernames and passwords.
Agent Robertson seized the equipment and searched them over the weekend. The search—done by running software called OS Triage on the seized devices—revealed Wright's computer contained hash values matched to known child pornography images. Equipped with this information, Agent Robertson returned to the East Water Street apartments on Monday, January 25th, and released all the seized computer equipment, except Wright's.
When Wright inquired about his devices, Agent Robertson asked to speak with him privately, giving him the option of talking inside or outside the house. Wright chose to talk outside. Agent Robertson and Wright went to the former's car parked in front of the house. Agent Robertson sat in the driver's seat, Wright sat in the front passenger seat, and another officer sat in the backseat. Before beginning a conversation, Robertson told Wright the car was unlocked, and he could leave at any point. Agent Robertson informed Wright he was not under arrest.
After Wright indicated he understood those warnings, Agent Robertson confronted him with the search results. He asked Wright if he used the TOR network1 to search for child pornography and Wright answered affirmatively. Agent Robertson informed Wright that standard protocol required him to conduct a forensic interview with any children living in the home "just to make sure that no [sexual] contact has occurred." Wright then admitted having sexual contact with two children living in the home.
With this disclosure, Agent Robertson immediately stopped the interview, exited the vehicle, and phoned Hartford City Police to report what Wright just told him. The police asked Robertson to place Wright under arrest and take him to the station. Robertson returned to the car, informed Wright he was now under arrest, and handcuffed him. After transporting Wright to the Hartford City Police Department, Robertson handed Wright over to Detective Cody Crouse, but he stuck around to sit through the interview.
Detective Crouse read Wright the standard Miranda warnings. Wright signed a waiver form and agreed to talk to Crouse. During that interview, Wright admitted to repeatedly molesting two children, W.S. (age 11) and F.S. (age 4) over a year's span, with the most recent sexual contact occurring within the last two weeks.
The State charged Wright with four counts of Level 1 felony child molesting: two counts for the sexual contact with W.S. and two counts for the sexual contact with F.S.
Wright moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the FBI search and subsequent police interviews. Invoking the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, Wright alleged he'd been illegally detained and searched. Specifically, he argued he did not give valid consent to search his computers because Agent Robertson failed to inform him that he had the right to refuse consent. Following a hearing on Wright's motion, the trial court granted in part, and denied in part. Finding that Wright's consent to the search proved invalid under both the federal and state constitutions, the trial court suppressed evidence obtained from searching Wright's computer and electronic equipment. But the court denied suppression of Wright's statements to Agent Robertson and Detective Crouse, concluding they were sufficiently independent and attenuated from the illegal search.
Wright's incriminating statements were admitted during the subsequent bench trial. The court found Wright guilty as charged, and, after identifying aggravators and mitigators, imposed an aggregate sixty-year sentence. The court deemed Wright a sexually violent predator and a credit restricted felon.
Wright appealed, arguing the trial court erred by only partially granting his suppression motion and by admitting his statements to law enforcement. He also argued his sixty-year sentence proved inappropriate since he had no criminal history, he admitted his crimes, he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct, and he had been victimized as a child.
The Court of Appeals reversed Wright's convictions, holding the trial court improperly admitted Wright's confessions to Agent Robertson and Detective Crouse. Wright v. State , 92 N.E.3d 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The court focused its analysis on Article 1, Section 11, particularly whether Indiana's jurisprudence recognized the attenuation doctrine as an exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1131–33. It ultimately rejected the attenuation doctrine for Indiana. Id. at 1132–33.
Upon removing attenuation from its legal calculus, the court concluded: "[T]here is no dispute that Wright's incriminating statements to the officers on January 25, 2016, about touching the children directly resulted from or derived from the unconstitutional search and seizure of Wright's computers." Id. at 1133. The court deemed Wright's statements fruit of the poisonous tree and, therefore, inadmissible evidence. Id. Because the Court of Appeals reversed Wright's convictions, it did not address the parties' arguments about the appropriateness of Wright's sentence. Id.
The State sought transfer, arguing the Court of Appeals had divided over this issue. In order to resolve the split in authority, we granted transfer, thereby vacating this Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
The primary issue before us is whether Wright's statements to law enforcement constitute admissible evidence against him. The trial court answered that query in the affirmative and admitted the statements. Since decisions to admit or exclude evidence fall within the trial court's sound discretion, we afford those decisions deference and review them for an abuse of discretion. Guilmette v. State , 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). We will reverse a trial court's decision to admit evidence only if the decision was "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects [the defendant's] substantial rights." Id.
However, to the extent the issue of admissibility...
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