Heuring v. State

• Decision Date: 20 February 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-528
• Parties: Derek HEURING, Appellant (Defendant) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff)
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

140 N.E.3d 270

Derek HEURING, Appellant (Defendant)

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff)

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-528

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: November 7, 2019

Decided: February 20, 2020

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Michael C. Keating, Andrew C. Carroll, Law Offices of Steven K. Deig, LLC, Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Jesse R. Drum, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 19A-CR-140

Rush, Chief Justice.

Law enforcement secured a warrant to plant a small, inconspicuous GPS tracking device on Derek Heuring's Ford Expedition. The device gave officers regular location readings for about a week—until it abruptly stopped providing updates. Over the next ten days, the officers could not determine what happened. But then, after discovering that the tracker was no longer attached to Heuring's car, an officer obtained warrants to search Heuring's home and his father's barn for evidence of the device's theft.

We hold that those search warrants were invalid because the affidavits did not establish probable cause that the GPS device was stolen. We further conclude that the affidavits were so lacking in probable cause that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. Thus, under the exclusionary rule, the evidence seized from Heuring's home and his father's barn must be suppressed. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

In summer 2018, Warrick County Sheriff's Department Officers Matt Young and Jarret Busing believed that Derek Heuring was dealing methamphetamine. To monitor his movements for thirty days, Officer Young obtained a warrant to place one of the department's GPS tracking devices onto Heuring's Ford Expedition.

On July 13, Officer Young attached the device—"a plain black plastic box" with no markings. The officers received regular location readings for the next six days. But on the seventh day, they received a "final update" from the tracker, showing Heuring's car at his home. Three days later, the officers were still not receiving location information even though a battery reading showed the device was fully charged. So, Officer Young contacted a technician with the GPS device's manufacturer. The technician told him that "the satellite was not reading," which "could" have been caused by the device being "unplugged and plugged back in."

At some point over the next week, Officer Busing saw the vehicle in Heuring's father's barn, which he thought may be affecting the device's satellite reception. Then on July 30—ten days after receiving the final location reading—the officers twice drove by the barn and Heuring's home. They first saw the vehicle parked outside of the barn and later saw it parked outside of the home.

After seeing the car away from the barn, Officer Young again contacted a technician "to see if the GPS would track now." The technician informed him "that the device was not registering and needed a hard reset." Officer Young went to retrieve the device from the vehicle, but it was gone. Though Officer Busing was "aware" that a GPS device had previously become "disengaged from a vehicle by accident," that device "was able to be located" because it was still transmitting satellite readings.

Based on the above information, the officers believed the device had been stolen and was in either Heuring's home or his father's barn. So, Officer Busing filed affidavits for warrants to search each location for evidence of "theft" of the GPS device. A magistrate issued both search warrants; and within the next hour, law enforcement executed them.

While looking for the device, officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. Each search was stopped, and Officer Busing sought and obtained warrants to search the house and barn for narcotics. During those subsequent searches, officers located the GPS device, as well as additional contraband. Heuring was arrested and charged with several offenses.

Before trial, Heuring moved to suppress the seized evidence, challenging the validity of the search warrants under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Heuring argued that the initial search warrants were issued without probable cause that evidence of a crime—theft of the GPS device—would be found in either his home or his father's barn. After a hearing, the trial court denied Heuring's motion. On interlocutory appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Heuring v. State , No. 19A-CR-140, 2019 WL 3226992, at *1, *4 (Ind. Ct. App. July 18, 2019).

We granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

The trial court upheld the magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue two search warrants. We review the trial court's decision de novo, as it concerned the constitutionality of a search. Marshall v. State , 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019).

But we apply a deferential standard of review to the magistrate's probable cause finding, affirming if the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for making that decision. McGrath v. State , 95 N.E.3d 522, 527 (Ind. 2018). Our focus is "whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support" the finding. Query v. State , 745 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind. 2001). In making this determination, "we consider only the evidence presented to the issuing magistrate" and not post hoc justifications for the search. Figert v. State , 686 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind. 1997).

Discussion and Decision

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require search warrants based on probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Our General Assembly has codified this constitutional requirement in Indiana Code section 35-33-5-2, which specifies the information that must be included in an affidavit supporting a search warrant. See Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2 (2019). Though a "fluid concept," probable cause exists when the affidavit establishes "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 232, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

When a magistrate concludes that an affidavit establishes probable cause, we accord that determination great deference. United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). But this deference "is not boundless." Id. A search warrant issued without probable cause is invalid and thus the subsequent search illegal. Shotts v. State , 925 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ind. 2010). Under the exclusionary rule—unless an exception applies—evidence obtained both directly and derivatively from an illegal search must be suppressed. See Utah v. Strieff , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) ; Dolliver v. State , 598 N.E.2d 525, 527, 529 (Ind. 1992).

Heuring argues that the initial search warrants for his home and his father's barn were invalid because the accompanying affidavits failed to establish probable cause that a crime had been committed. He thus asserts that the seized evidence pursuant to both the initial search warrants and the subsequently issued warrants must be suppressed. The State disagrees, maintaining that the affidavits were supported by probable cause. Alternatively, the State contends that, even if the warrants were invalid, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, making suppression unnecessary.

We agree with Heuring. The initial search warrants were invalid because the affidavits did not supply probable cause that the GPS device was stolen. And because reliance on the invalid warrants was objectively unreasonable, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. Thus, all direct and derivative evidence obtained as a result of the invalid warrants must be suppressed.

I. The affidavits do not provide a substantial basis of fact from which a magistrate could find probable cause that the GPS tracking device was stolen.

A search warrant affidavit must include facts that show, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, a fair probability that a crime has been committed. See Gates , 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Put differently, the affidavit must link the object of the search with criminal activity. I.C. § 35-33-5-2(a)(1)–(2) ; see also Berger v. New York , 388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (observing that the purpose of the probable cause requirement is "to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed").

Here, the warrants authorized law enforcement to search Heuring's home and his father's barn for evidence of theft of the sheriff department's GPS tracking device. So, to establish probable cause, the affidavits needed to show a fair probability that someone (1) at least "knowingly" exerted "unauthorized control over property of another person" and (2) did so "with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use." I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a) (defining "theft").

The affidavits include the following facts, which the State maintains established probable cause that the device was stolen. The officers saw Heuring's car at his house and in his father's barn after the tracker stopped working. The officers knew that neither the battery nor the barn caused the device to stop working. And the officers did not believe the tracker had been accidentally dislodged for two reasons: first, Officer Busing was aware of a time when a similar device had become dislodged but was later found because it kept signaling; and second, a technician told Officer Young that the tracker "could have been unplugged and plugged back in to cause" the satellite to stop reading despite the fully charged battery.

As explained below, we disagree that ...