Wright v. Velocity Express, LLC
| Decision Date | 21 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 14-00751-BAJ-RLB |
| Parties | WARREN WRIGHT v. VELOCITY EXPRESS, LLC, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 18) filed by defendant TransForce, Inc. ("TransForce") and a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(6), or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17) filed by defendant Dynamex, Inc. ("Dynamex"). Plaintiff Warren Wright, Jr. ("Wright") filed oppositions, (Docs. 21, 20), and both defendants filed replies, (Docs. 26, 27). Also before the Court is Wright's response to the Court's Order (Doc. 44) to show cause as to the propriety of venue in this district. Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
This action arises out of the alleged injuries Wright sustained while unloading floor-loaded1 freight on March 4, 2013. (Doc. 42 at ¶3). Wright alleges that the employees of Velocity Express, LLC ("Velocity Express"), a Louisiana corporation, Dynamex, a Texas corporation, and TransForce, a Canadian corporation, improperlyloaded the freight without utilizing pallets to prevent shifting. (Id. at ¶¶4-5). Wright claims that TransForce, Dynamex and Velocity Express are a single business enterprise, and that Dynamex is a subsidiary of TransForce and the sole shareholder of Velocity Express. (Id. at ¶¶7-8, 20).
On March 12, 2014, Wright filed this action in the 18th Judicial District Court in West Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. (Doc. 1-2 at p. 1). On November 7, 2014, TransForce filed a Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction2 in state court seeking to be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 12). Before the state court held a hearing on the motion, the defendants jointly removed this action to federal court on December 4, 2014. (Doc. 1).
On February 4, 2016, TransForce and Dynamex filed the subject motions. (Docs. 17, 18). Thereafter, the Court granted Wright leave to amend his Complaint to address some of the deficiencies raised in the subject motions. (Doc. 41). On June 20, 2016, the Court ordered Wright to show cause as to why this matter should remain in the Middle District of Louisiana as the alleged injury occurred in Picayune, Mississippi. (Doc. 44). Wright timely filed a response to the order to show cause onJune 24, 2016. (Doc. 47). All relevant memoranda are filed and the Court shall now rule on all matters sub judice.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 determines the proper venue for a federal civil action. When all defendants do not reside in a single state, as is the case here, a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Wright's Amended Complaint alleges that venue is appropriate in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred here. (Doc. 42 at p. 1). It further alleges that Wright sustained injury while "unloading floor loaded freight that were improperly loaded . . . within the City of Port Allen." (Id. at p. 2). The Joint Pretrial Order clarifies that the freight was loaded in Port Allen and unloaded in Picayune, Mississippi, where Wright sustained injury. (See Doc. 39 at p. 15).
Due to the lack of clarity in the Amended Complaint, and the fact that the accident occurred outside of this judicial district, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of venue. (Doc. 44). See Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989) (). Thus, the issue before the Court is whether venue is proper in the location of the accident or where the alleged negligent acts occurred. Compare Harrison v. McDonald's Mgmt. Co., No. 1:10CV587 LG-RHW, 2011 WL 2036443, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2011) () with Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Water Cleaning Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. H-12-0665, 2012 WL 2133589, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2012) . The Court is mindful that "there can be more than one district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred." Owen v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys. LLC, No. CIV. A. 07-1565, 2008 WL 5539486, at *2 (W.D. La. July 11, 2008) (quoting Globe Glass & Mirror Co. v. Brown, 888 F. Supp. 768, 770 (E.D. La. 1995)).
Here, it is clear that significant occurrences happened in the Middle District of Louisiana and the Southern District of Mississippi, and that venue would be proper in both districts. Thus, the Court shall consider both the private interests and public interests in maintaining venue. The private interest factors include: "(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)). The public interest factors include: "(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law." Id.
Based on the private and public interests factors, the Court finds that there is a basis for maintaining venue in the Middle District of Louisiana. Of significance is the fact that a majority of the witnesses reside in Louisiana, and only one witness resides in Mississippi. (See Doc. 39 at pp. 27-38). Transferring this case to the Southern District of Mississippi would result in increased litigation costs and an unreasonable inconvenience to the parties and witnesses. Lastly, the Middle District of Louisiana has a localized interest in this matter as Wright is a Louisiana resident and the loading facility is located in this judicial district.
TransForce, a Canadian corporation, seeks to dismiss Wright's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 (Doc. 18-2 at ¶6). When a nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). "The Court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Id. (citing Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1979)). "When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, it must accept as truethe uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual conflicts." Id. In such circumstances, "the plaintiff need only present a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction to satisfy its burden." Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 2000)
In a diversity action, a federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent permitted by the applicable state law. Panda Brandywine v. Potomac, 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 13:3201, Louisiana's long-arm statute, courts are permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents consistent with the Louisiana State Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 791 So.2d 1266, 1270 (La. 2001). A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with the due process clause when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with that state and (2) the court's exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Wright contends that the Court has personal jurisdiction over TransForce pursuant to the single business enterprise theory. (Doc. 21 at p. 5). When two entities are a single business enterprise, or when one entity is an alter ego of another, the Fifth Circuit has instructed that "the jurisdictional contacts of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the . . . due process analysis."Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir. 2002)). Some of the factors considered when determining whether two entities are a single business enterprise include: "common ownership, directors and officers, employees, and offices; unified control; inadequate capitalization; noncompliance with corporate formalities; centralized accounting; unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations; one corporation paying the salaries, expenses, or losses of another corporation; and undocumented transfers of funds between entities." Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
To determine the existence of a single business enterprise, the Court will rely on the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and the evidence4 submitted by Wright. Wright's Amended Complaint alleges that TransForce, in conjunction with its...
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