Wright v. Wright

• Decision Date: 19 October 1901
• Citation: 87 N.W. 709,114 Iowa 748
• Parties: WRIGHT v. WRIGHT.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

114 Iowa 748

87 N.W. 709

WRIGHT

v.WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 1901.

Appeal from district court, Wapello county; Robert Sloan, Judge.

Plaintiff states as her cause of action, in substance, as follows: That on and prior to October 17, 1895, she was unmarried; that on April 18, 1894, she gave birth to a son, of whom Ed Wright, son of the defendant, was the father. That about October 17, 1895, the plaintiff and said Ed Wright entered into a written contract to marry, by which said Wright acknowledged said child as his son. That at the same time, and as a part of the same transaction, the defendant executed a contract in writing as follows: “I, E. H. Wright, father of Edward Wright, the party of the first part to the foregoing contract, hereby agree by and with Amy Leretta Thomas, the party of the second part, that if she shall marry said Edward Wright on this day, and perform the duties of a wife to said Edward Wright to the best of her ability, and said Edward Wright should forsake her or her child, Edward Wayne Wright, referred to in the foregoing contract, within five years from this date, or during said period should refuse or willfully neglect to properly provide for her and said child, then I will furnish a home for her and said child, and properly provide for her and said child, until five years from this date.” Plaintiff alleged that, in consideration of and in compliance with said contract, she married Ed Wright, and has ever since performed all the duties of a wife to him; that, notwithstanding, the said Ed Wright about January 1, 1897, forsook and abandoned her and said child, and ever since has refused and willfully neglected to provide for the plaintiff and said child and to live with plaintiff, though frequently requested to do so; that plaintiff notified the defendant that Ed Wright had forsaken her and said child and refused and willfully neglected to provide for them, and demanded that the defendant furnish them a proper and suitable home and support, which he refuses to do; that, because of the failure of said Ed Wright and of the defendant to provide for her and said child, the plaintiff has done so from January 1, 1897, to September 5, 1898, which was of the value of $7 per week, amounting to $652, for which she asks judgment. The defendant answered denying generally, and, upon trial had, verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $280 and costs. The defendant appeals. Affirmed.Steck & Smith, for appellant.

E. E. McElroy and W. S. Coen, for appellee.

GIVEN, C. J.

1. Appellant's first contention is that the contract sued upon is “void for want of consideration, and as being contrary to public policy.” It is said that the defendant derives no benefit, and that there was no consideration moving from the plaintiff to him. Plaintiff's promise was to marry, and to perform the duties of a wife to, the defendant's son. In 14 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.) 544, under title “Marriage Settlement,” it is said: “The consideration of such a contract may be any valuable consideration, reciprocal stipulations, or the marriage itself. Marriage is a consideration of the highest value, and any contract or promise which brings about or helps to bring about a marriage is binding when the marriage has taken place,” etc. In Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239, 90 Am. Dec. 106, it was held that “the consideration of marriage is a valuable consideration, and not only sustains covenants in favor of the wife and the issue of the marriage, but also covenants for settlements in favor of children of a former marriage as a moral consideration.” In 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 726, it is said: “If a person be induced to marry by the promise or covenants of a third party, the marriage constitutes a valuable consideration for it; and this whether the promise or covenants be made upon condition that the promisee or grantee shall marry any particular woman, or merely that he shall marry, without restriction upon his choice.” There was ample consideration for the promise of the defendant. This contract was not in restraint, but in encouragement, of marriage. In Greenh. Pub. Pol. 482, it is stated as the rule: “A contract to pay money upon, but not in consideration of, the marital infidelity of the promisor, is not invalid, when its object is to benefit the injured spouse.” In Wyant v. Lesher, 23 Pa. 338, A. gave a bond to his expectant wife's father, conditioned that he should “treat her as a loving and affectionate husband ought, and not desert her,” and if he should “maltreat, abuse, or desert her,” he and his surety would pay to her father the sum of $500 for the use of the wife and her heirs. The court said: “I see no more tendency in such a contract to disturb the harmony of conjugal life than in a marriage settlement, or in articles entered into after marriage, looking to a future separation. This husband stipulated simply for the performance of his duty, and a faithful discharge of that was the surest way to preserve peace in the family. Among the most imperative of the...