Wright v. Wright

• Decision Date: 09 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–14–0160.,S–14–0160.
• Citation: 2015 WY 37,344 P.3d 267
• Parties: Shannan Krietemeier WRIGHT, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Shawn Brice WRIGHT, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

344 P.3d 267

2015 WY 37

Shannan Krietemeier WRIGHT, Appellant (Plaintiff)

v.Shawn Brice WRIGHT, Appellee (Defendant).

No. S–14–0160.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 9, 2015.

Representing Appellant: Kenneth S. Cohen of Cohen Law Office, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Elizabeth Greenwood, Inga L. Parsons of Greenwood Law, LLC, Pinedale, Wyoming.

Guardian Ad Litem: Anne B. Ashley, Jackson, Wyoming. No appearance.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Shannan Krietemeier Wright (Mother) appeals from a divorce decree awarding Shawn Brice Wright (Father) primary residential custody of the parties' two year old daughter in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement. Mother also claims she qualifies for joint support and should not be required to both reimburse Father for visitation travel costs and pay retroactive child support. We affirm the decree in all respects except for the provision ordering Mother to pay retroactive child support; we reverse the latter provision.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The issues for our determination are:

1. Whether Father is estopped from claiming the settlement agreement is binding because he previously took the position it was not.

2. Whether the district court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement because the evidence did not show it was in the child's best interest.

3. Whether Mother's child support obligation should be calculated under the joint presumptive support provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20–2–304(c) (LexisNexis 2013).

4. Whether the district court erred in ordering Mother to both reimburse Father for travel costs and pay retroactive child support.¹

FACTS

[¶ 3] The parties were married in August 2011 in Jackson, Wyoming. Their daughter was born three weeks later. Mother filed a complaint for divorce in February 2012. Father filed an answer and counterclaim asserting he was the aggrieved party and seeking a divorce. The parties informally shared custody of the child after Mother filed for divorce.

[¶ 4] In April 2012, Mother's employment was terminated and she attempted suicide. She was involuntarily committed to the hospital. Father filed a motion for an ex parte emergency order awarding him temporary custody of the child. The parties stipulated to the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the district court entered an order pursuant to the stipulation. The parties subsequently stipulated to a temporary custody order pursuant to which they would have joint legal custody of the child, Father would have primary residential custody and Mother would have liberal visitation. The district court entered the stipulated order in May 2012.

[¶ 5] In November 2012, the district court entered an order pursuant to Father's motion requiring the parties to mediate and make a good faith effort to settle the divorce proceedings. The district court imposed a February 4, 2013, deadline. The parties met with a mediator in January 2013 in an effort to reach a settlement agreement. They signed a document entitled Terms of Settlement on February 15, 2013. The document provided: “These terms will be incorporated into a final binding settlement agreement and a Decree of Divorce.” As it relates to the issues on appeal, the document also provided:

4. Transportation. [Mother] shall bear the costs for transportation for L's visitation until such time as she begins to pay guideline child support. Thereafter, the parties shall share the responsibility and costs for transportation of L equally.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶ 6] Shortly after agreeing on the terms of settlement, Mother filed notice of her intent to relocate to Texas. Mother also filed a status report in April 2013 advising the district court that the parties had reached a settlement in February 2013, she had forwarded a copy to Father and Father had failed to respond. On July 2, 2013, the parties filed a joint status report stating that they were close to reaching a settlement, asking for two more weeks to complete the settlement and, in the event a settlement was not reached by July 17, 2013, asking the district court to set a scheduling conference.

[¶ 7] On July 18, 2013, Father filed a motion for scheduling conference stating the parties had been unable to reach a settlement on all issues. Two months later, Father filed a motion requesting the district court to enforce the “parties' February 15, 2013, settlement agreement.” Father asserted in this motion that the parties had reached an agreement and signed a document entitled “Terms of Settlement” on February 15, 2013. The document provided that the parties agreed to the essential terms of divorce, child custody and visitation and those terms would be incorporated into a final binding settlement agreement. Father stated the final agreement was not signed because the parties disagreed over the sentence requiring them to equally share the responsibility and cost for transporting the child back and forth between Texas and Wyoming. Father asserted that Mother had taken the position that the language requiring the parties to equally share the responsibility for transporting the child meant Father had to transport or make arrangements for someone else to transport the child to Texas for visits with her. Although Father indicated that he had taken the position during the settlement discussions that the language “share the responsibility” meant that he had to cooperate with Mother in arranging the transport, he now stated in his motion that he would agree to Mother's interpretation. More specifically, Father agreed to share responsibility for transporting the child to Texas for visitation with Mother, take responsibility for transporting the child either to or from the appropriate airport, and pay the cost of whoever accompanied the child until she was old enough to travel as an unaccompanied minor. Having made this concession, Father asked the district court to enforce the agreement the parties reached in February.

[¶ 8] Four days after Father filed his motion, the district court, without a response from Mother or a hearing, entered an order enforcing the parties' February 2013 agreement. The district court found that the parties had entered into a valid agreement, agreed to the terms and agreed that those terms would be incorporated into a settlement agreement. The district court concluded the disagreement concerning shared responsibility for transporting the child was not material to the essential terms of the agreement. Concluding that it had the inherent power to summarily enforce settlement agreements in order to promote the policy favoring settlement and avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation, the district court ordered the parties to execute a final settlement agreement and divorce decree in accordance with the terms of settlement and submit it for consideration.

[¶ 9] Two days later, Mother filed a motion asking the district court to set aside the order enforcing the settlement agreement. She contended the district court violated W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), which allows a party affected by a motion seeking determination of final rights twenty days to request a hearing. She also asserted the district court deprived her of due process by denying her the opportunity to be heard on the motion. She further maintained that Father was estopped from seeking enforcement of the agreement because he had repudiated the terms of settlement, pursued litigation and let seven months go by without seeking enforcement of the terms. Mother also set out in detail the many ways in which she had attempted to settle the matter while Father repudiated the agreement and pursued litigation.

[¶ 10] Also in her motion, Mother asserted a material change of circumstances had occurred since the February 2013 settlement discussions which the district court needed to consider before entering a final custody order. That is, unlike in February when she was unemployed, Mother now had a full-time job in Texas working days with access to quality child care and in close proximity to a strong family support system. Mother further asserted that she had taken full-time maternity leave and was the child's primary caretaker from the child's birth in August 2011 until December 2011, the parties then had shared custody at Father's insistence, she agreed to Father having temporary custody only from mid-April to mid-June 2012 when she was unable to care for the child, she had custody of the child nearly 50% of the time from mid-June of 2012 until moving to Texas in July 2013 and, during that same twelve month period, she had taken the child whenever the demands of Father's work schedule necessitated.

[¶ 11] The district court entered an order setting aside its order enforcing the parties' agreement and set the matter for hearing.² Mother then filed a response to Father's motion in which she asserted the terms of settlement signed in February 2013 did not establish a binding agreement and set out additional facts intended to show the parties had not reached a settlement and Father had repudiated any agreement. She also reiterated that a material change of circumstances had occurred and asked the district court to consider the best interests of the child and the parties' current circumstances in determining custody.

[¶ 12] At the hearing, Mother provided the only testimony. She testified that between February 2013 when the parties agreed on the terms of settlement and September 2013, Father refused to sign an agreement requiring the parties to share responsibility for the child's travel to and from Texas. She testified that Father subjected her to a seven hour deposition, subpoenaed her employment records, and caused her to incur substantial attorney fees. Over Father's objection that the testimony was not relevant to the narrow issue before the court, Mother also testified about her changed circumstances. After her testimony and the arguments of counsel, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: So what's the

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