Wrigley v. Greanias, 87-1623

• Decision Date: 13 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1623,87-1623
• Citation: 842 F.2d 955
• Parties: E. Irene WRIGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Basil G. GREANIAS, Individually and as State's Attorney in and for Macon County, Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 955

842 F.2d 955

E. Irene WRIGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Basil G. GREANIAS, Individually and as State's Attorney in and for Macon County, Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-1623.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 5, 1987.

Decided March 22, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1988.

Edward Booth, Greanies & Booth, Decatur, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Mitchell Schick, Harlan Heller, Ltd., Mattoon, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Basil Greanias, appeals from an order of the district court denying him qualified immunity. For the following reasons, we affirm that order.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

In the November 1980 election for State's Attorney of Macon County, Illinois, Basil G. Greanias, the Democratic candidate, defeated Robert Wrigley, the Republican candidate. Prior to the 1980 election, E. Irene Wrigley, the mother of Robert Wrigley, was chief secretary for the then incumbent State's Attorney, Patrick Walsh, a Republican who had not run for reelection. Mrs. Wrigley had been employed by Macon County since 1970 in numerous positions. She became chief secretary in 1978. Shortly after the 1980 election, Mr. Greanias terminated Mrs. Wrigley's employment. In a letter, Mr. Greanias advised Mrs. Wrigley that he considered her position to be "one involved in the policies of the office, and one which requires a close rapport" with the State's Attorney. R. 27 (letter attached to affidavit of Irene Wrigley). Mr. Greanias did not disparage Mrs. Wrigley's work performance in any manner. Indeed, he stated in the letter that "[i]t has been my observation and it is generally known that you are [a] capable, hardworking and well-trained legal secretary." Id. Upon being fired, Mrs. Wrigley filed the present lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. She sought damages on the ground that her discharge was constitutionally improper because it was based solely on her political affiliation with the Republican party. ¹

B. Procedural History

This is the third motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Mr. Greanias, in this lawsuit. Mr. Greanias first filed a motion for summary judgment in which he asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), which the district court did not act on until the day of trial. R. 17. On the morning of trial, the parties met with the district judge in his chambers. At this time, the judge cancelled the trial on his own motion because he believed that the question of whether the plaintiff's position was a protected one under the Constitution was one of law for the court rather than the jury to decide. Accordingly, the district judge ordered the defendant to file a motion for summary judgment on the question of whether the plaintiff's position was constitutionally protected. At the same time, the district judge denied without opinion the defendant's previously filed motion for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity defense. See Wrigley v. Greanias, No. 86-2101, docket order (C.D.Ill. Mar. 12, 1984).

The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the question of whether the plaintiff's position was constitutionally protected. R. 20, 25. After reviewing the various affidavits and depositions submitted by both sides, the district court concluded that the termination was unquestionably politically motivated. ² Wrigley v. Greanias, No. 82-3109, order at 2 (C.D.Ill. Dec. 5, 1984); R. 38 at 2. However The plaintiff appealed from the district court's order granting the defendant's second motion for summary judgment. In an unpublished order, this court reversed. This court held that the district court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Wrigley was a confidential employee. Wrigley v. Greanias, No. 85-1206, order (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 1986) [787 F.2d 595 (table) ] [hereinafter Order of Mar. 3, 1986]; R. 47. In evaluating the factual evidence, the district court had erroneously credited Mr. Greanias' rather than Mrs. Wrigley's version of the chief secretary's job description. Such judicial weighing of the evidence, the court noted, is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 6. In view of the conflicting evidence submitted by the parties and the inferences which could be drawn therefrom, the court concluded that a material issue of fact remained as to whether Mrs. Wrigley was a confidential employee who could be discharged for political reasons. Id.

                the court went on to find that Mrs. Wrigley's position was one that "facilitates the policy making [of the State's Attorney's office] and administrates [sic] its creation."    Id. at 6.  Therefore, the court held that the termination did not, as a matter of law, violate any of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights, and it granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
                

Mr. Greanias then filed his third motion for summary judgment. In this motion, he raised the issue of qualified immunity for a second time. Because the court had not given a reasoned opinion for its earlier decision denying the defendant's first motion seeking summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, the district court readdressed the issue. Wrigley v. Greanias, No. 86-2101, order at 2 (C.D.Ill. Mar. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Order of Mar. 20, 1987]; R.61 at 2.

C. Opinion of the District Court

On the authority of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), the district court determined that the law surrounding politically motivated firings was settled and clearly established at the time of the plaintiff's discharge. Order of Mar. 20, 1987 at 4. Consequently, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity under the Harlow doctrine. The court determined that the only uncertainty in the case involved whether the plaintiff was a confidential employee whose party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of her job, and who thus could be terminated under Branti without violating the Constitution. Id. at 5. It had already been decided on appeal that this uncertainty constituted a disputed question of fact which should be resolved at trial by the jury. Id. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. ³ The defendant now appeals from this order of the district court.

II

DISCUSSION

The standard for determining when a public official is entitled to qualified immunity is set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). There, the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. After the district court ruled in this case, the Supreme Court refined the Harlow formula by emphasizing that the right allegedly violated may not be asserted at any level of generality. Rather,

the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly established" in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.

Anderson v. Creighton, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 532 (1987) (citation omitted).

What is important, in the final analysis, is "whether the legal norms governing [the government official's] behavior were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions." Wade v. Hegner, 804 F.2d 67, 71 (7th Cir.1986) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). We often refer to closely analogous case law, decided before the public official acted or failed to act, to determine whether such legal norms existed at the pertinent time. Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883, 887 (7th Cir.1986); Lojuk v. Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 822, 88 L.Ed.2d 795 (1986). Of course, "[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful...." Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. However, it must be "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates" such a clearly established right. Id.

The district court was certainly correct on one level of generality when it stated that "the law surrounding politically motivated firings was settled and clearly established at the time of the plaintiff's discharge." Order of Mar. 20, 1987 at 4. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), establish that the first and the fourteenth amendments protect public employees from being discharged solely because of their political beliefs and affiliations unless "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1295. However, the inquiry does not end here. Mr. Greanias would be entitled to qualified immunity if, at the time he acted, the law did not clearly establish that a state's attorney was prevented from discharging someone holding this particular position.

In defining the position, we must keep in mind that "[t]here is no question that a new officeholder can revamp the...