Wriston v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20-cv-00614 |
| Parties | JANICE WRISTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the Court is Defendant West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources' (“DHHR”) Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons more fully explained below, the motion is GRANTED. Defendants DHHR and Child Protective Services are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant Sorrent is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This action arises from the alleged neglect and abuse of a minor child, R.B., resulting in her tragic and untimely death. The following allegations are drawn from the Complaint. (ECF No 1.) The Plaintiff, Janice Wriston (“Plaintiff”) is the administratrix of the Estate of R.B., who was eight years old when she passed away. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was the biological mother of R.B. (Id. at ¶ 7.) In or around February 2013, R.B. “was placed in the home” of two individuals, Marty Browning and Julie Titchenell. (Id. at ¶ 21.) During the calendar year of 2018, R.B. was the subject of “multiple abuse and neglect reports” made to Defendants DHHR, Child Protective Services (“CPS”), and Joseph Sorrent (“Sorrent”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Among these reports, some made by “mandatory reporters” as defined by W.Va. Code § 49-2-803, included that R.B. was in the “care, custody, and control of individuals unfit to provide her care, ” and that she was “beaten by wooden and metal objects, starved, forbidden to drink water, and forced to wear a diaper and sleep on the floor.” (Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Oak Hill, West Virginia, Police Department conducted an investigation, but that investigation was “hampered by a lack of cooperation by the Defendants” through the untimely and incomplete submission of records. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff additionally alleges that Defendants “willfully and recklessly falsified records to hide the abuse of R.B.” (Id. at ¶ 27.)
R.B. suffered cardiac arrest on December 26, 2018, and local authorities were called to the hospital. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that R.B.'s “body had multiple bruising and abrasions as a result of assault/molestation.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]t the time [R.B.] was pronounced dead, she suffered cardiac arrest caused by unspecified respiratory arrest.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that an “[i]nvestigation in this matter revealed that the home was manifestly unfit for R.B. care.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants' “actions and inactions and conduct . . . ultimately resulted in the death of the said R.B.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) Defendants allegedly “failed to properly investigate and inspect the dangerous, unfit and unsafe living conditions that existed in the home . . . and failed to ensure that the home was safe, fit and suitable for children[.]” (Id. at ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff initiated this suit in this Court on September 17, 2020. (Id.) Plaintiff brings the following eight causes of action, presumably against each Defendant: (1) violations of the 8th Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2) violations of the Child Welfare Act and “federal law” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; (3) violations of the Child Welfare Act; (4) per se violation of the Child Welfare Act; (5) negligence; (6) gross negligence; (7) outrage; and (8) negligent hiring/supervision. (Id. at 6-15.)
On November 23, 2020, DHHR filed the instant motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 6), along with a Motion to Stay Discovery, (ECF No. 9), as DHHR raised several immunity claims that it argued were dispositive of this action. Plaintiff filed her response in opposition on December 18, 2020. (ECF No. 14.) DHHR did not file a reply. Then, on May 24, 2021, this Court ordered additional briefing by the parties on the issue of sovereign immunity and whether provisions in an insurance policy could waive immunity. (ECF No. 24.) The parties were given until June 7 to file their briefs, and June 14 should they wish to file any response. (Id.)
Defendant DHHR filed its brief on the issue of sovereign immunity on June 7, 2021. (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff filed her brief on June 8, 2021, beyond the deadline ordered by the Court. (ECF No. 36.) Then, without leave of Court, Plaintiff filed an “Amended Memorandum” on June 14, which served to “supersede” her original brief. (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum totals 26 pages in length, well beyond the limit proscribed by Rule 7.1(a)(2) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. DHHR, understandably, then filed a reply on June 21, (ECF No. 38), and renewed its motion to stay discovery. (ECF No. 39.) On July 20, this Court granted the motion to stay discovery, pending resolution of the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 45.) With the briefing on this motion complete, it is now ripe for adjudication.
“Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Haley v. Virginia Dep't of Health, No. 4:12-cv-00016, 2012 WL 5494306, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2012). Therefore, “[i]t is axiomatic that a court must find it has jurisdiction before determining the validity of any claims brought before it.” Price v. West Virginia Air Nat'l Guard, 130th Airlift Wing, Civ. Action No. 2:15-cv-11002, 2016 WL 3094010, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. June 1, 2016). Whether a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party or by the court, sua sponte, at any point in the litigation. Domestic Violence Survivor's Support Group, Inc. v. Crouch, Civ. Action No. 2:18-cv-00452, 2020 WL 59949897, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 7, 2020). If, at any point, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the claim must be dismissed. Id. “The burden of showing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction rests on the plaintiff.” Adkins v. United States, 923 F.Supp.2d 853, 857 (S.D. W.Va. 2013).
While the Fourth Circuit has not yet resolved “whether a motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment is properly considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), ” the trend has been to treat the assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity as motions under Rule 12(b)(1). Haley, 2012 WL 3094010 at *2, n.2 (citing Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 525 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000)). “Challenges to jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be raised in two distinct ways: ‘facial attacks' and ‘factual attacks.'” Adkins, 923 F.Supp.2d. at 857. A “facial attack” questions whether “the allegations of the complaint are facially [ ]sufficient to sustain the court's jurisdiction.” Price, 2016 WL 3094010 at *2 (quoting Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 401 n.15 (4th Cir. 1986) (Murnaghan, J., concurring)). Thus, in reviewing a facial attack brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a “court must accept the allegations as true and proceed to consider the motion as it would a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Id.
A pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) () (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint “must be sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Well-pleaded factual allegations are required; labels, conclusions, and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) .
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[ ] veracity” of the complaint's “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Review of the complaint is “a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged.” Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DHHR raises several arguments for the dismissal of...
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