Wrobel v. Gen. Accident, Fire Life Assur. Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 October 1934
• Parties: WROBEL v. GENERAL ACCIDENT, FIRE life assur. corporation/, LIMITED.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

288 Mass. 206

192 N.E. 498

WROBEL

v.GENERAL ACCIDENT, FIRE life assur. corporation/, LIMITED.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Oct. 25, 1934.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; W. A. Burns, Judge.

Action of contract upon a policy of accident insurance by Anthony Wrobel against the General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Limited. Finding for the plaintiff in the sum of $680.99, and plaintiff saved exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

E. A. Ryan, of Worcester, for plaintiff.

S. B. Milton, of Worcester, for defendant.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This case comes before us on the exceptions of the plaintiff, who seeks to recover upon a policy of accident insurance. The trial judge made these findings: The defendant issued to the plaintiff a policy of accident insurance. The plaintiff suffered an injury solely through external, violent and accidental means on March 27, 1931. That injury consisted in the fracture of the middle phalangesof the index and second fingers of the right hand. The occupation of the plaintiff was draw-frame spinner and operator. Three weeks after this there appeared on his right wrist a bunch termed a neurofibroma. For its removal two operations were performed, the first in September, 1931, and the second in November, 1932. The median and ulna nerves were affected and at the time of the trial the fingers which were broken were stiff, the thumb was affected and the plaintiff was unable to perform the work of a draw-frame operator and spinner. The accident did not cause, nor have causal relation to, the neurofibroma. The injury totally disabled the plaintiff for six months and partially disabled him for an additional six months. A general finding was made for the plaintiff and damages in accordance with the policy were assessed on the basis of the findings.

The chief controversy at the trial appears to have been whether the neurofibroma resulted from the injury which broke the fingers, or from an independent cause. The testimony on this point came chiefly from physiclans on this point came chiefly from physicians The trial judge examined the right hand of the plaintiff. There was evidence that the fractures of the fingers were comminuted and not compound and did not extend into the joint, and that there was no surface disturbance or injury.

These findings mean that the condition of inability of the plaintiff at the time of the trial and for a period subsequent to six months immediately following the injury to perform the work of his employment was not due to the accident but was due to the neurofibroma, which appeared three weeks after the accident and had no causal connection with the accident. Since this is an action at law, these findings must stand and be accepted as true provided there is any evidence to support them. Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 143, 140 N. E. 803.

The defendant by its policy of insurance described the plaintiff as a ‘Draw-frame operator, and Spinner by occupation.’ Other parts of the policy material to the presentexceptions are these: ‘Part 1-The Insuring Clause. This policy insures against-(1) the effects resulting directly and exclusively of all other causes, from bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy solely through External, Violent and Accidental Means (excluding suicide, sane or insane), said bodily injury so sustained being hereinafter referred to as ‘such injury.” ‘Part 3-Monthly Indemnity. Total Disability. Sec. (a). If ‘such injury’ alone shall from date of the accident wholly and continuously disable the Insured from performing any and every duty pertaining to his occupation, the Corporation will pay for the continuous period of total loss of time caused thereby, accident indemnity at the rate per month specified in Part 1; Partial Disability. Sec. (b) Or, if ‘such injury’ shall not from date of the accident wholly disable the Insured but shall within sixty days thereafter wholly disable him, or shall, commencing on date of the accident or immediately following total loss of time, prevent him from performing work substantially essential to the duties of his occupation, the Corporation will pay for the continuous period of loss of time caused thereby, not exceeding six consecutive months, one-half of said Monthly Accident Indemnity.'

The plaintiff excepted to the refusal of the trial judge to grant certain requests for rulings and findings of facts, to the granting of one request for ruling presented by the defendant,and to the inadequacy of the damages awarded.

The denial of these requests, so far as they ask for findings of fact, presents no question of law. A trial judge in an action at law is not required to pass upon such requests. His duty is to pass upon relevant requests for rulings of law and to decide the case. Davis v. Boston Elevated Railway, 235 Mass. 482, 494, 495, 126 N. E. 841.

The clauses quoted from the policy are parts of a single contract. They are to be construed as constituting a contract between the parties intended to be a complete and harmonious instrument designed to accomplish a reasonable end. Every word and phrase must be presumed to have been employed with a purpose and be given meaning and effect whenever practicable. Clark v. State Street Trust Co., 270 Mass. 140, 155, 169 N. E. 897.

The insuring clause in express and indubitable words confines the liability of the defendant to such consequences as come to the plaintiff ‘directly and...