Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station

• Decision Date: 12 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 12144,12144
• Citation: 556 P.2d 859,97 Idaho 900
• Parties: Chester G. WROBLE, Claimant-Appellant, v. BONNERS FERRY RANGER STATION, Employer, and Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 859

556 P.2d 859

97 Idaho 900

Chester G. WROBLE, Claimant-Appellant, v. BONNERS FERRY RANGER STATION, Employer and Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 12144.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 12, 1976.

Marshall C. Aungier, Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., Coeur d'Alene, for claimant-appellant.

Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., and Donald L. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendants-respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission in which claimant was denied unemployment compensation benefits because he was discharged for misconduct. We reverse.

In September of 1974 claimant-appellant Chester Wroble applied for a position as a surveyor's aide with the U. S. Forest Service office in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. In June of 1975 when he checked with that office he was told that his application 'had been rendered inactive or destroyed' and that he would have to file a new application. He was also told that while the Coeur d'Alene office had no openings, the Bonners Ferry and Avery offices had employment openings. He obtained two additional applications for filing with Bonners Ferry and Avery. At about 3 o'clock p. m. on June 5, Wroble was told in a telephone conversation with the Bonners Ferry office the deadline for applications there was the following day, June 6, 1975, at 4 o'clock p. m.

The application forms were the same as he had previously filed at the Coeur d'Alene office. Those forms required a complete employment history from age 16 and contained the following admonition:

'It is important that you answer all questions on your statement fully and accurately; failure to do so may delay its consideration and could mean loss of employment opportunities.'

Wroble filled out the application for filing with the Bonners Ferry office and sent it by special delivery mail to Bonners Ferry on either June 5 or June 6. In that application Wroble provided only prior employment history relating to recent Idaho employment and jobs that he deemed relevant to the surveyor's aide position. However, he had worked in many short time jobs in several states in the past which included three federal positions. He omitted from the Bonners Ferry application information relating to 10 or 15 of those positions and included in those omissions were all federal positions. Among those federal positions was a two-week employment at a post office in 1969 from which, according to employment records and although disputed by Wroble, he was discharged for being absent without leave.

On June 9, Wroble submitted an application form to the Avery office which was concededly complete in all respects except for what the Commission found was the inadvertent omission of the previous post office employment.

On June 16, Wroble was hired by the Bonners Ferry office but after two weeks employment it was discovered that Wroble had not included all previous employment on his application form. Wroble was informed that he would be terminated but that if he resigned and reapplied, his work record would not be affected. Therefore he submitted his resignation but later received notice from the Coeur d'Alene office stating that he was discharged 'due to falsification of a government document.'

Wroble filed for unemployment compensation benefits which were denied and upon appeal an examiner found that although there was a 'discharge', nevertheless it resulted from his own 'misconduct.' The appeals examiner concluded that Wroble's omission of previous employment data was a deliberate violation of an employer's rule and thus misconduct. That decision was affirmed on appeal to the Industrial Commission and this appeal results. I.C. § 72-1366(e) provides:

'the personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant (for unemployment benefits) are that * * * (his) unemployment is not due to the fact that he left his employment voluntarily without good cause, or that he was discharged from misconduct in connection with his employment.'

We note initially that we are dealing here with a discharge from employment and not a voluntary resignation. Both the appeals examiner and the Industrial Commission found on the basis of substantial evidence that Wroble's resignation was involuntary and in effect constituted discharge. Also we find no issue in the fact that Wroble's actions preceded actual employment. The statute expressly states that misconduct is cognizable if arising 'in connection with employment.' Although not all prior conduct would qualify as misconduct under I.C. § 72-1366(e), here the conduct although preliminary, was inextricably linked with the employment relationship and thus we hold it was conduct arising in connection with employment.

Misconduct within the meaning of I.C. § 72-1366(e) has been generally defined as '* * * wilful, intentional disregard of the employer's interests; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.' Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., 91 Idaho 312, 317, 420 P.2d 795, 800 (1966) (emphasis supplied). The respondent points to no decisions of this Court concerning an interpretation of violation of the employer's rules as constituting misconduct within the meaning of the statute unless the violation also was violative of the employer's interest. Prior cases of this Court have involved misconduct as being disregard of the employer's interests or disregard of the standards of behavior. See, Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957); Watts v. Employment Security Agency, 80 Idaho 529, 335 P.2d 533 (1959); Rasmussen v. Gem State Packing Co., 83 Idaho 198, 360 P.2d 90 (1961); Custom Meat Packing Co. v. Martin, 85 Idaho 374, 379 P.2d 664 (1963); O'Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Idaho 313, 404 P.2d 600 (1965); Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., supra; Alder v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 92 Idaho 506, 446 P.2d 628 (1968); Levesque v. Hi-Boy Meats, Inc., 95 Idaho 808, 520 P.2d 549 (1974).

We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting I.C. § 72-1366(e) nor do we construe our opinion in Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., supra, to require that any violation of any rule of an employer will, per se, constitute misconduct such as will result in the denial of unemployment compensation benefits upon discharge. While an employer may make almost any kind of a rule for the conduct of his employees and under some circumstances may be able to discharge an employee for violation of any rule, such does not, per se, amount to 'misconduct' constituting a bar to unemployment compensation benefits.

Here, if misconduct there was, it came from the claimant's nonconformance with the letter of the rule enunciated by the employer. Here, there appears to be no deliberate violation of the spirit of the rule.

The Industrial Commission found that claimant had inadvertently omitted from his applications a temporary two-week employment with the post office in 1969. The record indicates no substantial controversy as to whether claimant was voluntarily or involuntary terminated from that employment. The Industrial Commission further found that Wroble was constrained by the pressures of the deadline in submitting his application to the Bonners Ferry office for action by the following day. There is no contention but that the 1974 application to the Coeur d'Alene office and the 1975 application to the Avery office contained complete employment...